Connexin 43 expression in human hypertrophied heart due to pressure and volume overload

Left ventricular hypertrophy (LVH) is due to pressure overload or mechanical stretch and is thought to be associated with remodeling of gap-junctions. We investigated whether the expression of connexin 43 (Cx43) is altered in humans in response to different degrees of LVH. The expression of Cx43 was analyzed by quantitative polymerase chain reaction, Western blot analysis and immunohistochemistry on left ventricular biopsies from patients undergoing aortic or mitral valve replacement. Three groups were analyzed: patients with aortic stenosis with severe LVH (n=9) versus only mild LVH (n=7), and patients with LVH caused by mitral regurgitation (n=5). Cx43 mRNA expression and protein expression were similar in the three groups studied. Furthermore, immunohistochemistry revealed no change in Cx43 distribution. We can conclude that when compared with mild LVH or with LVH due to volume overload, severe LVH due to chronic pressure overload is not accompanied by detectable changes of Cx43 expression or spatial distribution.

Irrational Beliefs and Psychological Distress: A Meta-Analysis

Background: Since the cognitive revolution of the early 1950s, cognitions have been discussed as central components in the understanding and treatment of mental illnesses. Even though there is an extensive literature on the association between therapy-related cognitions such as irrational beliefs and psychological distress over the past 60 years, there is little meta-analytical knowledge about the nature of this association. Methods: The relationship between irrational beliefs and distress was examined based on a systematic review that included 100 independent samples, gathered in 83 primary studies, using a random-effect model. The overall effects as well as potential moderators were examined: (a) distress measure, (b) irrational belief measure, (c) irrational belief type, (d) method of assessment of distress, (e) nature of irrational beliefs, (f) time lag between irrational beliefs and distress assessment, (g) nature of stressful events, (h) sample characteristics (i.e. age, gender, income, and educational, marital, occupational and clinical status), (i) developer/validator status of the author(s), and (k) publication year and country. Results: Overall, irrational beliefs were positively associated with various types of distress, such as general distress, anxiety, depression, anger, and guilt (omnibus: r = 0.38). The following variables were significant moderators of the relationship between the intensity of irrational beliefs and the level of distress: irrational belief measure and type, stressful event, age, educational and clinical status, and developer/validator status of the author. Conclusions: Irrational beliefs and distress are moderately connected to each other; this relationship remains significant even after controlling for several potential covariates.

Descriptive/Inferential Cognitive Processes and Evaluative Cognitive Processes: Relationships Among Each Other and with Emotional Distress

We aimed to delineate key constructs from two forms of cognitive-behavioral therapy: cognitive therapy and rational-emotive behavior therapy. Furthermore, we aimed to investigate the interrelations among each other and with emotional distress. The key constructs of the underlying theories of these therapies (i.e., descriptive/inferential beliefs, evaluative beliefs) are often treated together as distorted cognitions and included as such in various scales. We used a cross-sectional design. Seventy-four undergraduate students (mean age = 24.68) completed measures of automatic thoughts and emotional distress. Three therapists trained in cognitive-behavioral therapy divided automatic thoughts into descriptive/inferential beliefs and evaluative beliefs by consensus. Correlation and mediation analyses were performed. These constructs showed medium to high associations to each other and to distress. The relationship between descriptive/inferential beliefs and distress was mediated by evaluative beliefs. Descriptive and inferential cognitions may not produce emotions without first being appraised in terms of personal relevance.