Participation in Further Education over the Life Course: a longitudinal study of three birth cohorts in the Federal Republic of Germany

In this paper we address the issue of who is most likely to participate in further training, for what reasons and at what stage of the life course. Special emphasis is given to the impact of labour-market policies to encourage further education and a person's individual or cohort possibilities to participate in further education. We apply a Cox proportional hazard model to data from the West German Life History Study, separately for women and men, within and outside the firm. Younger cohorts show not only higher proportions of participation in further education and training at early stages of the life course, they also continue to participate in higher numbers during later stages of the life course. General labour-force participation reduces and tenure with the same firm increases the propensity to participate in further education and training. Contrary to expectations, in Germany labour-market segmentation has been enhanced rather than reduced by further education and training policies, since in the firm-specific labour-market segment, i.e. skilled jobs in large firms, and in the public sector both women and men had a higher probability of participation. Particularly favourable conditions for participation in further education outside the firm prevailed during the first years of the labour promotion act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) between 1969 and 1974, but women did not benefit to the same extent as men. Training policies are, therefore, in need of continuous assessment based on a goal-achievement evaluation to avoid any unintended effects of such policies.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.