Measuring Consumers' Willingness to Pay. Which Method fits best?

Gauging the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) of a product accurately is a critical success factor that determines not only market performance but also financial results. A number of approaches have therefore been developed to accurately estimate consumers’ willingness to pay. Here, four commonly used measurement approaches are compared using real purchase data as a benchmark. The relative strengths of each method are analyzed on the basis of statistical criteria and, more importantly, on their potential to predict managerially relevant criteria such as optimal price, quantity and profit. The results show a slight advantage of incentive-aligned approaches though the market settings need to be considered to choose the best-fitting procedure.

Firm-level strategic orientation and performance: a synthesis and extension of the knowledge base on entrepreneurial, market and learning orientation

Should a firm stay focused or should it rather adopt a broader strategic perspective? This dissertation summarizes and extends the existing knowledge base on entrepreneurial, market, and learning orientation. Building on multiple theoretical perspectives, empirical evidence from prior studies, as well as on survey and archival data collected in two economic contexts, performance effects from individual orientations, their dimensions and combinations are explored. Results reveal that the three strategic orientations are highly interrelated and that their relationship to firm performance is more complex than previously assumed.

Long-run performance of initial public offerings: The evidence for Switzerland

We estimate the underpricing and long-run performance of Swiss initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1983 to 2000. The average market adjusted initial return is 34.97%. To examine the long-run performance of Swiss IPOs, we compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns, skewness-adjusted wealth ratios, and cumulative abnormal returns using 120 months of secondary market returns. In contrast to previous findings for the U.S. and Germany, we do not find strong evidence for a distinct IPO effect. We attribute long-run underperformance to the fact that IPO firms tend to be small firms. It virtually vanishes when we use a small capitalization index as a benchmark. In spite of distinct economic implications and statistical properties, our basic results are similar for all performance measures applied.

Postacquisition performance of acquiring firms

We investigate whether negative postacquisition stock-price performance of acquiring firms is a genuine phenomenon or a statistical artifact. Using a comprehensive sample of domestic acquisitions in the 1966-1986 period, we show that acquiring firms underperform a control portfolio only during the three years but not five years following the acquisition. There is evidence of negative performance in the second and third postacquisition years, but that performance occurs mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, and disappears in the 1980s. Thus, especially in the later years, the postacquisition years do not provide convincing evidence of wasteful corporate acquisitions, or strong evidence that contradicts market efficiency.

Three Essays on Age and Firm Performance

Old captains at the helm: Chairman age and firm performance Urs Waelchli and Jonas Zeller December, 2012 This paper examines whether the chairmen of the board (COBs) impose their life-cycles on the firms over which they preside. Using a large sample of unlisted firms we find a robust negative relation between COB age and firm performance. COBs age much like ‘ordinary’ people. Their cognitive abilities deteriorate and they experience significant shifts in motivation. Deteriorating cognitive abilities are the main driver of the performance effect that we observe. The results imply that succession planning problems in unlisted firms are real. Mandatory retirement age clauses cannot solve these problems. Corporate Aging around the World Jonas Zeller January, 2014 This paper examines whether firms internationally age as US firms do (Loderer, Stulz, and Wälchli, 2013). Using a large panel, I find that Tobin’s Q monotonically falls with firm Age across all nineteen countries in the sample. The decrease varies across countries but is generally extremely robust and economically significant. ROA, sales growth, and market share decrease over a firm’s lifetime in most countries as well. Furthermore, older firms reduce their capital expenditures and R&D outlays. Instead, they distribute more cash to their shareholders. Overall, the results suggest that corporate aging is not confined to the US but is a genuine phenomenon that affects listed firms worldwide. This evidence supports the hypothesis that corporate aging is driven by managers who optimally focus on managing their assets in place and neglect the development of growth opportunities. I finally ask whether the managers’ choice and with it the magnitude of the decline in Tobin’s Q is a function of country-level institutional settings. I find that most notably firms age faster in countries where employees are relatively well protected by labor regulation. Is employment protection the fountain of corporate youth? Claudio Loderer, Urs Wälchli, Jonas Zeller* September 2014 Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012, 2013) find that employment protection legislation (EPL) encourages innovation. We argue that this effect should be particularly strong in mature firms. We would therefore also expect EPL to boost growth opportunities. Using the natural Experiment created by the staggered passage of changes in EPL across seventeen countries, we find evidence that employment protection legislation does indeed stimulate Innovation efforts, especially in mature firms. The effect is stronger in countries in which patents are owned by the firm and in the context of regular contracts. Consistent with that, EPL encourages risk taking. Overall, however, there is Little evidence that the effect of EPL on innovation effort translates into higher firm value, not even in mature firms. EPL does motivate employees in those firms to put in a greater effort, as evidenced by stronger sales growth. Yet it also increases costs, reduces profitability, and depresses Tobin’s Q ratios in all firms, especially the mature ones, possibly because of the rigidities that characterize these firms [Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2014)].

Torn between state and market: Private policy implementation and conflicting institutional logics

Policy implementation by private actors constitutes a “missing link” for understanding the implications of private governance. This paper proposes and assesses an institutional logics framework that combines a top-down, policy design approach with a bottom-up, implementation perspective on discretion. We argue that the conflicting institutional logics of the state and the market, in combination with differing degrees of goal ambiguity, accountability and hybridity play a crucial role for output performance. These arguments are analyzed based on a secondary analysis of seven case studies of private and hybrid policy implementation in diverging contexts. We find that aligning private output performance with public interests is at least partly a question of policy design congruence: private implementing actors tend to perform deficiently when the conflicting logics of the state and the market combine with weak accountability mechanisms.