Unresolved Problems with the "I", the "A" and the "T": Logical and Psychometric Critique of the Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) had already gained the status of a prominent assessment procedure before its psychometric properties and underlying task structure were understood. The present critique addresses five major problems that arise when the IAT is used for diagnostic inferences: (1) the asymmetry of causal and diagnostic inferences; (2) the viability of the underlying association model; (3) the lack of a testable model underlying IAT-based inferences; (4) the difficulties of interpreting difference scores; and (5) the susceptibility of the IAT to deliberate faking and strategic processing. Based on a theoretical reflection of these issues, and a comprehensive survey of published IAT studies, it is concluded that a number of uncontrolled factors can produce (or reduce) significant IAT scores independently of the personality attribute that is supposed to be captured by the IAT procedure.

Logical omniscience as infeasibility

Logical theories for representing knowledge are often plagued by the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem. The problem stems from the clash between the desire to model rational agents, which should be capable of simple logical inferences, and the fact that any logical inference, however complex, almost inevitably consists of inference steps that are simple enough. This contradiction points to the fruitlessness of trying to solve the Logical Omniscience Problem qualitatively if the rationality of agents is to be maintained. We provide a quantitative solution to the problem compatible with the two important facets of the reasoning agent: rationality and resource boundedness. More precisely, we provide a test for the logical omniscience problem in a given formal theory of knowledge. The quantitative measures we use are inspired by the complexity theory. We illustrate our framework with a number of examples ranging from the traditional implicit representation of knowledge in modal logic to the language of justification logic, which is capable of spelling out the internal inference process. We use these examples to divide representations of knowledge into logically omniscient and not logically omniscient, thus trying to determine how much information about the reasoning process needs to be present in a theory to avoid logical omniscience.

A new model construction by making a detour via intuitionistic theories I: Operational set theory without choice is Π1-equivalent to KP

We introduce a version of operational set theory, OST−, without a choice operation, which has a machinery for Δ0Δ0 separation based on truth functions and the separation operator, and a new kind of applicative set theory, so-called weak explicit set theory WEST, based on Gödel operations. We show that both the theories and Kripke–Platek set theory KPKP with infinity are pairwise Π1Π1 equivalent. We also show analogous assertions for subtheories with ∈-induction restricted in various ways and for supertheories extended by powerset, beta, limit and Mahlo operations. Whereas the upper bound is given by a refinement of inductive definition in KPKP, the lower bound is by a combination, in a specific way, of realisability, (intuitionistic) forcing and negative interpretations. Thus, despite interpretability between classical theories, we make “a detour via intuitionistic theories”. The combined interpretation, seen as a model construction in the sense of Visser's miniature model theory, is a new way of construction for classical theories and could be said the third kind of model construction ever used which is non-trivial on the logical connective level, after generic extension à la Cohen and Krivine's classical realisability model.

Improving self-control by practicing logical reasoning

We tested the hypothesis that practicing logical reasoning can improve self-control. In an experimental training study (N = 49 undergraduates), for one week participants engaged in daily mental exercises with or without the requirement to practice logical reasoning. Participants in the logic group showed improvements in self-control, as revealed by anagram performance after a depleting self-control task. The benefits of the intervention were short-lived; participants in the two groups performed similarly just one week after the intervention had ended. We discuss the findings with respect to the strength model of self-control and consider possible benefits of regular cognitive challenges in education.