Climate change in Switzerland: a review of physical, institutional, and political aspects

Climate change is clearly discernible in observed climate records in Switzerland. It impacts on natural systems, ecosystems, and economic sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and energy, and it affects Swiss livelihood in various ways. The observed and projected changes call for a response from the political system, which in Switzerland is characterized by federalism and direct democratic instruments. Swiss climate science embraces natural and social sciences and builds on institutionalized links between researchers, public, and private stakeholders. In this article, we review the physical, institutional, and political aspects of climate change in Switzerland. We show how the current state of Swiss climate science and policy developed over the past 20 years in the context of international developments and national responses. Specific to Switzerland is its topographic setting with mountain regions and lowlands on both sides of the Alpine ridge, which makes climate change clearly apparent and for some aspects (tourist sector, hydropower, and extreme events) highly relevant and better perceivable (e.g., retreating glaciers). Not surprisingly the Alpine region is of central interest in Swiss climate change studies.

Political process and government growth: a theoretical and empirical investigation

A striking feature of virtually al western industrialized countries sice the middle of the past century has been the persistent growth of their government sector. From the beginning of the century to the late 1970's, the government expenditures' share of gross national product has increased from 7% to 36% in the U.S., 11% to 40% in the U.K., and 3% to 25% in Japan. In Germany, it went from 7% to 42% (1872-1978), while in France it soared from 11% to 59% (1872-1979). The evolution of the number of government employees followed a similar pattern. In the U.S., for instance, the average annual rate of growth of the government labor force over the period 1899-1974 has been 3.17%, compared to a 1.62% average annual growth rate of the working population. Less quantifiable aspects like the number and scope of regulations also refelct a growing public sector.

Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems: Conceptual Lessons from Subnational Switzerland

This article reconceptualizes shared rule and uses novel data to measure it, thus addressing two shortcomings of federal literature. First, while most studies focus on self-rule, one question that is largely neglected is how lower-level governments can influence politics at a higher level in the absence of “second” chambers. The answer is through shared rule. A second shortcoming is that even when addressing this question, scholars concentrate on constitutional-administrative aspects of vertical intergovernmentalism, neglecting more informal, “political” dynamics. Comparing the twenty-six Swiss cantons allows drawing two lessons for federal studies: That shared rule is multifaceted and complex, and that to study informal territorial actors as well as direct political processes is indispensable to understand how power is actually distributed in federal political systems.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.

Political Education and First-Time Voting in Switzerland

The proposed paper investigates the effect of political education on first-time voting in Switzerland. Theoretically, the paper takes up assumptions of recent research that political education is positively related to political interest, and hence to political participation. Thereby, the paper adds to the literature in two aspects: First, in Switzerland, education is a cantonal matter presenting a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of political education on voting on individual as well as cantonal level. Second, political education is not only measured by political knowledge, but also by civic skills and attitudes acquired in school. Conceptually, the study adopts a multilevel approach permitting a simultaneous testing of the influence of individual and contextual determinants on electoral participation. This paper corresponds closely to the panel topic by examining the important question of how political education affects the voting behaviour of first-time voters not only on individual, but also on contextual level.

Liberalism and racism: an ‘elective affinity’?

This appraisal of David Scott FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín's Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas argues that there is no ‘elective affinity’ between liberalism and racism, which is the core argument of the book. The notion of ‘elective affinity’, which the authors borrow from Max Weber, requires a structural homology between the ‘electively’ related elements that just does not exist in this case. The relationship between both is entirely contingent, ‘racism’ being a doctrine of inter-group relations while ‘liberalism’ is a doctrine of intra-group relations, with no consideration of how the boundaries of the group are constituted.