Dynamic computer simulations of electrophoresis: a versatile research and teaching tool

Software is available, which simulates all basic electrophoretic systems, including moving boundary electrophoresis, zone electrophoresis, ITP, IEF and EKC, and their combinations under almost exactly the same conditions used in the laboratory. These dynamic models are based upon equations derived from the transport concepts such as electromigration, diffusion, electroosmosis and imposed hydrodynamic buffer flow that are applied to user-specified initial distributions of analytes and electrolytes. They are able to predict the evolution of electrolyte systems together with associated properties such as pH and conductivity profiles and are as such the most versatile tool to explore the fundamentals of electrokinetic separations and analyses. In addition to revealing the detailed mechanisms of fundamental phenomena that occur in electrophoretic separations, dynamic simulations are useful for educational purposes. This review includes a list of current high-resolution simulators, information on how a simulation is performed, simulation examples for zone electrophoresis, ITP, IEF and EKC and a comprehensive discussion of the applications and achievements.

Genetic diversity of EBV-encoded LMP1 in the Swiss HIV Cohort Study and implication for NF-Κb activation

Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) is associated with several types of cancers including Hodgkin's lymphoma (HL) and nasopharyngeal carcinoma (NPC). EBV-encoded latent membrane protein 1 (LMP1), a multifunctional oncoprotein, is a powerful activator of the transcription factor NF-κB, a property that is essential for EBV-transformed lymphoblastoid cell survival. Previous studies reported LMP1 sequence variations and induction of higher NF-κB activation levels compared to the prototype B95-8 LMP1 by some variants. Here we used biopsies of EBV-associated cancers and blood of individuals included in the Swiss HIV Cohort Study (SHCS) to analyze LMP1 genetic diversity and impact of sequence variations on LMP1-mediated NF-κB activation potential. We found that a number of variants mediate higher NF-κB activation levels when compared to B95-8 LMP1 and mapped three single polymorphisms responsible for this phenotype: F106Y, I124V and F144I. F106Y was present in all LMP1 isolated in this study and its effect was variant dependent, suggesting that it was modulated by other polymorphisms. The two polymorphisms I124V and F144I were present in distinct phylogenetic groups and were linked with other specific polymorphisms nearby, I152L and D150A/L151I, respectively. The two sets of polymorphisms, I124V/I152L and F144I/D150A/L151I, which were markers of increased NF-κB activation in vitro, were not associated with EBV-associated HL in the SHCS. Taken together these results highlighted the importance of single polymorphisms for the modulation of LMP1 signaling activity and demonstrated that several groups of LMP1 variants, through distinct mutational paths, mediated enhanced NF-κB activation levels compared to B95-8 LMP1.

Information Integration Theory and the Construction of Individually Perceived Group Efficacy

According to Bandura (1997) efficacy beliefs are a primary determinant of motivation. Still, very little is known about the processes through which people integrate situational factors to form efficacy beliefs (Myers & Feltz, 2007). The aim of this study was to gain insight into the cognitive construction of subjective group-efficacy beliefs. Only with a sound understanding of those processes is there a sufficient base to derive psychological interventions aimed at group-efficacy beliefs. According to cognitive theories (e.g., Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1973) individual group-efficacy beliefs can be seen as the result of a comparison between the demands of a group task and the resources of the performing group. At the center of this comparison are internally represented structures of the group task and plans to perform it. The empirical plausibility of this notion was tested using functional measurement theory (Anderson, 1981). Twenty-three students (M = 23.30 years; SD = 3.39; 35 % females) of the University of Bern repeatedly judged the efficacy of groups in different group tasks. The groups consisted of the subjects and another one to two fictive group members. The latter were manipulated by their value (low, medium, high) in task-relevant abilities. Data obtained from multiple full factorial designs were structured with individuals as second level units and analyzed using mixed linear models. The task-relevant abilities of group members, specified as fixed factors, all had highly significant effects on subjects’ group-efficacy judgments. The effect sizes of the ability factors showed to be dependent on the respective abilities’ importance in a given task. In additive tasks (Steiner, 1972) group resources were integrated in a linear fashion whereas significant interaction between factors was obtained in interdependent tasks. The results also showed that people take into account other group members’ efficacy beliefs when forming their own group-efficacy beliefs. The results support the notion that personal group-efficacy beliefs are obtained by comparing the demands of a task with the performing groups’ resources. Psychological factors such as other team members’ efficacy beliefs are thereby being considered task relevant resources and affect subjective group-efficacy beliefs. This latter finding underlines the adequacy of multidimensional measures. While the validity of collective efficacy measures is usually estimated by how well they predict performances, the results of this study allow for a somewhat internal validity criterion. It is concluded that Information Integration Theory holds potential to further help understand people’s cognitive functioning in sport relevant situations.

Loss to follow-up of HIV-infected women after delivery: The Swiss HIV Cohort Study and the Swiss Mother and Child HIV Cohort Study.

INTRODUCTION HIV-infected pregnant women are very likely to engage in HIV medical care to prevent transmission of HIV to their newborn. After delivery, however, childcare and competing commitments might lead to disengagement from HIV care. The aim of this study was to quantify loss to follow-up (LTFU) from HIV care after delivery and to identify risk factors for LTFU. METHODS We used data on 719 pregnancies within the Swiss HIV Cohort Study from 1996 to 2012 and with information on follow-up visits available. Two LTFU events were defined: no clinical visit for >180 days and no visit for >360 days in the year after delivery. Logistic regression analysis was used to identify risk factors for a LTFU event after delivery. RESULTS Median maternal age at delivery was 32 years (IQR 28-36), 357 (49%) women were black, 280 (39%) white, 56 (8%) Asian and 4% other ethnicities. One hundred and seven (15%) women reported any history of IDU. The majority (524, 73%) of women received their HIV diagnosis before pregnancy, most of those (413, 79%) had lived with diagnosed HIV longer than three years and two-thirds (342, 65%) were already on antiretroviral therapy (ART) at time of conception. Of the 181 women diagnosed during pregnancy by a screening test, 80 (44%) were diagnosed in the first trimester, 67 (37%) in the second and 34 (19%) in the third trimester. Of 357 (69%) women who had been seen in HIV medical care during three months before conception, 93% achieved an undetectable HIV viral load (VL) at delivery. Of 62 (12%) women with the last medical visit more than six months before conception, only 72% achieved an undetectable VL (p=0.001). Overall, 247 (34%) women were LTFU over 180 days in the year after delivery and 86 (12%) women were LTFU over 360 days with 43 (50%) of those women returning. Being LTFU for 180 days was significantly associated with history of intravenous drug use (aOR 1.73, 95% CI 1.09-2.77, p=0.021) and not achieving an undetectable VL at delivery (aOR 1.79, 95% CI 1.03-3.11, p=0.040) after adjusting for maternal age, ethnicity, time of HIV diagnosis and being on ART at conception. CONCLUSIONS Women with a history of IDU and women with a detectable VL at delivery were more likely to be LTFU after delivery. This is of concern regarding their own health, as well as risk for sexual partners and subsequent pregnancies. Further strategies should be developed to enhance retention in medical care beyond pregnancy.

Is clipping the preferable technique to perform sympathicotomy? A retrospective study and review of the literature

PURPOSE Thoracoscopic sympathetic surgery is nowadays a broadly accepted technique in the treatment of primary hyperhidrosis as well as facial blushing. The objective of this study was to compare the two currently most commonly used methods for thoracic sympathicotomy: transection (ETS) and clipping (ETC.). METHODS This is a retrospective study on a total of 63 patients, who underwent rib-oriented sympathicotomy, either by transection (n = 36, 57 %) or by clipping (n = 27, 43 %). Moreover, the up-to-date international literature is reviewed concerning which level(s) of the sympathetic trunk should be addressed, depending on the patients underlying condition. Furthermore, the highly controversial topic of reversibility of sympathetic clipping is debated. RESULTS Our results confirm that clipping is at least as effective as transection of the sympathetic chain in the treatment of hyperhidrosis and facial blushing. Furthermore, the analysis of all larger studies on unclipping in humans shows a surprisingly high reported reversal rate between 48 and 77 %. CONCLUSIONS Depending on the symptoms of the patient, different levels of the sympathetic chain should be addressed. When a higher rib level such as R2 is approached, which more likely will result in moderate to severe compensatory sweating, clipping should be preferred as it seems that this technique has indeed a potential for reversibility. As demonstrated, this method is at least as effective as an irreversible transection of the sympathetic chain.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Time-order errors and standard-position effects in duration discrimination: An experimental study and an analysis by the sensation-weighting model

Studies have shown that the discriminability of successive time intervals depends on the presentation order of the standard (St) and the comparison (Co) stimuli. Also, this order affects the point of subjective equality. The first effect is here called the standard-position effect (SPE); the latter is known as the time-order error. In the present study, we investigated how these two effects vary across interval types and standard durations, using Hellström’s sensation-weighting model to describe the results and relate them to stimulus comparison mechanisms. In Experiment 1, four modes of interval presentation were used, factorially combining interval type (filled, empty) and sensory modality (auditory, visual). For each mode, two presentation orders (St–Co, Co–St) and two standard durations (100 ms, 1,000 ms) were used; half of the participants received correctness feedback, and half of them did not. The interstimulus interval was 900 ms. The SPEs were negative (i.e., a smaller difference limen for St–Co than for Co–St), except for the filled-auditory and empty-visual 100-ms standards, for which a positive effect was obtained. In Experiment 2, duration discrimination was investigated for filled auditory intervals with four standards between 100 and 1,000 ms, an interstimulus interval of 900 ms, and no feedback. Standard duration interacted with presentation order, here yielding SPEs that were negative for standards of 100 and 1,000 ms, but positive for 215 and 464 ms. Our findings indicate that the SPE can be positive as well as negative, depending on the interval type and standard duration, reflecting the relative weighting of the stimulus information, as is described by the sensation-weighting model.