13 resultados para Information Behavior
em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça
Resumo:
BACKGROUND The purpose of patient information leaflets (PILs) is to inform patients about the administration, precautions and potential side effects of their prescribed medication. Despite European Commission guidelines aiming at increasing readability and comprehension of PILs little is known about the potential risk information has on patients. This article explores patients' reactions and subsequent behavior towards risk information conveyed in PILs of commonly prescribed drugs by general practitioners (GPs) for the treatment of Type 2 diabetes, hypertension or hypercholesterolemia; the most frequent cause for consultations in family practices in Germany. METHODS We conducted six focus groups comprising 35 patients which were recruited in GP practices. Transcripts were read and coded for themes; categories were created by abstracting data and further refined into a coding framework. RESULTS Three interrelated categories are presented: (i) The vast amount of side effects and drug interactions commonly described in PILs provoke various emotional reactions in patients which (ii) lead to specific patient behavior of which (iii) consulting the GP for assistance is among the most common. Findings show that current description of potential risk information caused feelings of fear and anxiety in the reader resulting in undesirable behavioral reactions. CONCLUSIONS Future PILs need to convey potential risk information in a language that is less frightening while retaining the information content required to make informed decisions about the prescribed medication. Thus, during the production process greater emphasis needs to be placed on testing the degree of emotional arousal provoked in patients when reading risk information to allow them to undertake a benefit-risk-assessment of their medication that is based on rational rather than emotional (fearful) reactions.
Resumo:
Developers rely on the mechanisms provided by their IDE to browse and navigate a large software system. These mechanisms are usually based purely on a system's static source code. The static perspective, however, is not enough to understand an object-oriented program's behavior, in particular if implemented in a dynamic language. We propose to enhance IDEs with a program's runtime information (eg. message sends and type information) to support program comprehension through precise navigation and informative browsing. To precisely specify the type and amount of runtime data to gather about a system under development, dynamically and on demand, we adopt a technique known as partial behavioral reflection. We implemented navigation and browsing enhancements to an IDE that exploit this runtime information in a prototype called Hermion. We present preliminary validation of our experimental enhanced IDE by asking developers to assess its usefulness to understand an unfamiliar software system.
Resumo:
Code queries focus mainly on the static structure of a system. To comprehend the dynamic behavior of a system however, a software engineer needs to be able to reason about the dynamics of this system, for instance by querying a database of dynamic information. Such a querying mechanism should be directly available in the IDE where the developers implements, navigates and reasons about the software system. We propose (i) concepts to gather dynamic information, (ii) the means to query this information, and (iii) tools and techniques to integrate querying of dynamic information in the IDE, including the presentation of results generated by queries.
Resumo:
We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.
Resumo:
With improving clinical CT scanning technology, the accuracy of CT-based finite element (FE) models of the human skeleton may be ameliorated by an enhanced description of apparent level bone mechanical properties. Micro-finite element (μFE) modeling can be used to study the apparent elastic behavior of human cancellous bone. In this study, samples from the femur, radius and vertebral body were investigated to evaluate the predictive power of morphology–elasticity relationships and to compare them across different anatomical regions. μFE models of 701 trabecular bone cubes with a side length of 5.3 mm were analyzed using kinematic boundary conditions. Based on the FE results, four morphology–elasticity models using bone volume fraction as well as full, limited or no fabric information were calibrated for each anatomical region. The 5 parameter Zysset–Curnier model using full fabric information showed excellent predictive power with coefficients of determination ( r2adj ) of 0.98, 0.95 and 0.94 of the femur, radius and vertebra data, respectively, with mean total norm errors between 14 and 20%. A constant orthotropy model and a constant transverse isotropy model, where the elastic anisotropy is defined by the model parameters, yielded coefficients of determination between 0.90 and 0.98 with total norm errors between 16 and 25%. Neglecting fabric information and using an isotropic model led to r2adj between 0.73 and 0.92 with total norm errors between 38 and 49%. A comparison of the model regressions revealed minor but significant (p<0.01) differences for the fabric–elasticity model parameters calibrated for the different anatomical regions. The proposed models and identified parameters can be used in future studies to compute the apparent elastic properties of human cancellous bone for homogenized FE models.
Resumo:
Recognizing the increasing amount of information shared on Social Networking Sites (SNS), in this study we aim to explore the information processing strategies of users on Facebook. Specifically, we aim to investigate the impact of various factors on user attitudes towards the posts on their Newsfeed. To collect the data, we program a Facebook application that allows users to evaluate posts in real time. Applying Structural Equation Modeling to a sample of 857 observations we find that it is mostly the affective attitude that shapes user behavior on the network. This attitude, in turn, is mainly determined by the communication intensity between users, overriding comprehensibility of the post and almost neglecting post length and user posting frequency.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND There is ample evidence that a subgroup of Parkinson's disease patients who are treated with dopaminergic drugs develop certain behavioral addictions such as pathological gambling. The fact that only a subgroup of these patients develops pathological gambling suggests an interaction between dopaminergic drug treatment and individual susceptibility factors. These are potentially of genetic origin, since research in healthy subjects suggests that vulnerability for pathological gambling may be linked to variation in the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene. Using a pharmacogenetic approach, we investigated how variation in this gene modulates the impact of dopaminergic stimulation on gambling behavior in healthy subjects. METHODS We administered 300 mg of L-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or placebo to 200 healthy male subjects who were all genotyped for their DRD4 polymorphism. Subjects played a gambling task 60 minutes after L-DOPA administration. RESULTS Without considering genetic information, L-DOPA administration did not lead to an increase in gambling propensity compared with placebo. As expected, however, an individual's DRD4 polymorphism accounted for variation in gambling behavior after the administration of L-DOPA. Subjects who carry at least one copy of the 7-repeat allele showed an increased gambling propensity after dopaminergic stimulation. CONCLUSIONS These findings demonstrate that genetic variation in the DRD4 gene determines an individual's gambling behavior in response to a dopaminergic drug challenge. They may have implications for the treatment of Parkinson's disease patients by offering a genotype approach for determining individual susceptibilities for pathological gambling and may also afford insights into the vulnerability mechanisms underlying addictive behavior.
Resumo:
The aim of this study was to associate changes in dairy farmers' self-reported attitude, knowledge, and behavior with the decrease in incidence rate of clinical mastitis (IRCM). Farmer-diagnosed clinical mastitis cases were obtained from two surveys conducted before (July 2004-June 2005) and at the end (2009) of a mastitis control program in the Netherlands. Information on farmers' attitude, knowledge, and behavior was also obtained by sending the farmers the same questionnaire during both surveys. Multivariable linear regression models identified that the herd level 2004 IRCM explained 28% of the variation in the decrease of IRCM. Changes in farmers' attitude and knowledge, and changes in farmers' behavior additionally explained 24% and 5%, respectively. These results suggest that the way management measures are executed may be at least as important as the fact that they are executed. No control group was available for this study because the intervention was applied at the national level. We therefore do not claim any causal relationships.
Resumo:
Objectives The present study investigated the predictive value of the explicit and implicit affiliation motive for social behavior in sport competitions. From an information processing perspective, an explicit motive is linked to verbal cues and respondent behavior. The implicit motive in turn is linked to nonverbal stimuli and operant behavior (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008). Both respondent affiliative behavior (e.g., verbal interactions with teammates) and operant nonverbal social behavior (e.g., pleasant to opponents) can be observed in racquet sports team competitions. Design & Methods Fifty-two male racquet sportsmen completed the Personality Research Form (explicit affiliation motive) and the Operant Motive Test (implicit affiliation motive). Motive measures were used to predict social behavior during competitions using multiple regression analyses. To this aim real competitive matches were videotaped and analyzed. Results Results show that the explicit affiliation motive is associated with time spent in verbal team contact. The implicit affiliation motive, by contrast, is linked to pleasant nonverbal behavior shown toward opponents. Conclusions Findings suggest that implicit and explicit affiliation motives predict different kinds of social behavior in sports competition respectively. Indirect motive measures may be of additional predictive value for different behavior in real sports settings.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVES Bone replacement grafting materials play an important role in regenerative dentistry. Despite a large array of tested bone-grafting materials, little information is available comparing the effects of bone graft density on in vitro cell behavior. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to compare the effects of cells seeded on bone grafts at low and high density in vitro for osteoblast adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation. MATERIALS AND METHODS The response of osteoblasts to the presence of a growth factor (enamel matrix derivative, (EMD)) in combination with low (8 mg per well) or high (100 mg per well) bone grafts (BG; natural bone mineral, Bio-Oss®) density, was studied and compared for osteoblast cell adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation as assessed by real-time PCR. Standard tissue culture plastic was used as a control with and without EMD. RESULTS The present study demonstrates that in vitro testing of bone-grafting materials is largely influenced by bone graft seeding density. Osteoblast adhesion was up to 50 % lower when cells were seeded on high-density BG when compared to low-density BG and control tissue culture plastic. Furthermore, proliferation was affected in a similar manner whereby cell proliferation on high-density BG (100 mg/well) was significantly increased when compared to that on low-density BG (8 mg/well). In contrast, cell differentiation was significantly increased on high-density BG as assessed by real-time PCR for markers collagen 1 (Col 1), alkaline phosphatase (ALP), and osteocalcin (OC) as well as alizarin red staining. The effects of EMD on osteoblast adhesion, proliferation, and differentiation further demonstrated that the bone graft seeding density largely controls in vitro results. EMD significantly increased cell attachment only on high-density BG, whereas EMD was able to further stimulate cell proliferation and differentiation of osteoblasts on control culture plastic and low-density BG when compared to high-density BG. CONCLUSION The results from the present study demonstrate that the in vitro conditions largely influence cell behavior of osteoblasts seeded on bone grafts and in vitro testing. CLINICAL RELEVANCE These results also illustrate the necessity for careful selection of bone graft seeding density to optimize in vitro testing and provide the clinician with a more accurate description of the osteopromotive potential of bone grafts.
Resumo:
Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.
Resumo:
We address ethical consumption using a natural field experiment on the actual purchase of Fair Trade (FT) coffee in three supermarkets in Germany. Based on a quasi-experimental before-and-after design the effects of three different treatments – information, 20% price reduction, and a moral appeal – are analyzed. Sales data cover actual ethical purchase behavior and avoid problems of social desirability. But they offer only limited insights into the motivations of individual consumers. We therefore complemented the field experiment with a customer survey that allows us to contrast observed (ethical) buying behavior with self-reported FT consumption. Results from the experiment suggest that only the price reduction had the expected positive and statistically significant effect on FT consumption.