The Role of Online Platforms for Media Markets – Two‐Dimensional Spatial Competition in a Two‐Sided Market

We analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two-dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space. Consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions. For integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner's dilemma. Specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions. This is in contrast to the maximum–minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition. We show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets.

Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical character- istic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenar- ios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm adver- tises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative ad- vertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative advertis- ing firms do not advertise when the informational value to consumers is small.