Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

An initiative for participatory monitoring of large scale acquisitions: Opportunities and results thus far

Increasing commercial pressures on land are provoking fundamental and far-reaching changes in the relationships between people and land. Much knowledge on land-oriented investments projects currently comes from the media. Although this provides a good starting point, lack of transparency and rapidly changing contexts mean that this is often unreliable. The International Land Coalition, in partnership with Oxfam Novib, Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), University of Pretoria, Centre for Development and Environment of the University of Bern (CDE), and GIZ, started to compile an inventory of land-related investments. This project aims to better understand the extent, trends and impacts of land-related investments by supporting an ongoing and systematic stocktaking exercise of the various investment projects currently taking place worldwide. It involves a large number of organizations and individuals working in areas where land transactions are being made, and able to provide details of such investments. The project monitors land transactions in rural areas that imply a transformation of land use rights from communities and smallholders to commercial use, and are made both by domestic and foreign investors (private actors, governments, government-back private investors). The focus is on investments for food or agrofuel production, timber extraction, carbon trading, mineral extraction, conservation and tourism. A novel way of using ITC to document land acquisitions in a spatially explicit way and by using an approach called “crowdsourcing” is being developed. This approach will allow actors to share information and knowledge directly and at any time on a public platform, where it will be scrutinized in terms of reliability and cross checked with other sources. Up to now, over 1200 deals have been recorded across 96 countries. Details of such transactions have been classified in a matrix and distributed to over 350 contacts worldwide for verification. The verified information has been geo-referenced and represented in two global maps. This is an open database enabling a continued monitoring exercise and the improvement of data accuracy. More information will be released over time. The opportunities arise from overcoming constraints by incomplete information by proposing a new way of collecting, enhancing and sharing information and knowledge in a more democratic and transparent manner. The intention is to develop interactive knowledge platform where any interested person can share and access information on land deals, their link to involved stakeholders, and their embedding into a geographical context. By making use of new ICT technologies that are more and more in the reach of local stakeholders, as well as open access and web-based spatial information systems, it will become possible to create a dynamic database containing spatial explicit data. Feeding in data by a large number of stakeholders, increasingly also by means of new mobile ITC technologies, will open up new opportunities to analyse, monitor and assess highly dynamic trends of land acquisition and rural transformation.

Decision strategies for policy decisions under uncertainties: The case of mitigation measures addressing methane emissions from ruminants

Decision strategies aim at enabling reasonable decisions in cases of uncertain policy decision problems which do not meet the conditions for applying standard decision theory. This paper focuses on decision strategies that account for uncertainties by deciding whether a proposed list of policy options should be accepted or revised (scope strategies) and whether to decide now or later (timing strategies). They can be used in participatory approaches to structure the decision process. As a basis, we propose to classify the broad range of uncertainties affecting policy decision problems along two dimensions, source of uncertainty (incomplete information, inherent indeterminacy and unreliable information) and location of uncertainty (information about policy options, outcomes and values). Decision strategies encompass multiple and vague criteria to be deliberated in application. As an example, we discuss which decision strategies may account for the uncertainties related to nutritive technologies that aim at reducing methane (CH4) emissions from ruminants as a means of mitigating climate change, limiting our discussion to published scientific information. These considerations not only speak in favour of revising rather than accepting the discussed list of options, but also in favour of active postponement or semi-closure of decision-making rather than closure or passive postponement.