Perceptual learning of motion discrimination by mental imagery.

Perceptual learning can occur when stimuli are only imagined, i.e., without proper stimulus presentation. For example, perceptual learning improved bisection discrimination when only the two outer lines of the bisection stimulus were presented and the central line had to be imagined. Performance improved also with other static stimuli. In non-learning imagery experiments, imagining static stimuli is different from imagining motion stimuli. We hypothesized that those differences also affect imagery perceptual learning. Here, we show that imagery training also improves motion direction discrimination. Learning occurs when no stimulus at all is presented during training, whereas no learning occurs when only noise is presented. The interference between noise and mental imagery possibly hinders learning. For static bisection stimuli, the pattern is just the opposite. Learning occurs when presented with the two outer lines of the bisection stimulus, i.e., with only a part of the visual stimulus, while no learning occurs when no stimulus at all is presented.

Colors in Mind: A Novel Paradigm to Investigate Pure Color Imagery

Mental color imagery abilities are commonly measured using paradigms that involve naming, judging, or comparing the colors of visual mental images of well-known objects (e.g., “Is a sunflower darker yellow than a lemon”?). Although this approach is widely used in patient studies, differences in the ability to perform such color comparisons might simply reflect participants’ general knowledge of object colors rather than their ability to generate accurate visual mental images of the colors of the objects. The aim of the present study was to design a new color imagery paradigm. Participants were asked to visualize a color for 3 s and then to determine a visually presented color by pressing 1 of 6 keys. The authors reasoned that participants would react faster when the imagined and perceived colors were congruent than when they were incongruent. In Experiment 1, participants were slower in incongruent than congruent trials but only when they were instructed to visualize the colors. The results in Experiment 2 demonstrate that the congruency effect reported in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to verbalization of the color that had to be visualized. Finally, in Experiment 3, the congruency effect evoked by mental imagery correlated with performance in a perceptual version of the task. The authors discuss these findings with respect to the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and patients suffering from color imagery deficits.

Source Memory for Mental Imagery: Influences of the Stimuli’s Ease of Imagery.

The present study investigated how ease of imagery influences source monitoring accuracy. Two experiments were conducted in order to examine how ease of imagery influences the probability of source confusions of perceived and imagined completions of natural symmetric shapes. The stimuli consisted of binary pictures of natural objects, namely symmetric pictures of birds, butterflies, insects, and leaves. The ease of imagery (indicating the similarity of the sources) and the discriminability (indicating the similarity of the items) of each stimulus were estimated in a pretest and included as predictors of the memory performance for these stimuli. It was found that confusion of the sources becomes more likely when the imagery process was relatively easy. However, if the different processes of source monitoring-item memory, source memory and guessing biases-are disentangled, both experiments support the assumption that the effect of decreased source memory for easily imagined stimuli is due to decision processes and misinformation at retrieval rather than encoding processes and memory retention. The data were modeled with a Bayesian hierarchical implementation of the one high threshold source monitoring model.

Internal Models, Vestibular Cognition, and Mental Imagery: Conceptual Considerations

Vestibular cognition has recently gained attention. Despite numerous experimental and clinical demonstrations, it is not yet clear what vestibular cognition really is. For future research in vestibular cognition, adopting a computational approach will make it easier to explore the underlying mech- anisms. Indeed, most modeling approaches in vestibular science include a top-down or a priori component. We review recent Bayesian optimal observer models, and discuss in detail the conceptual value of prior assumptions, likelihood and posterior estimates for research in vestibular cognition. We then consider forward models in vestibular processing, which are required in order to distinguish between sensory input that is induced by active self-motion, and sensory input that is due to passive self-motion. We suggest that forward models are used not only in the service of estimating sensory states but they can also be drawn upon in an offline mode (e.g., spatial perspective transformations), in which interaction with sensory input is not desired. A computational approach to vestibular cogni- tion will help to discover connections across studies, and it will provide a more coherent framework for investigating vestibular cognition.

Disentangling mental imagery and perceptual expectation

Mental imagery and perception are thought to rely on similar neural circuits, and many recent behavioral studies have attempted to demonstrate interactions between actual physical stimulation and sensory imagery in the corresponding sensory modality. However, there has been a lack of theoretical understanding of the nature of these interactions, and both interferential and facilitatory effects have been found. Facilitatory effects appear strikingly similar to those that arise due to experimental manipulations of expectation. Using a self-motion discrimination task, we try to disentangle the effects of mental imagery from those of expectation by using a hierarchical drift diffusion model to investigate both choice data and response times. Manipulations of expectation are reasonably well understood in terms of their selective influence on parameters of the drift diffusion model, and in this study, we make the first attempt to similarly characterize the effects of mental imagery. We investigate mental imagery within the computational framework of control theory and state estimation. • Mental imagery and perception are thought to rely on similar neural circuits; however, on more theoretical grounds, imagery seems to be closely related to the output of forward models (sensory predictions). • We reanalyzed data from a study of imagined self-motion. • Bayesian modeling of response times may allow us to disentangle the effects of mental imagery on behavior from other cognitive (top-down) effects, such as expectation.