The evolution of antennal courtship in diplazontine parasitoid wasps (Hymenoptera, Ichneumonidae, Diplazontinae)

Background As predicted by theory, traits associated with reproduction often evolve at a comparatively high speed. This is especially the case for courtship behaviour which plays a central role in reproductive isolation. On the other hand, courtship behavioural traits often involve morphological and behavioural adaptations in both sexes; this suggests that their evolution might be under severe constraints, for instance irreversibility of character loss. Here, we use a recently proposed method to retrieve data on a peculiar courtship behavioural trait, i.e. antennal coiling, for 56 species of diplazontine parasitoid wasps. On the basis of a well-resolved phylogeny, we reconstruct the evolutionary history of antennal coiling and associated morphological modifications to study the mode of evolution of this complex character system. Results Our study reveals a large variation in shape, location and ultra-structure of male-specific modifications on the antennae. As for antennal coiling, we find either single-coiling, double-coiling or the absence of coiling; each state is present in multiple genera. Using a model comparison approach, we show that the possession of antennal modifications is highly correlated with antennal coiling behaviour. Ancestral state reconstruction shows that both antennal modifications and antennal coiling are highly congruent with the molecular phylogeny, implying low levels of homoplasy and a comparatively low speed of evolution. Antennal coiling is lost on two independent occasions, and never reacquired. A zero rate of regaining antennal coiling is supported by maximum parsimony, maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches. Conclusions Our study provides the first comparative evidence for a tight correlation between male-specific antennal modifications and the use of the antennae during courtship. Antennal coiling in Diplazontinae evolved at a comparatively low rate, and was never reacquired in any of the studied taxa. This suggests that the loss of antennal coiling is irreversible on the timescale examined here, and therefore that evolutionary constraints have greatly influenced the evolution of antennal courtship in this group of parasitoid wasps. Further studies are needed to ascertain whether the loss of antennal coiling is irreversible on larger timescales, and whether evolutionary constraints have influenced courtship behavioural traits in a similar way in other groups.

Concentration- and time-dependent effects of the synthetic estrogen, 17alpha-ethinylestradiol, on reproductive capabilities of the zebrafish, Danio rerio

Partial or full life-cycle tests are needed to assess the potential of endocrine-disrupting compounds (EDCs) to adversely affect development and reproduction of fish. Small fish species such as zebrafish, Danio rerio, are under consideration as model organisms for appropriate test protocols. The present study examines how reproductive effects resulting from exposure of zebrafish to the synthetic estrogen 17alpha-ethinylestradiol (EE2) vary with concentration (0.05 to 10 ng EE2 L(-1), nominal), and with timing/duration of exposure (partial life-cycle, full life-cycle, and two-generation exposure). Partial life-cycle exposure of the parental (F1) generation until completion of gonad differentiation (0-75 d postfertilization, dpf) impaired juvenile growth, time to sexual maturity, adult fecundity (egg production/female/day), and adult fertilization success at 1.1 ng EE2 L(-1) and higher. Lifelong exposure of the F1 generation until 177 dpf resulted in lowest observed effect concentrations (LOECs) for time to sexual maturity, fecundity, and fertilization success identical to those of the developmental test (0-75 dpf), but the slope of the concentration-response curve was steeper. Reproduction of zebrafish was completely inhibited at 9.3 ng EE2 L(-1), and this was essentially irreversible as a 3-mo depuration restored fertilization success to only a very low rate. Accordingly, elevated endogenous vitellogenin (VTG) synthesis and degenerative changes in gonad morphology persisted in depurated zebrafish. Full life-cycle exposure of the filial (F2) generation until 162 dpf impaired growth, delayed onset of spawning and reduced fecundity and fertilization success at 2.0 ng EE2 L(-1). In conclusion, results show that the impact of estrogenic agents on zebrafish sexual development and reproductive functions as well as the reversibility of effects, varies with exposure concentration (reversibility at < or = 1.1 ng EE2 L(-1) and irreversibility at 9.3 ng EE2 L(-1)), and between partial and full life-cycle exposure (exposure to 10 ng EE2 L(-1) during critical period exerted no permanent effect on sexual differentiation, but life-cycle exposure did).

Neer Award 2007: Reversion of structural muscle changes caused by chronic rotator cuff tears using continuous musculotendinous traction. An experimental study in sheep

HYPOTHESIS: Chronic rotator cuff tears are associated with irreversible architectural muscle changes and a high rate of repair failure. The changes observed in man and their irreversibility with a single stage repair can be reproduced in sheep. It was the purpose of this experiment to test the hypothesis that slow, continuous elongation of a retracted musculotendinous unit allows reversal of the currently irreversible structural muscle changes. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The infraspinatus tendon of 12 sheep was released using a greater tuberosity osteotomy and allowed to retract for 4 months. Then, a new device was mounted on the scapular spine and used to extend the infraspinatus muscuculotendinous unit transcutaneously by 1 mm per day. Thereafter, the tendon was repaired back to the greater tuberosity. We assessed the muscular architecture using magnetic resonance imaging, macroscopic dissection, histology, and electron microscopy. Fatty infiltration (in Hounsfield units 1/4 HU) and muscular cross-sectional area (in % of the control side) were monitored with computed tomography at tendon release, initiation of elongation, repair, and at sacrifice. RESULTS: Sixteen weeks after tendon release, the mean tendon retraction was 29 +/- 6 mm (14% of original length, P = .008). In 8 sheep, elongation was achieved as planned (group I), but in 4, the elongation failed technically (group II). The mean traction time was 24 +/- 6 days with a mean traction distance of 19 +/- 4 mm. At sacrifice, the mean pennation angle in the infraspinatus of group I was not different from the control side (29.8 degrees +/-7.5 degrees vs. 30 degrees +/-6 degrees , P = .575). In group II, the pennation angle had increased from 30 degrees +/-6 degrees to 55 degrees +/-14 degrees (P = .035). There was no fatty infiltration at the time of tendon release. After retraction, there was a significant increase in fatty infiltration of the infraspinatus muscle and a decrease of its cross-sectional area to 57% of the contralateral side (P = .0001). During traction, the degree of fatty infiltration remained unchanged (36 HU to 38 HU, P = .381), and atrophy improved to a muscle square area of 78% of the contralateral side (P = .0001) in group I. In group II, an increase of fatty infiltration was measured from 36 HU to 28 HU; however, this increase was not significant (P = .144). Atrophy did not change in group II (57-55%, P = .946). At sacrifice, the remaining muscle mass was 64% in group I and 46% in group II (P = .019). DISCUSSION: Our preliminary results document, that continuous elongation of a retracted, fatty infiltrated and atrophied musculotendinous unit is technically feasible. CONCLUSION: In the sheep, continuous elongation can lead to restoration of normal muscle architecture, to partial reversal of muscle atrophy, and to arrest of the progression of fatty infiltration. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Basic science level 2; Prospective comparative therapeutic study.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.