Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.

Enabling knowledge creation through outsiders: towards a push model of open innovation

Open innovation is increasingly being adopted in business and describes a situation in which firms exchange ideas and knowledge with external participants, such as customers, suppliers, partner firms, and universities. This article extends the concept of open innovation with a push model of open innovation: knowledge is voluntarily created outside a firm by individuals and organisations who proceed to push knowledge into a firm’s open innovation project. For empirical analysis, we examine source code and newsgroup data on the Eclipse Development Platform. We find that outsiders invest as much in the firm’s project as the founding firm itself. Based on the insights from Eclipse, we develop four propositions: ‘preemptive generosity’ of a firm, ‘continuous commitment’, ‘adaptive governance structure’, and ‘low entry barrier’ are contexts that enable the push model of open innovation.