Educational Systems and Gender Segregation in Education: A Three-Country Comparison of Germany, Norway and Canada

How do institutional settings and their embedded policy principles affect gender-typed enrolment in educational programmes? Based on gender-sensitive theories on career choice, we hypothesised that gender segregation in education is higher with a wider range of offers of vocational programmes. By analysing youth survey and panel data, we tested this assumption for Germany, Norway and Canada, three countries whose educational systems represent a different mix of academic, vocational and universalistic education principles. We found that vocational programmes are considerably more gender-segregated than are academic (e.g. university) programmes. Men, more so than women, can avoid gender-typed programmes by passing on to a university education. This in turn means that as long as their secondary school achievement does not allow for a higher education career, they have a higher likelihood of being allocated to male-typed programmes in the vocational education and training (VET) system. In addition, social background and the age at which students have to choose educational offers impact on the transition to gendered educational programmes. Overall, gender segregation in education is highest in Germany and the lowest in Canada. We interpret the differences between these countries with respect to the constellations of educational principles and policies in the respective countries.

Power Games in Strategy Formation Processes – A Performative Interpretation

The article approaches an understanding of power within strategy formation processes established by verbal and bodily communication. On this note, we examined concepts of power constituted by hierarchy and developed a conceptual framework for a performative interpretation of power. In line with Austin’s (1962) and Butler’s (1990, 1993, 1997) concept of performativity as well as strategy-as-practice research (Balogun et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) we ask: How is persuasion achieved by strategic actors during strategy formation processes? To explore verbal and bodily communication empirically we developed an experimental setting in a small high-tech company located in Germany in December, 2012. The Results indicate that (1) during critical incidents – when perspectives clash – actors use arguments to gain persuasion. (2) The data illustrates that independently of their hierarchical position within the company, strategic actors show an equal distribution of argumentative techniques.

Trust, Competition and Cooperation in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Objective: Impaired social interactions and repetitive behavior are key features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In the present study we compared social decision-making in subjects with and without ASD. Subjects performed five social decision-making games in order to assess trust, fairness, cooperation & competition behavior and social value orientation. Methods: 19 adults with autism spectrum disorder and 17 controls, matched for age and education, participated in the study. Each subject performed five social decision-making tasks. In the trust game, subjects could maximize their gain by sharing some of their money with another person. In the punishment game, subjects played two versions of the Dictator’s Dilemma. In the dictator condition they could share an amount of 0-100 points with another person. In the punishment condition, the opponent was able to punish the subject if he/she was not satisfied with the amount of points received. In the cooperation game, subjects played with a small group of 3 people. Each of them could (anonymously) select an amount of 5, 7.5 or 10 Swiss francs. The goal of the game was to achieve a high group minimum. In the competition game, subjects performed a dexterity task. Before performing the task, they were asked whether they wanted to compete (winner takes it all) or cooperation (sharing the joint achieved amount of points) with a randomly selected person. Lastly, subjects performed a social value orientation task where they were playing for themselves and for another person. Results: There was no overall difference between healthy controls an ASD subjects in investment in the trust game. However, healthy controls increased their investment over number of trials whereas ASD subjects did not. A similar pattern was found for the punishment game. Furthermore, ASD subjects revealed a decreased investment in the dictator condition of the punishment game. There were no mean differences in competition behavior and social value orientation. Conclusions: The results provide evidence for differences between ASD subjects and healthy controls in social decision-making. Subjects with ASD showed a more consistent behavior than healthy controls in the trust game and the dictator dilemma. The present findings provide evidence for impaired social learning in ASD.