Dynamic computer simulations of electrophoresis: a versatile research and teaching tool

Software is available, which simulates all basic electrophoretic systems, including moving boundary electrophoresis, zone electrophoresis, ITP, IEF and EKC, and their combinations under almost exactly the same conditions used in the laboratory. These dynamic models are based upon equations derived from the transport concepts such as electromigration, diffusion, electroosmosis and imposed hydrodynamic buffer flow that are applied to user-specified initial distributions of analytes and electrolytes. They are able to predict the evolution of electrolyte systems together with associated properties such as pH and conductivity profiles and are as such the most versatile tool to explore the fundamentals of electrokinetic separations and analyses. In addition to revealing the detailed mechanisms of fundamental phenomena that occur in electrophoretic separations, dynamic simulations are useful for educational purposes. This review includes a list of current high-resolution simulators, information on how a simulation is performed, simulation examples for zone electrophoresis, ITP, IEF and EKC and a comprehensive discussion of the applications and achievements.

Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural Diversity : Transdisciplinary Enquiries

Digital game environments are of increasing economic, social and cultural value. As their influence on diverse facets of life grows, states have felt compelled to intervene and secure some public interests. Yet, the contours of a comprehensive governance model are far from recognisable and governments are grappling with the complexity and fluidity of online games and virtual worlds as private spaces and as experimentation fields for creativity and innovation. This book contributes to a more comprehensive and fine-grained understanding of digital game environments, which is a precondition for addressing any of the pressing governance questions posed. Particular attention is given to the concept and policy objective of cultural diversity, which also offers a unique entry point into the discussion of the appropriate legal regulation of digital games. Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural Diversity will be of interest to researchers of media law, internet law and governance, cultural studies, anthropology and sociology. As the book addresses a highly topical theme, it will attract the attention of policymakers at national, regional and international levels and will also serve as a great resource tool for scholars in new media and, in particular, digital games and virtual worlds.

Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural Diversity. Preface

Conventional legal models have proven unable to cater for the novel issues created by the advancing digital game media, resulting in a fragmentation of national, regional and international regulations, which impact societies, economies and culture. The governance of this media and its affect on cultural diversity are introduced herein.

Casting materials and their application in research and teaching

From a biological point of view, casting refers to filling of anatomical and/or pathological spaces with extraneous material that reproduces a three-dimensional replica of the space. Casting may be accompanied by additional procedures such as corrosion, in which the soft tissue is digested out, leaving a clean cast, or the material may be mixed with radiopaque substances to allow x-ray photography or micro computed topography (µCT) scanning. Alternatively, clearing of the surrounding soft tissue increases transparency and allows visualization of the casted cavities. Combination of casting with tissue fixation allows anatomical dissection and didactic surgical procedures on the tissue. Casting materials fall into three categories namely, aqueous substances (India ink, Prussian blue ink), pliable materials (gelatins, latex, and silicone rubber), or hard materials (methyl methacrylates, polyurethanes, polyesters, and epoxy resins). Casting has proved invaluable in both teaching and research and many phenomenal biological processes have been discovered through casting. The choice of a particular material depends inter alia on the targeted use and the intended subsequent investigative procedures, such as dissection, microscopy, or µCT. The casting material needs to be pliable where anatomical and surgical manipulations are intended, and capillary-passable for ultrastructural investigations.

Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural Diversity : Transdisciplinary Enquiries. Preface

Digital game environments are of increasing economic, social and cultural value. As their influence on diverse facets of life grows, states have felt compelled to intervene and secure some public interests. Yet, the contours of a comprehensive governance model are far from recognisable and governments are grappling with the complexity and fluidity of online games and virtual worlds as private spaces and as experimentation fields for creativity and innovation. This book contributes to a more comprehensive and fine-grained understanding of digital game environments, which is a precondition for addressing any of the pressing governance questions posed. Particular attention is given to the concept and policy objective of cultural diversity, which also offers a unique entry point into the discussion of the appropriate legal regulation of digital games. Governance of Digital Game Environments and Cultural Diversity will be of interest to researchers of media law, internet law and governance, cultural studies, anthropology and sociology. As the book addresses a highly topical theme, it will attract the attention of policymakers at national, regional and international levels and will also serve as a great resource tool for scholars in new media and, in particular, digital games and virtual worlds.

Cost-effectiveness of peer role play and standardized patients in undergraduate communication training.

BACKGROUND The few studies directly comparing the methodological approach of peer role play (RP) and standardized patients (SP) for the delivery of communication skills all suggest that both methods are effective. In this study we calculated the costs of both methods (given comparable outcomes) and are the first to generate a differential cost-effectiveness analysis of both methods. METHODS Medical students in their prefinal year were randomly assigned to one of two groups receiving communication training in Pediatrics either with RP (N = 34) or 19 individually trained SP (N = 35). In an OSCE with standardized patients using the Calgary-Cambridge Referenced Observation Guide both groups achieved comparable high scores (results published). In this study, corresponding costs were assessed as man-hours resulting from hours of work of SP and tutors. A cost-effectiveness analysis was performed. RESULTS Cost-effectiveness analysis revealed a major advantage for RP as compared to SP (112 vs. 172 man hours; cost effectiveness ratio .74 vs. .45) at comparable performance levels after training with both methods. CONCLUSIONS While both peer role play and training with standardized patients have their value in medical curricula, RP has a major advantage in terms of cost-effectiveness. This could be taken into account in future decisions.

User Created Content in Virtual Worlds and Cultural Diversity

User created content (UCC) has often been celebrated as a grassroots cultural revolution that as a genuine expression of creativity, localism and non-commercialism can arguably also cater for a sustainable culturally diverse environment. The present article puts these claims under scrutiny and in a more differentiated manner seeks to identify the value of UCC within digital game environments considering the constraints upon players and upon creative play that these impose. The article subsequently tests whether UCC in its dynamic sense of a creative and communicative process can be seen as a channel for the promotion of cultural diversity and if so, what the State should (and could) do about this.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.