Mergers, executive risk reduction and stockholder wealth

Among the possible consequences of agency problems between owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers' personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mrgers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the aqquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.

Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the experience of a comprehensive sample

The sample used includes tender offers, mergers, acquisitions of privately held corporations, and comprehensive acquisitions of other firms' assets. According to the results, the majority of bid announcements prompt significant stock price increases, especially when controlling for partial anticipation problems and relative acquisition size. Furthermore, there is little evidence that firms that engage in "bad" acquisitions are more likely to be taken over.

Umstrukturierung von kollektiven Kapitalanlagen

The issuance of the Swiss Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (CISA) in the year 2007 and the revision thereof in 2013 expanded the possibilities for restructuring of collective investment schemes and simplified the procedures. For instance, in article 95 the CISA contains a provision that deals in a non-conclusive way with the restructuring of open-ended collective investment schemes. As a novelty regulation, this provision allows for mergers not only of contractual funds but also of investment companies with variable capital (SICAV). Additionally, the transformation of an open-ended collective investment into another CISA legal form was also included into the catalogue of possible restructuring processes. Further, a SICAV still maintains the possibility for asset transfer according to article 69 ff. of the Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Transformation and Transfer of Assets (MerA). However, not all open questions have been clarified. As long as the CISA does not contain restructuring provisions, as is the case with closed-ended collective investment schemes, generally the MerA and/or the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) apply. The interplay of diverse, partly overlapping legislative bases leads to the emergence of unwanted gaps. Moreover, the partial revision of the CISA was not completely implemented at the ordinance level. Among others, the following issues have not been conclusively or clearly regulated: the permitted combinations of mergers, the merger procedure of the SICAV, the permitted restructurings, the transformation procedure as well as the application scope of the asset transfer for collective investment schemes according to the relevant merger regulations. Although these questions will be clarified in the following article through a systematic and teleological analysis of the relevant regulations, it is to be hoped that the gaps will be closed within the next CISA revision in order to guarantee comprehensive legal certainty.