Benford's Law and Fraud Detection. Facts and Legends

Is Benford's law a good instrument to detect fraud in reports of statistical and scientific data? For a valid test the probability of "false positives" and "false negatives" has to be low. However, it is very doubtful whether the Benford distribution is an appropriate tool to discriminate between manipulated and non-manipulated estimates. Further research should focus more on the validity of the test and test results should be interpreted more carefully.

Traktaty pedagogiczne Honoraty z Wiśniowskich Zapovej i Klementyny z Tańskich Hoffmanowej – inspiracja czy przeróbka?

As is well know, the long-lasting influence in Poland of Hoffmanowa’s conservative pedagogical treatise « Keepsake of a Good Mother » (1819) was criticized by more progressive Polish women writers of the 19th century, such as Narcyza Żmichowska and Eliza Orzeszkowa. But the unexpected success of that book in other Slav countries later in the 19th century, especially in Bohemia, is less well known. Honorata z Wiśniowskich Zapová (1825-1856), a member of the Galician Polish szlachta who moved to Prague after her marriage in 1841 to the Czech writer K. V. Zap, has been recently exhumed as a Czech writer by Czech and Polish literary criticism: apart from her essays in Czech journals on her native country, much emphasis has been laid on the value of her most important work, Nezabudky, dar našim pannám (Forget-me-not: A Gift to Our Young Ladies, published in 1859), which was the first book of pedagogy dedicated to the instruction of young women in Bohemia. In her preface to this book, Zapová mentions Hoffmanowa as being one of her many sources of inspiration. Wishing to know more about what exactly Zapová owes to Hoffmanowa, in this article I compare Hoffmanowa’s book of pedagogy with Zapová’s. I am astonished to discover that Zapová’s book is in fact an almost literal translation from Polish to Czech of „Keepsake of a Good Mother” – in other words, that it is a plagiarism of Hoffmanowa’s book. The main question I ask here is : why did no one until now, either in 19th-century criticism or in our contemporary criticism, mention this literary fraud before?

Delinquenz als soziales Handeln. Eine erweiterte Modellierung und empirische Überprüfung

Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird aus Perspektive der strukturell-individualistischen Handlungstheorie versucht, kriminelles Handeln als soziales Handeln zu modellieren. Die subjektiv rationale Entscheidung für oder gegen delinquentes Handeln erfolgt in Abhängigkeit von Restriktionen, Gelegenheiten, Assoziationen sowie von normativen Überzeugungen und moralischen Bewertungen von Straftaten. Die empirische Anwendung mithilfe einer Bevölkerungsumfrage in Bern liefert für intendierte Straftaten wie Ladendiebstahl, Schwarzfahren, Versicherungsbetrug und Steuerhinterziehung theoriekonsistente Ergebnisse.

Punitive reactions to completed crimes versus accidentally uncompleted crimes

Previous studies have shown that the harm caused by crime affects punitive reactions even if differences in the degree of harm are merely accidental. However, it remains unclear whether the effect is direct or whether it is mediated by attributed responsibility or blame. Participants were 303 university students who listened to 4 case vignettes (between-subjects design). Half received information about a completed crime and half about an accidentally uncompleted crime. Crime type was either fraud or rape. The results suggest that individuals consider the actual harm to a significantly greater extent than attribution theory would predict. Moreover, the link between harm and punishment was virtually not mediated by attributed blame and not moderated by individual differences in morality. Future studies should investigate whether the harm-punishment link is a result of an automatic act of retaliation or a desire to compensate for the harm done to the victim (restorative justice).

Mikro- versus Makroperspektive der retributiven Gerechtigkeit, Strafziele und die Forderung nach Strafe

Wie Personen auf Straftaten reagieren und welche Strafziele sie dabei verfolgen, war bisher kaum Gegenstand psychologischer Forschung. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die dimensionale Struktur der Präferenz von Strafzielen untersucht. In zwei Befragungen wurden juristischen Laien Fallgeschichten zur Beurteilung vorgelegt (Raubüberfall, Körperverletzung, Betrug, Vergewaltigung). Die multivariaten Auswertungen weisen eine hohe Übereinstimmung auf: Strafziele lassen sich durch die zwei voneinander unabhängigen Dimensionen Strafhärte und Mikro- versus Makroperspektive klassifizieren. Wird eine Makroperspektive eingenommen, so ist dies mit einer stärkeren Gewichtung von Gesellschaftsinteressen verbunden sowie mit der Präferenz für das Strafziel der positiven Generalprävention. Die Mikroperspektive ist hingegen mit der Überzeugung verbunden, dass Gerechtigkeit insbesondere aus der Perspektive der konkret Beteiligten herzustellen ist. Je nach geforderter Strafhärte geht die Mikroperspektive mit einem Bias entweder für das Opfer und das Strafziel der Vergeltung oder aber für den Täter und das Strafziel der Resozialisierung einher.

Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions

Exchange between anonymous actors in Internet auctions corresponds to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma-like situation. Therefore, in any given auction the risk is high that seller and buyer will cheat and, as a consequence, that the market will collapse. However, mutual cooperation can be attained by the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this system, sellers have incentives to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we empirically explore the effects of the reputation system. In general, the analysis of nonobtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation, and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimates of effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions such as the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the selling price (highest bid). In particular, we try to answer the question whether sellers receive a "premium" for reputation. Our results show that buyers are willing to pay higher prices for reputation in order to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves from cheating buyers by the choice of an appropriate payment mode. Therefore, despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior, simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets.