Tumor budding score based on 10 high-power fields is a promising basis for a standardized prognostic scoring system in stage II colorectal cancer

Tumor budding is recognized by the World Health Organization as an additional prognostic factor in colorectal cancer but remains unreported in diagnostic work due to the absence of a standardized scoring method. This study aims to assess the most prognostic and reproducible scoring systems for tumor budding in colorectal cancer. Tumor budding on pancytokeratin-stained whole tissue sections from 105 well-characterized stage II patients was scored by 3 observers using 7 methods: Hase, Nakamura, Ueno, Wang (conventional and rapid method), densest high-power field, and 10 densest high-power fields. The predictive value for clinicopathologic features, the prognostic significance, and interobserver variability of each scoring method was analyzed. Pancytokeratin staining allowed accurate evaluation of tumor buds. Interobserver agreement for 3 observers was excellent for densest high-power field (intraclass correlation coefficient, 0.83) and 10 densest high-power fields (intraclass correlation coefficient, 0.91). Agreement was moderate to substantial for the conventional Wang method (κ = 0.46-0.62) and moderate for the rapid method (κ = 0.46-0.58). For Nakamura, moderate agreement (κ = 0.41-0.52) was reached, whereas concordance was fair to moderate for Ueno (κ = 0.39-0.56) and Hase (κ = 0.29-0.51). The Hase, Ueno, densest high-power field, and 10 densest high-power field methods identified a significant association of tumor budding with tumor border configuration. In multivariate analysis, only tumor budding as evaluated in densest high-power field and 10 densest high-power fields had significant prognostic effects on patient survival (P < .01), with high prognostic accuracy over the full 10-year follow-up. Scoring tumor buds in 10 densest high-power fields is a promising method to identify stage II patients at high risk for recurrence in daily diagnostics; it is highly reproducible, accounts for heterogeneity, and has a strong predictive value for adverse outcome.

Proposal for a 10-high-power-fields scoring method for the assessment of tumor budding in colorectal cancer

Although tumor budding is linked to adverse prognosis in colorectal cancer, it remains largely unreported in daily diagnostic work due to the absence of a standardized scoring method. Our aim was to assess the inter-observer agreement of a novel 10-high-power-fields method for assessment of tumor budding at the invasive front and to confirm the prognostic value of tumor budding in our setting of colorectal cancers. Whole tissue sections of 215 colorectal cancers with full clinico-pathological and follow-up information were stained with cytokeratin AE1/AE3 antibody. Presence of buds was scored across 10-high-power fields at the invasive front by two pathologists and two additional observers were asked to score 50 cases of tumor budding randomly selected from the larger cohort. The measurements were correlated to the patient and tumor characteristics. Inter-observer agreement and correlation between observers' scores were excellent (P<0.0001; intraclass correlation coefficient=0.96). A test subgroup of 65 patients (30%) was used to define a valid cutoff score for high-grade tumor budding and the remaining 70% of the patients were entered into the analysis. High-grade budding was defined as an average of ≥10 buds across 10-high-power fields. High-grade budding was associated with a higher tumor grade (P<0.0001), higher TNM stage (P=0.0003), vascular invasion (P<0.0001), infiltrating tumor border configuration (P<0.0001) and reduced survival (P<0.0001). Multivariate analysis confirmed its independent prognostic effect (P=0.007) when adjusting for TNM stage and adjuvant therapy. Using 10-high-power fields for evaluating tumor budding has independent prognostic value and shows excellent inter-observer agreement. Like the BRE and Gleason scores in breast and prostate cancers, respectively, tumor budding could be a basis for a prognostic score in colorectal cancer.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture

To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.