Socialism and intrafirm asset allocation

We rely on a survey of Swiss firms to document deviation from first-best for reasons of internal 'fairness' when allicating resources. This 'socialist' practice is more widespread in smaller than in larger firms. It ignores the reputation and past performance of the managers who apply for dunding, but takes into account their hierarchical position and their past use of resources. Socialism is only partially explained by concerns about empire building and managerial optimism, and it is not meant to benefit shareholders.

Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices

We examine the board overlap among firms listed in Switzerland. Collusion, managerial entrenchment, and financial participation cannot explain it. The overlap appears to be induced by banks and by the accumulation of seats by the most popular directors. We also document that seat accumulation is negatively related to firm value, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that multiple directorships induce and the time constraints directors face. Contrary to popular beliefs, however, the directors of traded firms do not generally hold more than one mandate in other traded firms. They do hold multiple seats in non-traded firms.

What Does the Market Learn from Stock Offering Revisions?

We examine the disclosure of size revisions of seasoned stock offerings to see what information revisions impart to investros. Revisions could deliver firm-originated infoirmation, which discloses something managers know about the firm. Alternatively, they could disseminate market-originated information, which is information market participants have but which is not conveyed until trading takes place. Our results reject the notion that revisions reveal firm-originated news. Instead, the results are consistent with the market-originated news hypothesis and suggest a mechanism that investros and underwriters use to learn about the demand for an offering.