Macular hole surgery in patients with end-stage choroideremia

OBJECTIVE To assess macular hole surgery in patients with end-stage choroideremia with regard to anatomic closure and visual outcome. DESIGN Retrospective, interventional case series. PARTICIPANTS Thirty adult male patients with a diagnosis of advanced choroideremia were reviewed and underwent spectral domain optical coherence tomography (OCT) as part of the screening process for a gene therapy clinical trial. From within that cohort, 3 were identified as having a full-thickness macular hole (FTMH). METHODS A 23-gauge pars plana vitrectomy was performed with peeling of the inner limiting membrane and gas tamponade. Preoperative best-corrected visual acuity ranged from perception of light to 6/24. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES Prevalence of FTMH in advanced choroideremia, morphologic phenotype characteristics of FTMH in OCT, pre- and postoperative best-corrected visual acuity, and closure rate after surgery. RESULTS The prevalence of FTMH in advanced choroideremia in our cohort was 10%. One hole was associated with significant macular schisis, presumed to be attributable to degeneration of outer retinal layers. Anatomic closure was achieved in all 3 patients and confirmed with spectral domain OCT. Gas tamponade lasted approximately twice as long as might be expected compared with standard FTMH surgery. Objective visual acuity did not improve; however, perceived vision improved in all patients. CONCLUSIONS Although FTMH in choroideremia is a rare finding, it could potentially mask central progression of the disease. Regular screening may help to diagnose holes at an earlier stage when the visual prognosis after surgery may be better. Standard macular hole surgery seems to be effective in gaining anatomic closure, which would be significant for patients who subsequently require macula detachment for subretinal gene therapy. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE(S) The authors have no proprietary or commercial interest in any of the materials discussed in this article.

Prevention of increased abnormal fundus autofluorescence with blue light-filtering intraocular lenses

PURPOSE To observe changes in fundus autofluorescence 2 years after implantation of blue light-filtering (yellow-tinted) and ultraviolet light-filtering (colorless) intraocular lenses (IOLs). SETTING Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Science, Nagoya City University Graduate School of Medical Sciences, Nagoya, Japan, and the Department of Ophthalmology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland. DESIGN Prospective comparative observational study. METHODS Patients were enrolled who had cataract surgery with implantation of a yellow-tinted or colorless IOL and for whom images were obtained on which the fundus autofluorescence was measurable using the Heidelberg Retina Angiogram 2 postoperatively. The fundus autofluorescence in the images was classified into 8 abnormal patterns based on the classification of the International Fundus Autofluorescence Classification Group, The presence of normal fundus autofluorescence, geographic atrophy, and wet age-related macular degeneration (AMD) also was recorded. The fundus findings at baseline and 2 years postoperatively were compared. RESULTS Fifty-two eyes with a yellow-tinted IOL and 79 eyes with a colorless IOL were included. Abnormal fundus autofluorescence did not develop or increase in the yellow-tinted IOL group; however, progressive abnormal fundus autofluorescence developed or increased in 12 eyes (15.2%) in the colorless IOL group (P = .0016). New drusen, geographic atrophy, and choroidal neovascularization were observed mainly in the colorless IOL group. The incidence of AMD was statistically significantly higher in the colorless IOL group (P = .042). CONCLUSIONS Two years after cataract surgery, significant differences were seen in the progression of abnormal fundus autofluorescence between the 2 groups. The incidence of AMD was lower in eyes with a yellow-tinted IOL. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE No author has a financial or proprietary interest in any material or method mentioned.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.