European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements

Who in the European Union drives the process of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations? In contrast to societal explanations, this article develops a novel argument as to how the European Commission manages the process and uses its position in strategic ways to pursue its interests. Rooted in principal–agent theory, the article discusses agent preferences and theorizes the conditions under which the agent sets specific focal points and interacts strategically with principals and third parties. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from the first trade agreement concluded and ratified since the EU Commission announced its new strategy in 2006: the EU–South Korea trade agreement

Stricter regulation boosts exports: the case of Maximum Residue Levels in pesticides

Constructing an original panel on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) in pesticides for 50 countries over 2006-2012, this paper studies the effect of heterogeneity in MRL regulation on bilateral trade. We find evidence of regulatory heterogeneity diminishing trade at the extensive margin when the exporter faces more stringent regulation abroad, suggesting compliance costs in entering the destination market. Significantly, however, we also find strong evidence of regulatory heterogeneity increasing trade at the intensive margin for exports coming from countries that set the strictest standards, alluding to the positive informative effect of such regulation.