Integration of external and internal dosimetry in Switzerland

Individual monitoring regulations in Switzerland are based on the ICRP60 recommendations. The annual limit of 20 mSv for the effective dose applies to the sum of external and internal radiation. External radiation is monitored monthly or quarterly with TLD, DIS or CR-39 dosemeters by 10 approved external dosimetry services and reported as H(p)(10) and H(p)(0.07). Internal monitoring is done in two steps. At the workplace, simple screening measurements are done frequently in order to recognise a possible incorporation. If a nuclide dependent activity threshold is exceeded then one of the seven approved dosimetry services for internal radiation does an incorporation measurement to assess the committed effective dose E(50). The dosimetry services report all the measured or assessed dose values to the employer and to the National Dose Registry. The employer records the annually accumulated dose values into the individual dose certificate of the occupationally exposed person, both the external dose H(p)(10) and the internal dose E(50) as well as the total effective dose E = H(p)(10)+E(50). Based on the national dose registry an annual report on the dosimetry in Switzerland is published which contains the statistics for the total effective dose, as well as separate statistics for external and internal exposure.

Opinion of headhunters about the ability of strabismic subjects to obtain employment

BACKGROUND: Through the opinion of Swiss headhunters, we wanted to determine the influence of strabismus on the ability to obtain employment. METHODS: Out of 31 randomly selected Swiss headhunters, 20 could be interviewed using a validated questionnaire. RESULTS: Forty-seven percent of the headhunters judged that strabismic subjects have more difficulties in obtaining a job. Gender has no influence on discrimination (p > 0.1). Asked about six facial disfigurements, strabismus was found to have the second largest negative impact on employment directly after acne. Strabismus was estimated to decrease the attractiveness of job applicants (p < 0.0001) and to have a negative impact on the overall judgment of a potential employer (p < 0.05). CONCLUSIONS: Visible strabismus influences negatively the ability to obtain a job. Because of its impact on the employability of a person, we believe that strabismus surgery in adults cannot be considered to be only a beautifying procedure.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.