Economic efficiency analysis of different strategies to control post-weaning multi-systemic wasting syndrome and porcine circovirus type 2 subclinical infection in 3-weekly batch system farms.

The study assessed the economic efficiency of different strategies for the control of post-weaning multi-systemic wasting syndrome (PMWS) and porcine circovirus type 2 subclinical infection (PCV2SI), which have a major economic impact on the pig farming industry worldwide. The control strategies investigated consisted on the combination of up to 5 different control measures. The control measures considered were: (1) PCV2 vaccination of piglets (vac); (2) ensuring age adjusted diet for growers (diets); (3) reduction of stocking density (stock); (4) improvement of biosecurity measures (bios); and (5) total depopulation and repopulation of the farm for the elimination of other major pathogens (DPRP). A model was developed to simulate 5 years production of a pig farm with a 3-weekly batch system and with 100 sows. A PMWS/PCV2SI disease and economic model, based on PMWS severity scores, was linked to the production model in order to assess disease losses. This PMWS severity scores depends on the combination post-weaning mortality, PMWS morbidity in younger pigs and proportion of PCV2 infected pigs observed on farms. The economic analysis investigated eleven different farm scenarios, depending on the number of risk factors present before the intervention. For each strategy, an investment appraisal assessed the extra costs and benefits of reducing a given PMWS severity score to the average score of a slightly affected farm. The net present value obtained for each strategy was then multiplied by the corresponding probability of success to obtain an expected value. A stochastic simulation was performed to account for uncertainty and variability. For moderately affected farms PCV2 vaccination alone was the most cost-efficient strategy, but for highly affected farms it was either PCV2 vaccination alone or in combination with biosecurity measures, with the marginal profitability between 'vac' and 'vac+bios' being small. Other strategies such as 'diets', 'vac+diets' and 'bios+diets' were frequently identified as the second or third best strategy. The mean expected values of the best strategy for a moderately and a highly affected farm were £14,739 and £57,648 after 5 years, respectively. This is the first study to compare economic efficiency of control strategies for PMWS and PCV2SI. The results demonstrate the economic value of PCV2 vaccination, and highlight that on highly affected farms biosecurity measures are required to achieve optimal profitability. The model developed has potential as a farm-level decision support tool for the control of this economically important syndrome.

Evaluation of control and surveillance strategies for classical swine fever using a simulation model

Classical swine fever (CSF) outbreaks can cause enormous losses in naïve pig populations. How to best minimize the economic damage and number of culled animals caused by CSF is therefore an important research area. The baseline CSF control strategy in the European Union and Switzerland consists of culling all animals in infected herds, movement restrictions for animals, material and people within a given distance to the infected herd and epidemiological tracing of transmission contacts. Additional disease control measures such as pre-emptive culling or vaccination have been recommended based on the results from several simulation models; however, these models were parameterized for areas with high animal densities. The objective of this study was to explore whether pre-emptive culling and emergency vaccination should also be recommended in low- to moderate-density areas such as Switzerland. Additionally, we studied the influence of initial outbreak conditions on outbreak severity to improve the efficiency of disease prevention and surveillance. A spatial, stochastic, individual-animal-based simulation model using all registered Swiss pig premises in 2009 (n=9770) was implemented to quantify these relationships. The model simulates within-herd and between-herd transmission (direct and indirect contacts and local area spread). By varying the four parameters (a) control measures, (b) index herd type (breeding, fattening, weaning or mixed herd), (c) detection delay for secondary cases during an outbreak and (d) contact tracing probability, 112 distinct scenarios were simulated. To assess the impact of scenarios on outbreak severity, daily transmission rates were compared between scenarios. Compared with the baseline strategy (stamping out and movement restrictions) vaccination and pre-emptive culling neither reduced outbreak size nor duration. Outbreaks starting in a herd with weaning piglets or fattening pigs caused higher losses regarding to the number of culled premises and were longer lasting than those starting in the two other index herd types. Similarly, larger transmission rates were estimated for these index herd type outbreaks. A longer detection delay resulted in more culled premises and longer duration and better transmission tracing increased the number of short outbreaks. Based on the simulation results, baseline control strategies seem sufficient to control CSF in low-medium animal-dense areas. Early detection of outbreaks is crucial and risk-based surveillance should be focused on weaning piglet and fattening pig premises.

Livelihood and Community Development: LforS learning and simulation game

Up to 15 people can participate in the game, which is supervised by a moderator. Households consisting of 1-5 people discuss options for diversification of household strategies. Aim of the game: By devising appropriate strategies, households seek to stand up to various types of events while improving their economic and social situation and, at the same time, taking account of ecological conditions. The annual General Community Meeting (GCM) provides an opportunity for households to create a general set-up at the local level that is more or less favourable to the strategies they are pursuing. The development of a community investment strategy, to be implemented by the GCM, and successful coordination between households will allow players to optimise their investments at the household level. The household who owns the most assets at the end of the game wins. Players participate very actively, as the game stimulates lively and interesting discussions. They find themselves confronted with different types of decision-making related to the reality of their daily lives. They explore different ways to model their own household strategies and discuss risks and opportunities. Reflections on the course of the game continually refer to the real-life situations of the participants.

Sustainable Pasture Management : LforS learning and simulation game

Three teams consisting of 2 to 5 persons each play the game. Each team represents a farm. Each team decides jointly on its strategy. In annual meetings in winter, the farm teams jointly discuss, evaluate and decide on how to proceed and actions to be taken. The farms make use of three different pasture areas (village pasture, intensive pasture and summer pasture) for grazing their livestock. The carrying capacity of each pasture area is different and varies according to the season. In each season, the farms have to decide on how many livestock units to graze on which pasture. Overgrazing and pasture degradation occur if the total number of livestock units exceeds the carrying capacity of a specific pasture area. Overgrazing results in a reduction of pasture productivity. To diversify and improve their livelihood strategy farms can make individual investments to increase productivity at the farm level, eg. in fodder production or in income generating activities. At the community level, collective investments can be made which may influence livestock and household economy, e.g. rehabilitate and improve pasture productivity, improve living conditions on remote pastures etc. Events occurring in the course of the game represent different types of (risk) factors such as meteorology, market, politics etc. that may positively or negatively influence livestock production and household economy. A sustainable management of pastures requires that farms actively regulate the development of their herds, that they take measures to prevent pasture degradation and to improve pasture productivity, and that they find a balance between livestock economy and other productive activities. The game has a double aim: a) each farm aims at its economic success and prosperity, and b) the three farm teams jointly have to find and implement strategies for a sustainable use of pasture areas.

CONMICOM – conflict mitigation in communities: LforS learning and simulation game

Three extended families live around a lake. One family are rice farmers, the second family are vegetable farmers, and the third are a family of livestock herders. All of them depend on the use of lake water for their production, and all of them need large quantities of water. All are dependent on the use of the lake water to secure their livelihood. In the game, the families are represented by their councils of elders. Each of the councils has to find means and ways to increase production in order to keep up with the growth of its family and their demands. This puts more and more pressure on the water resources, increasing the risk of overuse. Conflicts over water are about to emerge between the families. Each council of elders must try to pursue its families interests, while at the same time preventing excessive pressure on the water resources. Once a council of elders is no longer able to meet the needs of its family, it is excluded from the game. Will the parties cooperate or compete? To face the challenge of balancing economic well-being, sustainable resource management, and individual and collective interests, the three parties have a set of options for action at hand. These include power play to safeguard their own interests, communication and cooperation to negotiate with neighbours, and searching for alternatives to reduce pressure on existing water resources. During the game the players can experience how tensions may arise, increase and finally escalate. They realise what impact power play has and how alliances form, and the importance of trust-building measures, consensus and cooperation. From the insights gained, important conflict prevention and mitigation measures are derived in a debriefing session. The game is facilitated by a moderator, and lasts for 3-4 hours. Aim of the game: Each family pursues the objective of serving its own interests and securing its position through appropriate strategies and skilful negotiation, while at the same time optimising use of the water resources in a way that prevents their degradation. The end of the game is open. While the game may end by one or two families dropping out because they can no longer secure their subsistence, it is also possible that the three families succeed in creating a situation that allows them to meet their own needs as well as the requirements for sustainable water use in the long term. Learning objectives The game demonstrates how tension builds up, increases, and finally escalates; it shows how power positions work and alliances are formed; and it enables the players to experience the great significance of mutual agreement and cooperation. During the game and particularly during the debriefing and evaluation session it is important to link experiences made during the game to the players’ real-life experiences, and to discuss these links in the group. The resulting insights will provide a basis for deducing important conflict prevention and transformation measures.

A simulation study on the statistical monitoring of condemnation rates from slaughterhouses for syndromic surveillance: an evaluation based on Swiss data

Syndromic surveillance (SyS) systems currently exploit various sources of health-related data, most of which are collected for purposes other than surveillance (e.g. economic). Several European SyS systems use data collected during meat inspection for syndromic surveillance of animal health, as some diseases may be more easily detected post-mortem than at their point of origin or during the ante-mortem inspection upon arrival at the slaughterhouse. In this paper we use simulation to evaluate the performance of a quasi-Poisson regression (also known as an improved Farrington) algorithm for the detection of disease outbreaks during post-mortem inspection of slaughtered animals. When parameterizing the algorithm based on the retrospective analyses of 6 years of historic data, the probability of detection was satisfactory for large (range 83-445 cases) outbreaks but poor for small (range 20-177 cases) outbreaks. Varying the amount of historical data used to fit the algorithm can help increasing the probability of detection for small outbreaks. However, while the use of a 0·975 quantile generated a low false-positive rate, in most cases, more than 50% of outbreak cases had already occurred at the time of detection. High variance observed in the whole carcass condemnations time-series, and lack of flexibility in terms of the temporal distribution of simulated outbreaks resulting from low reporting frequency (monthly), constitute major challenges for early detection of outbreaks in the livestock population based on meat inspection data. Reporting frequency should be increased in the future to improve timeliness of the SyS system while increased sensitivity may be achieved by integrating meat inspection data into a multivariate system simultaneously evaluating multiple sources of data on livestock health.

The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate Change Mitigation: Legal and Economic Analysis

This paper addresses a potential role that tariffs and tariff policy can play in encouraging countries to take part in a multilateral effort to mitigate climate change. It begins by assessing whether increasing tariffs on products from energy intensive or polluting industries amounts to a violation of WTO rules and whether protectionism in this case can be differentiated from genuine environmental concerns. It then argues that while lowering tariffs for environmental goods can serve as a carrot to promote dissemination of cleaner technologies, tariff deconsolidation is a legitimate stick to encourage polluting countries to move towards an international climate agreement. The paper further explores this view by undertaking a partialequilibrium simulation analysis to examine the impact of a unilateral unit increase in tariffs on the imports of the most carbon-intensive products from countries not committed to climate polices. Our results suggest that the committed importing countries would have to raise their tariffs only slightly to effect a significant decline in the imports of these products from the non-committed countries. For instance, a unit increase in the simple average applied tariffs on the imports of these carbon-intensive products in 2005 from our sample of non-committed exporting countries would reduce the imports of these products by an average 32.6% in Australia, 178% in Canada, 195% in the EU, 271% in Japan and 62% in the US, therebysuggesting the effectiveness of such a measure in pushing countries towards a global climate policy.