Cost effectiveness of home based population screening for Chlamydia trachomatis in the UK: economic evaluation of chlamydia screening studies (ClaSS) project

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the cost effectiveness of screening for Chlamydia trachomatis compared with a policy of no organised screening in the United Kingdom. DESIGN: Economic evaluation using a transmission dynamic mathematical model. SETTING: Central and southwest England. PARTICIPANTS: Hypothetical population of 50,000 men and women, in which all those aged 16-24 years were invited to be screened each year. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Cost effectiveness based on major outcomes averted, defined as pelvic inflammatory disease, ectopic pregnancy, infertility, or neonatal complications. RESULTS: The incremental cost per major outcome averted for a programme of screening women only (assuming eight years of screening) was 22,300 pounds (33,000 euros; $45,000) compared with no organised screening. For a programme screening both men and women, the incremental cost effectiveness ratio was approximately 28,900 pounds. Pelvic inflammatory disease leading to hospital admission was the most frequently averted major outcome. The model was highly sensitive to the incidence of major outcomes and to uptake of screening. When both were increased the cost effectiveness ratio fell to 6200 pound per major outcome averted for screening women only. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive register based screening for chlamydia is not cost effective if the uptake of screening and incidence of complications are based on contemporary empirical studies, which show lower rates than commonly assumed. These data are relevant to discussions about the cost effectiveness of the opportunistic model of chlamydia screening being introduced in England.

Economic burden of surgical site infections at a European university hospital

OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic burden of in-hospital surgical site infections (SSIs) at a European university hospital. DESIGN: Matched case-control study nested in a prospective observational cohort study. SETTING: Basel University Hospital in Switzerland, where an average of 28,000 surgical procedures are performed per year. METHODS: All in-hospital occurrences of SSI associated with surgeries performed between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2001, by the visceral, vascular, and traumatology divisions at Basel University Hospital were prospectively recorded. Each case patient was matched to a control patient by age, procedure code, and National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System risk index. The case-control pairs were analyzed for differences in cost of hospital care and in provision of specialized care. RESULTS: A total of 6,283 procedures were performed: 187 SSIs were detected in inpatients, 168 of whom were successfully matched with a control patient. For case patients, the mean additional hospital cost was SwF-19,638 (95% confidence interval [CI], SwF-8,492-SwF-30,784); the mean additional postoperative length of hospital stay was 16.8 days (95% CI, 13-20.6 days); and the mean additional in-hospital duration of antibiotic therapy was 7.4 days (95% CI, 5.1-9.6 days). Differences were primarily attributable to organ space SSIs (n = 76). CONCLUSIONS: In a European university hospital setting, SSIs are costly and constitute a heavy and potentially preventable burden on both patients and healthcare providers.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.