The doctrine of multilayered governance: The Example of Swiss Foreign Migration Policy

The New Swiss interdepartemental cooperation structure results in a new setting in negotiations and stimulates the counterpart or for the same setting and at least for the same domestic cooperation.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Law and science: risk assessment and risk management in the WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Assessing and managing risks relating to the consumption of food stuffs for humans and to the environment has been one of the most complex legal issues in WTO law, ever since the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was adopted at the end of the Uruguay Round and entered into force in 1995. The problem was expounded in a number of cases. Panels and the Appellate Body adopted different philosophies in interpreting the agreement and the basic concept of risk assessment as defined in Annex A para. 4 of the Agreement. Risk assessment entails fundamental question on law and science. Different interpretations reflect different underlying perceptions of science and its relationship to the law. The present thesis supported by the Swiss National Research Foundation undertakes an in-depth analysis of these underlying perceptions. The author expounds the essence and differences of positivism and relativism in philosophy and natural sciences. He clarifies the relationship of fundamental concepts such as risk, hazards and probability. This investigation is a remarkable effort on the part of lawyer keen to learn more about the fundamentals based upon which the law – often unconsciously – is operated by the legal profession and the trade community. Based upon these insights, he turns to a critical assessment of jurisprudence both of panels and the Appellate Body. Extensively referring and discussing the literature, he deconstructs findings and decisions in light of implied and assumed underlying philosophies and perceptions as to the relationship of law and science, in particular in the field of food standards. Finding that both positivism and relativism does not provide adequate answers, the author turns critical rationalism and applies the methodologies of falsification developed by Karl R. Popper. Critical rationalism allows combining discourse in science and law and helps preparing the ground for a new approach to risk assessment and risk management. Linking the problem to the doctrine of multilevel governance the author develops a theory allocating risk assessment to international for a while leaving the matter of risk management to national and democratically accountable government. While the author throughout the thesis questions the possibility of separating risk assessment and risk management, the thesis offers new avenues which may assist in structuring a complex and difficult problem

Climate Change and International Law. Exploring the Linkages Between Human Rights, Environment, Trade and Investment

Mapping the relevant principles and norms of international law, the paper discusses scientific evidence and identifies current legal foundations of climate change mitigation adaptation and communication in international environmental law, human rights protection and international trade regulation in WTO law. It briefly discusses the evolution and architecture of relevant multilateral environmental agreements, in particular the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It discusses the potential role of human rights in identifying pertinent goals and values of mitigation and adaptation and eventually turns to principles and rules of international trade regulation and investment protection which are likely to be of crucial importance should the advent of a new multilateral agreement fail to materialize. The economic and legal relevance of rules on tariffs, border tax adjustment and subsidies, services and intellectual property and investment law are discussed in relation to the production, supply and use of energy. Moreover, lessons from trade negotiations may be drawn for negotiations of future environmental instruments. The paper offers a survey of the main interacting areas of public international law and discusses the intricate interaction of all these components informing climate change mitigation, adaptation and communication in international law in light of an emerging doctrine of multilayered governance. It seeks to contribute to greater coherence of what today is highly fragmented and rarely discussed in an overall context. The paper argues that trade regulation will be of critical importance in assessing domestic policies and potential trade remedies offer powerful incentives for all nations alike to participate in a multilateral framework defining appropriate goals and principles.

Liberalism and racism: an ‘elective affinity’?

This appraisal of David Scott FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín's Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas argues that there is no ‘elective affinity’ between liberalism and racism, which is the core argument of the book. The notion of ‘elective affinity’, which the authors borrow from Max Weber, requires a structural homology between the ‘electively’ related elements that just does not exist in this case. The relationship between both is entirely contingent, ‘racism’ being a doctrine of inter-group relations while ‘liberalism’ is a doctrine of intra-group relations, with no consideration of how the boundaries of the group are constituted.

Unfair Advantage: An Intriguing Example of Legal Transformation in the Swiss Private Law

This paper demonstrates a mixed approach to the theme of the instrumentality of law by both analysing the goal of a legal transformation and the techniques adapted to achieve it. The correct recognition of a certain practical necessity has lead the Swiss Federal Tribunal to an intriguing judgement “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” of 1997. The legal remedies provided for cases of unfair advantage have been then creatively modified praeter legem. The adaptation was strongly influenced by foreign legal patterns. The Swiss Code of Obligations of 1911 provides a norm in art. 21 on unfair advantage (unconscionable contract), prescribing that if one party takes unjustified advantage over the weaknesses of another in order to receive an excessive benefit, such a contract is avoidable. Its wording has been shaped over a hundred years ago and still remains intact. However, over the course of the 20th century the necessity for a more efficient protection has arisen. The legal doctrine and jurisprudence were constantly pointing out the incompleteness of the remedies provided by art. 21 of the Code of Obligations. In the “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” (BGE 123 III 292) the Swiss Federal Tribunal finally introduced the possibility to modify the contract. Its decision has been described as “a sign of the zeitgeist, spirit of the time”. It was the Swiss legal doctrine that has imposed the new measure under the influence of the German “quantitative Teilnichtigkeit” (quantitative partial nullity). The historical heritage of the Roman laesio enormis has also played its role.