Hepatic-portal vein infusions of glucagon-like peptide-1 reduce meal size and increase c-Fos expression in the nucleus tractus solitarii, area postrema and central nucleus of the amygdala in rats

We recently reported that brief, remotely controlled intrameal hepatic-portal vein infusions of glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) reduced spontaneous meal size in rats. To investigate the neurobehavioural correlates of this effect, we equipped male Sprague-Dawley rats with hepatic-portal vein catheters and assessed (i) the effect on eating of remotely triggered infusions of GLP-1 (1 nmol/kg, 5 min) or vehicle during the first nocturnal meal after 3 h of food deprivation and (ii) the effect of identical infusions performed at dark onset on c-Fos expression in several brain areas involved in the control of eating. GLP-1 reduced (P < 0.05) the size of the first nocturnal meal and increased its satiety ratio. Also, GLP-1 increased (P < 0.05) the number of c-Fos-expressing cells in the nucleus tractus solitarii, the area postrema and the central nucleus of the amygdala, but not in the arcuate or paraventricular hypothalamic nuclei. These data suggest that the nucleus tractus solitarii, the area postrema and the central nucleus of the amygdala play a role in the eating-inhibitory actions of GLP-1 infused into the hepatic-portal vein; it remains to be established whether activation of these brain nuclei reflect satiation, aversion, or both.

Comparing expectations and experiences of care for sexually transmitted infections in general practice: a qualitative study

Background A key aim of England's National Strategy for Sexual Health is to extend high-quality sexual health services in primary care. Objectives To explore the expectations and experiences of men and women who initially presented at their general practice with a suspected sexually transmitted infection in order to identify areas where change could improve service delivery. Methods Semi-structured interviews were carried out in six general practices and two genitourinary medicine (GUM) clinics in Brent primary care trust (London) and Bristol (southwest England). Patients within general practice, and GUM patients who had initially attended general practice were eligible to participate. Interview transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis. Results 49 patients (29 women, 20 men) were interviewed. Patients approaching their GP practice typically expected written referral or in-house care, but this expectation was often not met. Absence of formal referral, lack of information and perceived avoidance of sexual health matters by practitioners were commonly cited as reasons for disappointment. However, a dedicated service within general practice met expectations well. Conclusion Purchasers and providers of all general practice services should ensure that any patient consulting in primary care with a suspected sexually transmitted infection can either receive appropriate care there, or a formal and supported referral to a specialised GUM clinic or primary care service.

Experience and attitudes towards CAM--a survey of internal and psychosomatic patients in a German university hospital

Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is popular in Germany. In a consecutive survey the experiences with CAM and the need for a CAM consultation among inpatients of the departments of cardiology (CL), gastroenterology (GE), oncology (OL) and psychosomatics (PS) of the University Hospital Freiburg (FUH) were questionned. Exclusion criteria were inability to understand the questions or a Karnofsky Index < 30%. Four hundred thirty-five patients were included. Three hundred and fifty patients, 100 each in the departments of CL, GE and OL, and 50 in PS answered the questionnaires. Eighty-five patients (20%) refused. Among the 350 patients 26% had previously visited a CAM physician and 19% had visited a CAM therapist (Heilpraktiker). Information about CAM was obtained mainly by television, radio and family members. Frequently used therapies for the current disease were physical training (21%), diet (19%), massage (19%), vitamins/trace elements (19%), herbs (13%), acupuncture (10%) and homeopathy (7%). The highest frequency of CAM use had PS patients, followed by GE, OL and CL patients. High effectivity (> or = 70%) for the current disease, rated on a scale of 4 degrees, had for CL patients physical exercise and massage, for GE patients herbal treatment and for OL patients diet. Physical exercise, diet, massage and herbal treatment generally had better ratings than homeopathy, acupuncture and vitamins. 65% would welcome a CAM center and 53% asked for a consultation about CAM at FUH. OL and GE patients had the strongest (58%), PS patients a lower (52%) and patients with cardiovascular diseases the lowest (43%) interest in a CAM consultation. Twenty-five percent believed, that CAM can help to cope better with their disease. Predictors for a positive attitude towards CAM were young age, aversion to chemical medications (Spearman correlation r = 0.22), desire to participate in therapeutic decisions (r = 0.29), motivation to change, if recommended, the life style (r = 0.31) and desire for a holistic treatment (r = 0.37).

10001 manuscripts in practice: Perl, XML, medieval chronicles, and why Unicode rocks‎

I work in the field of Armenian historiography. This means I get to play with medieval manuscripts. The things I'm doing with the manuscripts are theoretically interesting, but pretty boring in practice, so I'm using Perl to program away the most boring bits. I will talk about the problems of text criticism in general, what sorts of things can and can't be done by the computer, my initial aversion to XML, how I was shown (some of) the error of my ways, and how I'm combining a bunch of isolated pieces of technology that were mostly already in use to achieve fame and fortune in the world of Armenian studies.

Tonic activity level in the right prefrontal cortex predicts individuals' risk taking

Human risk taking is characterized by a large amount of individual heterogeneity. In this study, we applied resting-state electroencephalography, which captures stable individual differences in neural activity, before subjects performed a risk-taking task. Using a source-localization technique, we found that the baseline cortical activity in the right prefrontal cortex predicts individual risk-taking behavior. Individuals with higher baseline cortical activity in this brain area display more risk aversion than do other individuals. This finding demonstrates that neural characteristics that are stable over time can predict a highly complex behavior such as risk-taking behavior and furthermore suggests that hypoactivity in the right prefrontal cortex might serve as a dispositional indicator of lower regulatory abilities, which is expressed in greater risk-taking behavior.

An investigation into the factors that encourage learner participation in a large group medical classroom

BACKGROUND: Effective lectures often incorporate activities that encourage learner participation. A challenge for educators is how to facilitate this in the large group lecture setting. This study investigates the individual student characteristics involved in encouraging (or dissuading) learners to interact, ask questions, and make comments in class. METHODS: Students enrolled in a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine program at Ross University School of Veterinary Medicine, St Kitts, were invited to complete a questionnaire canvassing their participation in the large group classroom. Data from the questionnaire were analyzed using Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) and the R software environment (http://www.r-project.org/). RESULTS: One hundred and ninety-two students completed the questionnaire (response rate, 85.7%). The results showed statistically significant differences between male and female students when asked to self-report their level of participation (P=0.011) and their confidence to participate (P<0.001) in class. No statistically significant difference was identified between different age groups of students (P=0.594). Student responses reflected that an "aversion to public speaking" acted as the main deterrent to participating during a lecture. Female participants were 3.56 times more likely to report a fear of public speaking than male participants (odds ratio 3.56, 95% confidence interval 1.28-12.33, P=0.01). Students also reported "smaller sizes of class and small group activities" and "other students participating" as factors that made it easier for them to participate during a lecture. CONCLUSION: In this study, sex likely played a role in learner participation in the large group veterinary classroom. Male students were more likely to participate in class and reported feeling more confident to participate than female students. Female students in this study commonly identified aversion to public speaking as a factor which held them back from participating in the large group lecture setting. These are important findings for veterinary and medical educators aiming to improve learner participation in the classroom. Potential ways of addressing this challenge include addition of small group activities and audience response systems during lectures, and inclusion of training interventions in public speaking at an early stage of veterinary and medical curricula.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.