Effect of sibling competition and male carotenoid supply on offspring condition and oxidative stress

Early developmental conditions have major implications for an individual's fitness. In species where offspring are born simultaneously, the level of sibling competition for food access is intense. In birds, high sibling competition may subject nestlings to decreased growth rate as a result of limited food and increased levels of oxidative stress through high metabolic activity induced by begging behaviors. We manipulated the level of sibling competition in a natural population of great tits and assessed the consequences for nestling body condition and resistance to oxidative stress. In a full factorial design, we both augmented brood size to increase sibling competition and supplemented the male parents with physiological doses of carotenoids thereby doubling the natural carotenoid intake, aiming at increasing the males' investment in current reproduction and thereby decreasing sibling competition. Nestling body mass was reduced by the brood enlargement and enhanced by the carotenoid supplementation of fathers. Nestling resistance to oxidative stress, measured as total antioxidant defenses in whole blood, was not influenced by the treatments. Because nestlings experience high metabolic activities, an absence of an effect of sibling competition on free radicals production seems unlikely. Nestling body mass decreased and resistance to oxidative stress tended to increase with initial brood size, and hence these correlational effects suggest a trade-off between morphological growth and development of the antioxidant system. However, the result of the experimental treatment did not support this trade-off hypothesis. Alternatively, it suggests that nestling developed compensatory mechanisms that were not detected by our antioxidant capacity measure.

Making epothilones fluoresce: design, synthesis, and biological characterization of a fluorescent N12-aza-epothilone (azathilone)

A green fluorescent 12-aza-epothilone (azathilone) derivative has been prepared through the attachment of the 4-nitro-2,1,3-benzoxadiazole (NBD) fluorophore to the 12-nitrogen atom of the azamacrolide core structure. While less potent than natural epothilones or different N12-acylated azathilone derivatives, NBD-azathilone (3) promotes tubulin assembly, inhibits cancer cell proliferation in vitro and arrests the cell cycle at the G2/M transition. Most significantly, the binding of 3 to cellular microtubules (MTs) could be directly visualized by confocal fluorescence microscopy. Based on competition binding experiments with laulimalide-stabilized MTs in vitro, the N12-Boc substituted azathilone 1, Epo A, and NBD-azathilone (3) all interact with the same tubulin-binding site. Computational studies provided a structural model of the complexes between beta-tubulin and 1 or 3, respectively, in which the NBD moiety of 3 or the BOC moiety of 1 directly and specifically contribute to MT binding. Collectively, these data demonstrate that the cellular effects of 3 and, by inference, also of other azathilones are the result of their interactions with the cellular MT network.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Explicit vs implicit affiliation motives predict different social behavior in sports competition

Objectives The present study investigated the predictive value of the explicit and implicit affiliation motive for social behavior in sport competitions. From an information processing perspective, an explicit motive is linked to verbal cues and respondent behavior. The implicit motive in turn is linked to nonverbal stimuli and operant behavior (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Schultheiss, 2008). Both respondent affiliative behavior (e.g., verbal interactions with teammates) and operant nonverbal social behavior (e.g., pleasant to opponents) can be observed in racquet sports team competitions. Design & Methods Fifty-two male racquet sportsmen completed the Personality Research Form (explicit affiliation motive) and the Operant Motive Test (implicit affiliation motive). Motive measures were used to predict social behavior during competitions using multiple regression analyses. To this aim real competitive matches were videotaped and analyzed. Results Results show that the explicit affiliation motive is associated with time spent in verbal team contact. The implicit affiliation motive, by contrast, is linked to pleasant nonverbal behavior shown toward opponents. Conclusions Findings suggest that implicit and explicit affiliation motives predict different kinds of social behavior in sports competition respectively. Indirect motive measures may be of additional predictive value for different behavior in real sports settings.