Maine Coon renal screening: ultrasonographical characterisation and preliminary genetic analysis for common genes in cats with renal cysts.

The objective of this study was to assess the prevalence of renal cysts and other renal abnormalities in purebred Maine Coon cats, and to characterise these through genetic typing. Voluntary pre-breeding screening programmes for polycystic kidney disease (PKD) are offered for this breed throughout Switzerland, Germany and other northern European countries. We performed a retrospective evaluation of Maine Coon screening for renal disease at one institution over an 8-year period. Renal ultrasonography was performed in 187 healthy Maine Coon cats. Renal changes were observed in 27 of these cats. Renal cysts were found in seven cats, and were mostly single and unilateral (6/7, 85.7%), small (mean 3.6 mm) and located at the corticomedullary junction (4/6, 66.7%). Sonographical changes indicating chronic kidney disease (CKD) were observed in 10/187 (5.3%) cats and changes of unknown significance were documented in 11/187 (5.9%) cats. All six cats genetically tested for PKD1 were negative for the mutation, and gene sequencing of these cats did not demonstrate any common genetic sequences. Cystic renal disease occurs with a low prevalence in Maine Coons and is unrelated to the PKD observed in Persians and related breeds. Ultrasonographical findings compatible with CKD are not uncommon in juvenile Maine Coons.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.