Implementing fisher Black's simple discounting rule

We propose a simple implementation of Black’s (1988) elegant rule for discounting uncertain future cash flows. Black’s rule avoids the thorny problem of estimating an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. Instead, the rule calls for discounting conditional mean cash flows at appropriate riskless interest rates. Our contribution in this article is to describe and illustrate a method of estimating the conditional mean cash flows called for in Black’s rule. The method is quite flexible with respect to the types of information available concerning the distributions of future cash flows. We argue that this approach to computing present values offers a theoretically sound and generally feasible addition to the toolbox of financial managers.

When Shareholders choose not to Maximize Value: The Union Bank of Switzerland's 1994 Proxy Fight

The staid Union Bank of Switzerland, in a very close vote, won the support of its shareholders in its battle against an attempt by dissidents to guide the way the nation's biggest bank is run. The special shareholder vote, held in a packed Zurich sports hall, was one of the most keenly awaited events in recent Swiss financial histroy. The Wall Street Journal, November 23, 1994

A test of the Bolton-Scheinkman-Xiong hypothesis of how speculation affects the vesting time of options granted to directors

This paper investigates empirically the Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) hypothesis, according to which initial shareholders may provide incentives to managers to take actions that stimulate speculative bubbles. We test this hypothesis with data on up to 8,544 directors and up to 1,677 companies between 2004-2008. Using vesting time as a measure of the short-term performance weighting in CEO compensation and various alternative measures of the extent of speculation, the findings support the hypothesis: vesting time decreases with more intensive speculation. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.

Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk

Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior

We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.