Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Implementation of Evidence-Based Practices for Treatment of Alcohol and Drug Disorders: The Role of the State Authority

The current climate of increasing performance expectations and diminishing resources, along with innovations in evidence-based practices (EBPs), creates new dilemmas for substance abuse treatment providers, policymakers, funders, and the service delivery system. This paper describes findings from baseline interviews with representatives from 49 state substance abuse authorities (SSAs). Interviews assessed efforts aimed at facilitating EBP adoption in each state and the District of Columbia. Results suggested that SSAs are concentrating more effort on EBP implementation strategies such as education, training, and infrastructure development, and less effort on financial mechanisms, regulations, and accreditation. The majority of SSAs use EBPs as a criterion in their contracts with providers, and just over half reported that EBP use is tied to state funding. To date, Oregon remains the only state with legislation that mandates treatment expenditures for EBPs; North Carolina follows suit with legislation that requires EBP promotion within current resources.

Quantitative assessment of oral orbicular muscle deformation after cleft lip reconstruction: an ultrasound elastography study

Reconstruction of a cleft lip leads inevitably to scar tissue formation. Scar tissue within the restored oral orbicular muscle might be assessed by quantification of the local contractility of this muscle. Furthermore, information about the contraction capability of the oral orbicular muscle is crucial for planning the revision surgery of an individual patient. We used ultrasound elastography to determine the local deformation (strain) of the upper lip and to differentiate contracting muscle from passive scar tissue. Raw ultrasound data (radio-frequency format; rf-) were acquired, while the lips were brought from normal state into a pout condition and back in normal state, in three patients and three normal individuals. During this movement, the oral orbicular muscle contracts and, consequently, thickens in contrast to scar tissue that will not contract, or even expand. An iterative coarse-to-fine strain estimation method was used to calculate the local tissue strain. Analysis of the raw ultrasound data allows estimation of tissue strain with a high precision. The minimum strain that can be assessed reproducibly is 0.1%. In normal individuals, strain of the orbicular oral muscle was in the order of 20%. Also, a uniform strain distribution in the oral orbicular muscle was found. However, in patients deviating values were found in the region of the reconstruction and the muscle tissue surrounding that. In two patients with a successful reconstruction, strain was reduced by 6% in the reconstructed region with respect to the normal parts of the muscle (from 22% to 16% and from 25% to 19%). In a patient with severe aesthetical and functional disability, strain decreased from 30% in the normal region to 5% in the reconstructed region. With ultrasound elastography, the strain of the oral orbicular muscle can be quantified. In healthy subjects, the strain profiles and maximum strain values in all parts of the muscle were similar. The maximum strain of the muscle during pout was 20% +/- 1%. In surgically repaired cleft lips, decreased deformation was observed.

Factors influencing the quality of the consultation process

Sport psychology services have become to be an important brick stone when building athletic success. The strive for better performance is not only a characteristic of athletes, but of the whole support system in top level sport including sport psychology. Sport psychology consultants are permanently challenged to deliver highest quality services to their clients if they do not want to lose their contracts. Sport psychologists are continuously improving their consulting skills, learn new intervention techniques, read scientific papers and, last but not least, gain experience by accumulating hours of deliberate practice (Ericsson) in sport psychology. Even with increasing experience, the consultant has a certain number of degrees of freedom and has to make a series of decisions about how he or she wants to work. Quality, however, depends on a number of issues, and not all of them are under direct control of the consultant. It is argued that, in order for these choices being good, the following factors - among others - must be considered: Who is seeking assistance? What are the "issues and problems" (Gardner & Moore, 2006) the athlete is confronted with? What kind of approaches do fit with the client's need? Who is the 'client' the sport psychologist is supposed to work with? If it is a team, is the sport psychologist supposed to work with a number of individuals, with the coach, or with the whole system? Where are the boundaries of the system? What is the role of the sport psychologist in the sport system? All these issues directly affect the process and outcome quality of the sport psychology consultant. A sound theoretical basis, in connection with a distinct philosophy of the intervention, is an important cornerstone for the quality of sport psychology consultation.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.