Seasonality as a core business of phenology

The best characteristics of phenological observations are their description of seasons and seasonal patterns. Specific phenological phases are used to define the beginning and the end of seasons that form phenological calendars. Phenological observations more closely capture the integrated seasonal rhythm than statistically derived means or thresholds from climate elements. They only provide approximate indicators of seasonal changes and cannot replace visible or directly measurable phenomena. Including abiotic observations such as the timing of frost, thawing, icing, snow and fog even provides seasonality descriptions beyond the vegetation period. The length and position of seasons within the year is a foundation for an integrated description of seasonality presented as a phenological season diagram. Phenological observations are the indispensable basis for an integral description of a seasonal classification and seasonality. A well designed phenological diagram could offer a comprehensive picture of the rhythm and amplitude of seasons.

Integration of WSNs into enterprise systems based on semantic physical business entities

Internet of Things based systems are anticipated to gain widespread use in industrial applications. Standardization efforts, like 6L0WPAN and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) have made the integration of wireless sensor nodes possible using Internet technology and web-like access to data (RESTful service access). While there are still some open issues, the interoperability problem in the lower layers can now be considered solved from an enterprise software vendors' point of view. One possible next step towards integration of real-world objects into enterprise systems and solving the corresponding interoperability problems at higher levels is to use semantic web technologies. We introduce an abstraction of real-world objects, called Semantic Physical Business Entities (SPBE), using Linked Data principles. We show that this abstraction nicely fits into enterprise systems, as SPBEs allow a business object centric view on real-world objects, instead of a pure device centric view. The interdependencies between how currently services in an enterprise system are used and how this can be done in a semantic real-world aware enterprise system are outlined, arguing for the need of semantic services and semantic knowledge repositories. We introduce a lightweight query language, which we use to perform a quantitative analysis of our approach to demonstrate its feasibility.

Enterprise software adoption and perceived business performance — an empirical investigation in Germany and the U.S.

This work contributes to the ongoing debate on the productivity paradox by considering CIOs’ perceptions of IT business value. Applying regression analysis to data from an international survey, we study how the adoption of certain types of enterprise software affects the CIOs’ perception of the impact of IT on the firm’s business activities and vice versa. Other potentially important factors such as country, sector and size of the firms are also taken into account. Our results indicate a more significant support for the impact of perceived IT benefits on adoption of enterprise software than vice versa. CIOs based in the US perceive IT benefits more strongly than their German counterparts. Furthermore, certain types of enterprise software seem to be more prevalent in the US.

Commentary of GATS Article IX : Business Practices

Commentary of Article IX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on business practices, including a textual analysis of the provision, as well as an examination of the pertinent WTO case law and of other related international and regional rules and practices.

Information Technology Outsourcing: Towards Sustainable Business Value

This book attempts to synthesize research that contributes to a better understanding of how to reach sustainable business value through information systems (IS) outsourcing. Important topics in this realm are how IS outsourcing can contribute to innovation, how it can be dynamically governed, how to cope with its increasing complexity through multi-vendor arrangements, how service quality standards can be met, how corporate social responsibility can be upheld, and how to cope with increasing demands of internationalization and new sourcing models, such as crowdsourcing and platform-based cooperation. These issues are viewed from either the client or vendor perspective, or both. The book should be of interest to all academics and students in the fields of Information Systems, Management, and Organization as well as corporate executives and professionals who seek a more profound analysis and understanding of the underlying factors and mechanisms of outsourcing.

Information Systems Outsourcing: Towards Sustainable Business Value

This book attempts to synthesize research that contributes to a better understanding of how to reach sustainable business value through information systems (IS) outsourcing. Important topics in this realm are how IS outsourcing can contribute to innovation, how it can be dynamically governed, how to cope with its increasing complexity through multi-vendor arrangements, how service quality standards can be met, how corporate social responsibility can be upheld and how to cope with increasing demands of internationalization and new sourcing models, such as crowdsourcing and platform-based cooperation. These issues are viewed from either the client or vendor perspective, or both. The book should be of interest to all academics and students in the fields of Information Systems, Management and Organization as well as corporate executives and professionals who seek a more profound analysis and understanding of the underlying factors and mechanisms of outsourcing.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Analysis of Nucleocytoplasmic Protein Shuttling by Imaging Flow Cytometry

Many intracellular signal transduction events involve the reversible shuttling of proteins between the cytoplasm and the nucleus. Study of these processes requires imaging information on the protein localization in a given cell and a large number of measurements to obtain sufficient statistics on the protein localization in the whole population. The protocol describes method for quantitative imaging flow cytometry analysis of intracellular distribution of NF-kappaB in ARPE-19 cells stained with specific fluorochrome-conjugated antibodies. The described technique alone or in combination with standard flow cytometry methods can be applied to study any protein undergoing translocation from cytoplasm into the nucleus in a variety of cell lines as well as in heterogeneous primary cell populations