The Advantages of Parametric Modeling for the Reconstruction of Historic Buildings

Consecrated in 1297 as the monastery church of the four years earlier founded St. Catherine’s monastery, the Gothic Church of St. Catherine was largely destroyed in a devastating bombing raid on January 2nd 1945. To counteract the process of disintegration, the departments of geo-information and lower monument protection authority of the City of Nuremburg decided to getting done a three dimensional building model of the Church of St. Catherine’s. A heterogeneous set of data was used for preparation of a parametric architectural model. In effect the modeling of historic buildings can profit from the so called BIM method (Building Information Modeling), as the necessary structuring of the basic data renders it into very sustainable information. The resulting model is perfectly suited to deliver a vivid impression of the interior and exterior of this former mendicant orders’ church to present observers.

SLA-driven predictive orchestration for distributed cloud-based mobile services

We describe a system for performing SLA-driven management and orchestration of distributed infrastructures composed of services supporting mobile computing use cases. In particular, we focus on a Follow-Me Cloud scenario in which we consider mobile users accessing cloud-enable services. We combine a SLA-driven approach to infrastructure optimization, with forecast-based performance degradation preventive actions and pattern detection for supporting mobile cloud infrastructure management. We present our system's information model and architecture including the algorithmic support and the proposed scenarios for system evaluation.

A prediction model for assessing residential radon concentration in Switzerland

Indoor radon is regularly measured in Switzerland. However, a nationwide model to predict residential radon levels has not been developed. The aim of this study was to develop a prediction model to assess indoor radon concentrations in Switzerland. The model was based on 44,631 measurements from the nationwide Swiss radon database collected between 1994 and 2004. Of these, 80% randomly selected measurements were used for model development and the remaining 20% for an independent model validation. A multivariable log-linear regression model was fitted and relevant predictors selected according to evidence from the literature, the adjusted R², the Akaike's information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The prediction model was evaluated by calculating Spearman rank correlation between measured and predicted values. Additionally, the predicted values were categorised into three categories (50th, 50th-90th and 90th percentile) and compared with measured categories using a weighted Kappa statistic. The most relevant predictors for indoor radon levels were tectonic units and year of construction of the building, followed by soil texture, degree of urbanisation, floor of the building where the measurement was taken and housing type (P-values <0.001 for all). Mean predicted radon values (geometric mean) were 66 Bq/m³ (interquartile range 40-111 Bq/m³) in the lowest exposure category, 126 Bq/m³ (69-215 Bq/m³) in the medium category, and 219 Bq/m³ (108-427 Bq/m³) in the highest category. Spearman correlation between predictions and measurements was 0.45 (95%-CI: 0.44; 0.46) for the development dataset and 0.44 (95%-CI: 0.42; 0.46) for the validation dataset. Kappa coefficients were 0.31 for the development and 0.30 for the validation dataset, respectively. The model explained 20% overall variability (adjusted R²). In conclusion, this residential radon prediction model, based on a large number of measurements, was demonstrated to be robust through validation with an independent dataset. The model is appropriate for predicting radon level exposure of the Swiss population in epidemiological research. Nevertheless, some exposure misclassification and regression to the mean is unavoidable and should be taken into account in future applications of the model.

Beyond the tree of texts: Building an empirical model of scribal variation through graph analysis of texts and stemmata

Stemmatology, or the reconstruction of the transmission history of texts, is a field that stands particularly to gain from digital methods. Many scholars already take stemmatic approaches that rely heavily on computational analysis of the collated text (e.g. Robinson and O’Hara 1996; Salemans 2000; Heikkilä 2005; Windram et al. 2008 among many others). Although there is great value in computationally assisted stemmatology, providing as it does a reproducible result and allowing access to the relevant methodological process in related fields such as evolutionary biology, computational stemmatics is not without its critics. The current state-of-the-art effectively forces scholars to choose between a preconceived judgment of the significance of textual differences (the Lachmannian or neo-Lachmannian approach, and the weighted phylogenetic approach) or to make no judgment at all (the unweighted phylogenetic approach). Some basis for judgment of the significance of variation is sorely needed for medieval text criticism in particular. By this, we mean that there is a need for a statistical empirical profile of the text-genealogical significance of the different sorts of variation in different sorts of medieval texts. The rules that apply to copies of Greek and Latin classics may not apply to copies of medieval Dutch story collections; the practices of copying authoritative texts such as the Bible will most likely have been different from the practices of copying the Lives of local saints and other commonly adapted texts. It is nevertheless imperative that we have a consistent, flexible, and analytically tractable model for capturing these phenomena of transmission. In this article, we present a computational model that captures most of the phenomena of text variation, and a method for analysis of one or more stemma hypotheses against the variation model. We apply this method to three ‘artificial traditions’ (i.e. texts copied under laboratory conditions by scholars to study the properties of text variation) and four genuine medieval traditions whose transmission history is known or deduced in varying degrees. Although our findings are necessarily limited by the small number of texts at our disposal, we demonstrate here some of the wide variety of calculations that can be made using our model. Certain of our results call sharply into question the utility of excluding ‘trivial’ variation such as orthographic and spelling changes from stemmatic analysis.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.