The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.

Emotions and Values

There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).

Exploring the emotional brain: Neural correlates of homeostatic and sensory-evoked emotions and their interaction in emotional rivalry

Human emotions are essential for survival. They are vital for the satisfaction of basic needs, the regulation of personal life and successful integration into social structures. Depending on which aspect of an emotion is used in its definition, many different theories offer possible answers to the questions of what emotions are and how they can be distinguished. The systematic investigation of emotions in cognitive neuroscience is relatively new, and neuroimaging studies specifically focussing on the neural correlates of different categories of emotions are still lacking. Therefore, the current thesis aimed at investigating the behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of different human emotional levels and their interaction in healthy subjects. We differentiated between emotions according to their cerebral entry site and neural processing pathways: homeostatic emotions, which are elicited by metabolic changes and processed by the interoceptive system (such as thirst, hunger, and need for air), and sensory-evoked emotions, which are evoked by external inputs via the eyes, ears or nose, or their corresponding mental representations and processed in the brain as sensory perception (e.g. fear, disgust, or pride). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioural parameters, we examined both the specific neural underpinnings of a homeostatic emotion (thirst) and a sensory-evoked emotion (disgust), and their interaction in a situation of emotional rivalry when both emotions were perceived simultaneously. This thesis comprises three research articles reporting the results of this research. The first paper presents disgust-related brain imaging data in a thirsty and a satiated condition. We found that disgust mainly activated the anterior insular cortex. In the thirsty condition, however, we observed an interaction effect between disgust and thirst: when thirsty, the subjects rated the disgusting stimulus as less repulsive. On the neurobiological level, this reduction of subjective disgust was accompanied by significantly reduced neural activity in the insular cortex. These results provide new neurophysiological evidence for a hierarchical organization among homeostatic and sensory-evoked emotions, revealing that in a situation of emotional conflict, homeostatic emotions are prioritized over sensory-evoked emotions. In the second paper, findings on brain perfusion over four different thirst stages are reported, with a special focus on the parametric progression of thirst. Cerebral perfusion differences over all thirst stages were found in the posterior insular cortex. Taking this result together with the findings of the first paper, the insular cortex seems to be a key player in human emotional processing, since it comprises specific representations of homeostatic and sensory-evoked emotions and also represents the site of cortical interaction between the two levels of emotions. Finally, although this thesis focussed on the homeostatic modulation of disgust, we were also interested in whether dehydration modulates taste perception. The results of this behavioural experiment are described in the third paper, where we show that dehydration alters the perception of neutral taste stimuli.

Emotion recognition: The role of featural and configural face information

Several studies investigated the role of featural and configural information when processing facial identity. A lot less is known about their contribution to emotion recognition. In this study, we addressed this issue by inducing either a featural or a configural processing strategy (Experiment 1) and by investigating the attentional strategies in response to emotional expressions (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants identified emotional expressions in faces that were presented in three different versions (intact, blurred, and scrambled) and in two orientations (upright and inverted). Blurred faces contain mainly configural information, and scrambled faces contain mainly featural information. Inversion is known to selectively hinder configural processing. Analyses of the discriminability measure (A′) and response times (RTs) revealed that configural processing plays a more prominent role in expression recognition than featural processing, but their relative contribution varies depending on the emotion. In Experiment 2, we qualified these differences between emotions by investigating the relative importance of specific features by means of eye movements. Participants had to match intact expressions with the emotional cues that preceded the stimulus. The analysis of eye movements confirmed that the recognition of different emotions rely on different types of information. While the mouth is important for the detection of happiness and fear, the eyes are more relevant for anger, fear, and sadness.

The relationship between self-efficacy and resting blood pressure in spousal Alzheimer's caregivers

Objective. To examine whether high levels of self-efficacy for problem-focused coping were significantly related to several resting BP measures in spousal Alzheimer's disease caregivers. Design. Cross-sectional. Methods. Participants included 100 older caregivers (mean age = 73.8 ± 8.14 years) providing in home care for a spouse with Alzheimer's disease. All participants completed a 13-item short form of the Coping Self-Efficacy Scale and underwent an in-home assessment where a visiting nurse took the average of three serial BP readings. Multiple regression was used to examine the relationship between self-efficacy and mean arterial pressure (MAP), systolic BP (SBP), diastolic BP (DBP), and pulse pressure (PP) after controlling for age, gender, smoking history, body mass index, the care recipient's clinical dementia rating, diabetes, alcohol use, and the use of antihypertensive medications. Results. Overall, high levels of self-efficacy for problem-focused coping were associated with lower MAP, SBP, and PP. Self-efficacy for problem-focused coping was marginally associated with resting DBP, but not significant. In addition, we conducted secondary analyses of the other two self-efficacy scales to explore the relationship between each dimension and MAP. We found that there were no significant relationships found between MAP and self-efficacy for stopping unpleasant thoughts/emotions or self-efficacy for getting social support. Conclusions. The present study adds to the current body of literature by illustrating the possibility that higher self-efficacy can have physiological advantages, perhaps by buffering chronic stress's impact on resting BP. Another contribution of the current study is its attempt to understand the role of each individual component of self-efficacy. These findings invite future research to investigate whether caregivers might experience cardiovascular benefits from interventions aimed at enhancing self-efficacy.

Faces and emotions: brain electric field sources during covert emotional processing

Covert brain activity related to task-free, spontaneous (i.e. unrequested), emotional evaluation of human face images was analysed in 27-channel averaged event-related potential (ERP) map series recorded from 18 healthy subjects while observing random sequences of face images without further instructions. After recording, subjects self-rated each face image on a scale from “liked” to “disliked”. These ratings were used to dichotomize the face images into the affective evaluation categories of “liked” and “disliked” for each subject and the subjects into the affective attitudes of “philanthropists” and “misanthropists” (depending on their mean rating across images). Event-related map series were averaged for “liked” and “disliked” face images and for “philanthropists” and “misanthropists”. The spatial configuration (landscape) of the electric field maps was assessed numerically by the electric gravity center, a conservative estimate of the mean location of all intracerebral, active, electric sources. Differences in electric gravity center location indicate activity of different neuronal populations. The electric gravity center locations of all event-related maps were averaged over the entire stimulus-on time (450 ms). The mean electric gravity center for disliked faces was located (significant across subjects) more to the right and somewhat more posterior than for liked faces. Similar differences were found between the mean electric gravity centers of misanthropists (more right and posterior) and philanthropists. Our neurophysiological findings are in line with neuropsychological findings, revealing visual emotional processing to depend on affective evaluation category and affective attitude, and extending the conclusions to a paradigm without directed task.

Rivalry of homeostatic and sensory-evoked emotions: dehydration attenuates olfactory disgust and its neural correlates

Neural correlates have been described for emotions evoked by states of homeostatic imbalance (e.g. thirst, hunger, and breathlessness) and for emotions induced by external sensory stimulation (such as fear and disgust). However, the neurobiological mechanisms of their interaction, when they are experienced simultaneously, are still unknown. We investigated the interaction on the neurobiological and the perceptional level using subjective ratings, serum parameters, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a situation of emotional rivalry, when both a homeostatic and a sensory-evoked emotion were experienced at the same time. Twenty highly dehydrated male subjects rated a disgusting odor as significantly less repulsive when they were thirsty. On the neurobiological level, we found that this reduction in subjective disgust during thirst was accompanied by a significantly reduced neural activity in the insular cortex, a brain area known to be considerably involved in processing of disgust. Furthermore, during the experience of disgust in the satiated condition, we observed a significant functional connectivity between brain areas responding to the disgusting odor, which was absent during the stimulation in the thirsty condition. These results suggest interference of conflicting emotions: An acute homeostatic imbalance can attenuate the experience of another emotion evoked by the sensory perception of a potentially harmful external agent. This finding offers novel insights with regard to the behavioral relevance of biologically different types of emotions, indicating that some types of emotions are more imperative for behavior than others. As a general principle, this modulatory effect during the conflict of homeostatic and sensory-evoked emotions may function to safeguard survival.

Teacher emotions in the classroom: Associations with students’ engagement, classroom discipline and the interpersonal teacher-student relationship

The present study explores teacher emotions, in particular how they are predicted by students’ behaviour and the interpersonal aspect of the teacher-student relationship (TSR). One hundred thirty-two secondary teachers participated in a quantitative study relying on self-report questionnaire data. Based on the model of teacher emotions by Frenzel (2014), teachers rated their experienced joy, anger and anxiety during classroom instruction (dependent variable). Students’ motivational behaviour (= engagement), socio-emotional behaviour (= discipline in class) and relational behaviour (= closeness; interpersonal TSR) were assessed as the independent variables. Teachers’ self-efficacy beliefs served as a control variable. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the interpersonal relationship formed between teachers and students was the strongest predictor for teachers’ joy (positive relation) and anxiety (negative relation), whereas lack of discipline in class best predicted teachers’ anger experiences. Students’ engagement also proved a significant predictor of teacher emotions. The results suggest that interpersonal TSR plays a particularly important role in teachers’ emotional experiences in class.

Narcissism and emotional contagion: do narcissists “catch” the emotions of others?

In this research, we investigated the association between narcissism and one central aspect of empathy, susceptibility for emotional contagion (the transfer of emotional states from one person to another). In an experimental study (N=101), we were able to compare actual susceptibility for emotional contagion (as indicated by a change in emotions that converges with the emotions of another person) and self-reported susceptibility for emotional contagion (assessed via questionnaire). Results showed that in the case of positive emotions, narcissists were actually less susceptible to emotional contagion than individuals low in narcissism. At the same time, however, narcissists believed they were more susceptible to contagion of positive emotions. Thus, narcissists were less likely to “catch the positive emotions” of others than individuals low in narcissism, but at the same time lacked the self-insight capabilities to notice this.