An examination of the link between just world belief and schadenfreude

Schadenfreude is a pleasure derived from someone else’s misfortune. Just world belief is a desire to belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner, 1965,1980). Interestingly, previous scholars documented the link between schadenfreude, responsibility and deservingness (e.g. van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk, 2008), i.e. the more failure is deserved, the more perceived responsibility for the failure, and subsequently more schadenfreude is evoked. Thus, the present study tested if a threat of a just world belief intensifies experience of schadenfreude. The participants (N=48, 31 women and 17 men, M age = 23.72), were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions (just world belief: threat versus no-threat) between-participant design. They read scenarios which were designed to threaten or maintain their just world belief. Next, they were transferred to an online magazine presenting funny stories about other peoples’ failures. The stories were selected in a pilot study in order to evoke schadenfreude. As presumed, the participants exposed to the threat of just world belief experienced more schadenfreude, i.e. spent more time on reading schadenfreude stories. The results confirmed the existence of a link between just world threat and schadenfreude.

Associative processing and paranormal belief

In the present study we introduce a novel task for the quantitative assessment of both originality and speed of individual associations. This 'BAG' (Bridge-the-Associative-Gap) task was used to investigate the relationships between creativity and paranormal belief. Twelve strong 'believers' and 12 strong 'skeptics' in paranormal phenomena were selected from a large student population (n > 350). Subjects were asked to produce single-word associations to word pairs. In 40 trials the two stimulus words were semantically indirectly related and in 40 other trials the words were semantically unrelated. Separately for these two stimulus types, response commonalities and association latencies were calculated. The main finding was that for unrelated stimuli, believers produced associations that were more original (had a lower frequency of occurrence in the group as a whole) than those of the skeptics. For the interpretation of the result we propose a model of association behavior that captures both 'positive' psychological aspects (i.e., verbal creativity) and 'negative' aspects (susceptibility to unfounded inferences), and outline its relevance for psychiatry. This model suggests that believers adopt a looser response criterion than skeptics when confronted with 'semantic noise'. Such a signal detection view of the presence/absence of judgments for loose semantic relations may help to elucidate the commonalities between creative thinking, paranormal belief and delusional ideation.

Intuitionistic common knowledge or belief

Starting off from the usual language of modal logic for multi-agent systems dealing with the agents’ knowledge/belief and common knowledge/belief we define so-called epistemic Kripke structures for intu- itionistic (common) knowledge/belief. Then we introduce corresponding deductive systems and show that they are sound and complete with respect to these semantics.

The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.

EEG microstates during resting represent personality differences

We investigated the spontaneous brain electric activity of 13 skeptics and 16 believers in paranormal phenomena; they were university students assessed with a self-report scale about paranormal beliefs. 33-channel EEG recordings during no-task resting were processed as sequences of momentary potential distribution maps. Based on the maps at peak times of Global Field Power, the sequences were parsed into segments of quasi-stable potential distribution, the 'microstates'. The microstates were clustered into four classes of map topographies (A-D). Analysis of the microstate parameters time coverage, occurrence frequency and duration as well as the temporal sequence (syntax) of the microstate classes revealed significant differences: Believers had a higher coverage and occurrence of class B, tended to decreased coverage and occurrence of class C, and showed a predominant sequence of microstate concatenations from A to C to B to A that was reversed in skeptics (A to B to C to A). Microstates of different topographies, putative "atoms of thought", are hypothesized to represent different types of information processing.The study demonstrates that personality differences can be detected in resting EEG microstate parameters and microstate syntax. Microstate analysis yielded no conclusive evidence for the hypothesized relation between paranormal belief and schizophrenia.

Probabilistic Justification Logic

We present a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, to study rational belief, degrees of belief and justifications. We establish soundness and completeness for PPJ and show that its satisfiability problem is decidable. In the last part we use PPJ to provide a solution to the lottery paradox.

Brain electric correlates of strong belief in paranormal phenomena: intracerebral EEG source and regional Omega complexity analyses

The neurocognitive processes underlying the formation and maintenance of paranormal beliefs are important for understanding schizotypal ideation. Behavioral studies indicated that both schizotypal and paranormal ideation are based on an overreliance on the right hemisphere, whose coarse rather than focussed semantic processing may favor the emergence of 'loose' and 'uncommon' associations. To elucidate the electrophysiological basis of these behavioral observations, 35-channel resting EEG was recorded in pre-screened female strong believers and disbelievers during resting baseline. EEG data were subjected to FFT-Dipole-Approximation analysis, a reference-free frequency-domain dipole source modeling, and Regional (hemispheric) Omega Complexity analysis, a linear approach estimating the complexity of the trajectories of momentary EEG map series in state space. Compared to disbelievers, believers showed: more right-located sources of the beta2 band (18.5-21 Hz, excitatory activity); reduced interhemispheric differences in Omega complexity values; higher scores on the Magical Ideation scale; more general negative affect; and more hypnagogic-like reveries after a 4-min eyes-closed resting period. Thus, subjects differing in their declared paranormal belief displayed different active, cerebral neural populations during resting, task-free conditions. As hypothesized, believers showed relatively higher right hemispheric activation and reduced hemispheric asymmetry of functional complexity. These markers may constitute the neurophysiological basis for paranormal and schizotypal ideation.

Schadenfreude and just world belief

The present study tested the hypothesis that a threat of a just world belief intensifies experience of schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure at another's misfortune). The participants read scenarios which were designed to threaten or maintain their just world belief. Subsequently, they were transferred to an online magazine presenting funny stories about other peoples' failures. As presumed, the participants exposed to the threat of just world belief spent more time on reading. These results confirmed the existence of a link between just world threat and schadenfreude.