The Interplay of Power and Trust in Platform Ecosystems of the Enterprise Application Software Industry

In recent years, the formerly oligopolistic Enterprise Application Software (EAS) industry began to disintegrate into focal inter-firm networks with one huge, powerful, and multi-national plat-form vendor as the center, surrounded by hundreds or even thousands of small, niche players that act as complementors. From a theoretical point of view, these platform ecosystems may be governed by two organizing principles - trust and power. However, it is neither from a practical nor from a theoretical perspective clear, how trust and power relate to each other, i.e. whether they act as complements or substitutes. This study tries to elaborate our understanding of the relationship of trust and power by exploring their interplay using multi-dimensional conceptual-izations of trust and power, and by investigating potential dynamics in this interplay over the course of a partnership. Based on an exploratory multiple-case study of seven dyadic partner-ships between four platform vendors, and seven complementors, we find six different patterns of how trust and power interact over time. These patterns bear important implications for the suc-cessful management of partnerships between platform vendors and complementors, and clarify the theoretical debate surrounding the relationship of trust and power.

Dynamics of governance and control in inter-organizational software development

In recent years, development of information systems (IS) has rapidly changed towards increasing division of labor between firms. Two trends are emerging. First, client companies increasingly outsource software development to external service providers. Second, the formerly oligopolistic enterprise application software industry has started to disintegrate into focal partnership networks – so called platform ecosystems. Despite the increasing prominence of IS outsourcing and platform ecosystems, many of these inter-organizational partnerships fail to achieve expected benefits. Ineffective governance and control frequently plays a pivotal role in producing these failures. While designing effective governance and control mechanisms is always challenging, inter-organizational software development projects are often business-critical and exhibit additional dynamics and uncertainty. As a consequence governance and control have to be adapted over time. The three research projects included in this book provide a better understanding of how and why governance and control can be effectively adapted over time. The implications for successful management of inter-organizational software development projects are highly relevant for theory and practice.