Metabolic control in children and adolescents with diabetes mellitus type I in Berne: a cross-sectional study.

AIMS/HYPOTHESIS In diabetes mellitus type I, good glycaemic control is crucial in preventing long-term diabetic complications. The aim of this study was to determine the current level of metabolic control in children and adolescents in our diabetes outpatient clinic at the University Children's Hospital, Berne. Furthermore, the impact of different factors such as age, pubertal stage, sex, duration of diabetes and insulin regimen on glycaemic control was studied. METHODS In a cross-sectional, prospective study 168 children and adolescents with type I diabetes mellitus (f:m = 87:81; prepubertal 48 [mean age 4.4 years, mean duration of diabetes 2.8 years]; pubertal 120 [mean age 9.4 years; mean duration of diabetes 5.2 years]) were studied for three months. Clinical data and HbA1c levels (latex immunoagglutination test) were recorded, statistically analysed and compared with the international literature. RESULTS In our type I diabetic children and adolescents the overall HbA1c was 8.07 +/- 1.15% (mean +/- SD; test-specific norm for healthy subjects: 4.1-6.1%). Glycaemic control was significantly worse in the pubertal group compared to the prepubertal (HbA1c 8.22 +/- 1.25% vs. 7.81 +/- 0.87%; p < 0.01). In addition, we found better metabolic control in patients with duration of diabetes below 2 years in children and adolescents (HbA1c prepubertal < 2 years: 7.45 +/- 0.67% vs. > 2 years: 8.05 +/- 0.93%, p < 0.05; pubertal < 2 years: 7.62 +/- 0.75% vs. > 2 years: 8.31 +/- 1.29%, p < 0.005). Importantly, sex and insulin regimen did not significantly influence glycaemic control. CONCLUSION/INTERPRETATION The current level of metabolic control in our children and adolescents with diabetes mellitus type I is comparable to the glycaemic control of the intensively treated adolescent group of the DCCT-study, in whom decreased risk of long-term diabetic complications was found. In contrast, our patients were intensively treated in terms of frequent contacts with the diabetes team, but were not necessarily on an intensified insulin regimen. The impact of biopsychosocial support from multidisciplinary diabetes team on good metabolic control in children and adolescents with type I diabetes mellitus and their families seems to be very important.

Ego depletion in color priming research: Self-control strength moderates the detrimental effect of red on cognitive test performance

Colors have been found to affect psychological functioning. Empirical evidence suggests that, in test situations, brief perceptions of the color red or even the word "red" printed in black ink prime implicit anxious responses and consequently impair cognitive performance. However, we propose that this red effect depends on people's momentary capacity to exert control over their prepotent responses (i.e., self-control). In three experiments (Ns = 66, 78, and 130), first participants' self-control strength was manipulated. Participants were then primed with the color or word red versus gray prior to completing an arithmetic test or an intelligence test. As expected, self-control strength moderated the red effect. While red had a detrimental effect on performance of participants with depleted self-control strength (ego depletion), it did not affect performance of participants with intact self-control strength. We discuss implications of the present findings within the current debate on the robustness of priming results

Inhibition of indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase in mixed lymphocyte reaction affects glucose influx and enzymes involved in aerobic glycolysis and glutaminolysis in alloreactive T-cells

Indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase (IDO) suppresses adaptive immunity. T-cell proliferation and differentiation to effector cells require increased glucose consumption, aerobic glycolysis and glutaminolysis. The effect of IDO on the above metabolic pathways was evaluated in alloreactive T-cells. Mixed lymphocyte reaction (MLR) in the presence or not of the IDO inhibitor, 1-DL-methyl-tryptophane (1-MT), was used. In MLRs, 1-MT decreased tryptophan consumption, increased cell proliferation, glucose influx and lactate production, whereas it decreased tricarboxylic acid cycle activity. In T-cells, from the two pathways that could sense tryptophan depletion, i.e. general control nonrepressed 2 (GCN2) kinase and mammalian target of rapamycin complex 1, 1-MT reduced only the activity of the GCN2 kinase. Additionally 1-MT treatment of MLRs altered the expression and/or the phosphorylation state of glucose transporter-1 and of key enzymes involved in glucose metabolism and glutaminolysis in alloreactive T-cells in a way that favors glucose influx, aerobic glycolysis and glutaminolysis. Thus in alloreactive T-cells, IDO through activation of the GCN2 kinase, decreases glucose influx and alters key enzymes involved in metabolism, decreasing aerobic glycolysis and glutaminolysis. Acting in such a way, IDO could be considered as a constraining factor for alloreactive T-cell proliferation and differentiation to effector T-cell subtypes.

Changes in situational and dispositional factors as predictors of job satisfaction

Arguably, job satisfaction is one of the most important variables with regard to work. When explaining job satisfaction, research usually focuses on predictor variables in terms of levels but neglects growth rates. Therefore it remains unclear how potential predictors evolve over time and how their development affects job satisfaction. Using multivariate latent growth modeling in a study with 1145 young workers over five years, we analyzed how well job satisfaction is predicted a) by levels of situational (i.e., job control) and dispositional (i.e., Core Self-Evaluations (CSE)) factors and b) by growth per year of these predictors. Results showed both intercepts and slopes to be related to each other, suggesting a joint growth of job control and CSE during early careers. Job satisfaction after five years was best predicted by the slopes of job control (β = .31, p < .001) and CSE (β = .34, p < .01). These findings provide further longitudinal evidence for the role of situational as well as dispositional factors for predicting job satisfaction. In addition, growth rates per year were better predictors than initial levels. Furthermore, a lack of change in job control or CSE went along with a drop in job satisfaction, implying that young workers need to perceive things to be improving in order to increase, or at least maintain, their level of job satisfaction. In terms of theory, the relative importance of levels versus changes deserves more attention. In terms of practical implications, our results suggest a double emphasis on job design (i.e., granting sufficient, and increasing, control) and on personal development (e.g., through training) so that people experience a match between both. Finally, negative associations between initial levels and growth rates suggest that people are quite successful in achieving a reasonable fit between their job characteristics and their needs and goals.

Improvement of cardiac function with device-based diaphragmatic stimulation in chronic heart failure patients: the randomized, open-label, crossover Epiphrenic II Pilot Trial.

AIMS Device-based pacing-induced diaphragmatic stimulation (PIDS) may have therapeutic potential for chronic heart failure (HF) patients. We studied the effects of PIDS on cardiac function and functional outcomes. METHODS AND RESULTS In 24 chronic HF patients with CRT, an additional electrode was attached to the left diaphragm. Randomized into two groups, patients received the following PIDS modes for 3 weeks in a different sequence: (i) PIDS off (control group); (ii) PIDS 0 ms mode (PIDS simultaneously with ventricular CRT pulse); or (iii) PIDS optimized mode (PIDS with optimized delay to ventricular CRT pulse). For PIDS optimization, acoustic cardiography was used. Effects of each PIDS mode on dyspnoea, power during exercise testing, and LVEF were assessed. Dyspnoea improved with the PIDS 0 ms mode (P = 0.057) and the PIDS optimized mode (P = 0.034) as compared with the control group. Maximal power increased from median 100.5 W in the control group to 104.0 W in the PIDS 0 ms mode (P = 0.092) and 109.5 W in the PIDS optimized mode (P = 0.022). Median LVEF was 33.5% in the control group, 33.0% in the PIDS 0 ms mode, and 37.0% in the PIDS optimized mode (P = 0.763 and P = 0.009 as compared with the control group, respectively). PIDS was asymptomatic in all patients. CONCLUSION PIDS improves dyspnoea, working capacity, and LVEF in chronic HF patients over a 3 week period in addition to CRT. This pilot study demonstrates proof of principle of an innovative technology which should be confirmed in a larger sample. TRIAL REGISTRATION NCT00769678.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Impaired type I and type III interferon induction and rhinovirus control in human cystic fibrosis airway epithelial cells

Rhinoviruses are important triggers of pulmonary exacerbations and possible contributors to long-term respiratory morbidity in cystic fibrosis (CF), but mechanisms leading to rhinovirus-induced CF exacerbations are poorly understood. It is hypothesised that there is a deficient innate immune response of the airway epithelium towards rhinovirus infection in CF.

I shouldn't have to do this: Illegitimate tasks as a stressor in relation to organizational control and resource deficits

The performance of tasks that are perceived as unnecessary or unreasonable, illegitimate tasks, represents a new stressor concept that refers to assignments that violate the norms associated with the role requirements of professional work. Research has shown that illegitimate tasks are associated with stress and counterproductive work behaviour. The purpose of this study was to provide insight into the contribution of characteristics of the organization on the prevalence of illegitimate tasks in the work of frontline and middle managers. Using the Bern Illegitimate Task Scale (BITS) in a sample of 440 local government operations managers in 28 different organizations in Sweden, this study supports the theoretical assumptions that illegitimate tasks are positively related to stress and negatively related to satisfaction with work performance. Results further show that 10% of the variance in illegitimate tasks can be attributed to the organization where the managers work. Multilevel referential analysis showed that the more the organization was characterized by competition for resources between units, unfair and arbitrary resource allocation and obscure decisional structure, the more illegitimate tasks managers reported. These results should be valuable for strategic-level management since they indicate that illegitimate tasks can be counteracted by means of the organization of work.