Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Decision-usefulness of ideal cost- and ideal value accounting for valuation and stewardship

This paper contrasts the decision-usefulness of prototype accounting regimes based on perfect accounting for value, i.e. ideal value accounting (IVA), and perfect matching of cost, i.e. ideal cost accounting (ICA). The regimes are analyzed in the context of a firm with overlapping capacity investments where projects earn excess returns and residual income is utilized as performance indicator. Provided that IVA and ICA systematically differ based on the criterion of unconditional conservatism, we assess their respective decision-usefulness for different valuation- and stewardship-scenarios. Assuming that addressees solely observe current accounting data of the firm, ICA provides information which is useful for valuation and stewardship without reservation whereas IVA entails problems under specific assumptions.