Evaluation of a Bayesian MCMC Random Effects Inference Methodology for Capture-Mark-Recapture Data

Monte Carlo simulation was used to evaluate properties of a simple Bayesian MCMC analysis of the random effects model for single group Cormack-Jolly-Seber capture-recapture data. The MCMC method is applied to the model via a logit link, so parameters p, S are on a logit scale, where logit(S) is assumed to have, and is generated from, a normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ2 . Marginal prior distributions on logit(p) and μ were independent normal with mean zero and standard deviation 1.75 for logit(p) and 100 for μ ; hence minimally informative. Marginal prior distribution on σ2 was placed on τ2=1/σ2 as a gamma distribution with α=β=0.001 . The study design has 432 points spread over 5 factors: occasions (t) , new releases per occasion (u), p, μ , and σ . At each design point 100 independent trials were completed (hence 43,200 trials in total), each with sample size n=10,000 from the parameter posterior distribution. At 128 of these design points comparisons are made to previously reported results from a method of moments procedure. We looked at properties of point and interval inference on μ , and σ based on the posterior mean, median, and mode and equal-tailed 95% credibility interval. Bayesian inference did very well for the parameter μ , but under the conditions used here, MCMC inference performance for σ was mixed: poor for sparse data (i.e., only 7 occasions) or σ=0 , but good when there were sufficient data and not small σ .

State Capture from Below? The Contradictory Effects of Decentralisation on Public Spending

This study analyses the contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending. We distinguish three dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their joint and separate effects on public spending in the Swiss cantons over 20 years. We find that overall decentralisation has a strong, significant and negative effect on the size of the public sector, thus confirming the Leviathan hypothesis. The same holds for fiscal and institutional decentralisation. However, the extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than centrally actually increases central and decreases local spending. This suggests that actors behave strategically when dealing with the centre by offloading the more costly policies. The wider implication of our study is that the balance between self-rule and shared rule has implications also for the size of the overall political system.