Core networks for visual-concrete and abstract thought content: a brain electric microstate analysis

Commonality of activation of spontaneously forming and stimulus-induced mental representations is an often made but rarely tested assumption in neuroscience. In a conjunction analysis of two earlier studies, brain electric activity during visual-concrete and abstract thoughts was studied. The conditions were: in study 1, spontaneous stimulus-independent thinking (post-hoc, visual imagery or abstract thought were identified); in study 2, reading of single nouns ranking high or low on a visual imagery scale. In both studies, subjects' tasks were similar: when prompted, they had to recall the last thought (study 1) or the last word (study 2). In both studies, subjects had no instruction to classify or to visually imagine their thoughts, and accordingly were not aware of the studies' aim. Brain electric data were analyzed into functional topographic brain images (using LORETA) of the last microstate before the prompt (study 1) and of the word-type discriminating event-related microstate after word onset (study 2). Conjunction analysis across the two studies yielded commonality of activation of core networks for abstract thought content in left anterior superior regions, and for visual-concrete thought content in right temporal-posterior inferior regions. The results suggest that two different core networks are automatedly activated when abstract or visual-concrete information, respectively, enters working memory, without a subject task or instruction about the two classes of information, and regardless of internal or external origin, and of input modality. These core machineries of working memory thus are invariant to source or modality of input when treating the two types of information.

Electric pulses augment reporter gene expression in the beating heart

Gene therapy of the heart has been attempted in a number of clinical trials with the injection of naked DNA, although quantitative information on myocellular transfection rates is not available. The present study aimed to quantify the efficacy of electropulsing protocols that differ in pulse duration and number to stimulate transfection of cardiomyocytes and to determine the impact on myocardial integrity.

Event-related electric microstates of the brain differ between words with visual and abstract meaning

The present study shows that different neural activity during mental imagery and abstract mentation can be assigned to well-defined steps of the brain's information-processing. During randomized visual presentation of single, imagery-type and abstract-type words, 27 channel event-related potential (ERP) field maps were obtained from 25 subjects (sequence-divided into a first and second group for statistics). The brain field map series showed a sequence of typical map configurations that were quasi-stable for brief time periods (microstates). The microstates were concatenated by rapid map changes. As different map configurations must result from different spatial patterns of neural activity, each microstate represents different active neural networks. Accordingly, microstates are assumed to correspond to discrete steps of information-processing. Comparing microstate topographies (using centroids) between imagery- and abstract-type words, significantly different microstates were found in both subject groups at 286–354 ms where imagery-type words were more right-lateralized than abstract-type words, and at 550–606 ms and 606–666 ms where anterior-posterior differences occurred. We conclude that language-processing consists of several, well-defined steps and that the brain-states incorporating those steps are altered by the stimuli's capacities to generate mental imagery or abstract mentation in a state-dependent manner.

Spatio-temporal dynamics of alpha brain electric fields, and cognitive modes

Brian electric activity is viewed as sequences of momentary maps of potential distribution. Frequency-domain source modeling, estimation of the complexity of the trajectory of the mapped brain field distributions in state space, and microstate parsing were used as analysis tools. Input-presentation as well as task-free (spontaneous thought) data collection paradigms were employed. We found: Alpha EEG field strength is more affected by visualizing mentation than by abstract mentation, both input-driven as well as self-generated. There are different neuronal populations and brain locations of the electric generators for different temporal frequencies of the brain field. Different alpha frequencies execute different brain functions as revealed by canonical correlations with mentation profiles. Different modes of mentation engage the same temporal frequencies at different brain locations. The basic structure of alpha electric fields implies inhomogeneity over time — alpha consists of concatenated global microstates in the sub-second range, characterized by quasi-stable field topographies, and rapid transitions between the microstates. In general, brain activity is strongly discontinuous, indicating that parsing into field landscape-defined microstates is appropriate. Different modes of spontaneous and induced mentation are associated with different brain electric microstates; these are proposed as candidates for psychophysiological ``atoms of thought''.

Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts

Prompted reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected in a no-input, no-task, no-response paradigm (30 random prompts to each of 13 healthy volunteers). The mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. Spontaneous 19-channel brain electric activity (EEG) was continuously recorded, viewed as series of momentary spatial distributions (maps) of the brain electric field and segmented into microstates, i.e. into time segments characterized by quasi-stable landscapes of potential distribution maps which showed varying durations in the sub-second range. Microstate segmentation used a data-driven strategy. Different microstates, i.e. different brain electric landscapes must have been generated by activity of different neural assemblies and therefore are hypothesized to constitute different functions. The two types of reported experiences were associated with significantly different microstates (mean duration 121 ms) immediately preceding the prompts; these microstates showed, across subjects, for abstract thought (compared to visual imagery) a shift of the electric gravity center to the left and a clockwise rotation of the field axis. Contrariwise, the microstates 2 s before the prompt did not differ between the two types of experiences. The results support the hypothesis that different microstates of the brain as recognized in its electric field implement different conscious, reportable mind states, i.e. different classes (types) of thoughts (mentations); thus, the microstates might be candidates for the `atoms of thought'.