After Bali: WTO Rules Applying to Public Food Reserves

Once more, agriculture threatened to prevent all progress in multilateral trade rule-making at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013. But this time, the “magic of Bali” worked. After the clock had been stopped mainly because of the food security file, the ministers adopted a comprehensive package of decisions and declarations mainly in respect of development issues. Five are about agriculture. Decision 38 on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes contains a “peace clause” which will now be shielding certain stockpile programmes from subsidy complaints in formal litigation. This article provides contextual background and analyses this decision from a legal perspective. It finds that, at best, Decision 38 provides a starting point for a WTO Work Programme for food security, for review at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference which will probably take place in 2017. At worst, it may unduly widen the limited window for government-financed competition existing under present rules in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture – yet without increasing global food security or even guaranteeing that no subsidy claims will be launched, or entertained, under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Hence, the Work Programme should find more coherence between farm support and socio-economic and trade objectives when it comes to stockpiles. This also encompasses a review of the present WTO rules applying to other forms of food reserves and to regional or “virtual” stockpiles. Another “low hanging fruit” would be a decision to exempt food aid purchases from export restrictions.

Structural and Institutional Determinants of Influence Reputation: A Comparison of Collaborative and Adversarial Policy Networks in Decision Making and Implementation

The central assumption in the literature on collaborative networks and policy networks is that political outcomes are affected by a variety of state and nonstate actors. Some of these actors are more powerful than others and can therefore have a considerable effect on decision making. In this article, we seek to provide a structural and institutional explanation for these power differentials in policy networks and support the explanation with empirical evidence. We use a dyadic measure of influence reputation as a proxy for power, and posit that influence reputation over the political outcome is related to vertical integration into the political system by means of formal decision-making authority, and to horizontal integration by means of being well embedded into the policy network. Hence, we argue that actors are perceived as influential because of two complementary factors: (a) their institutional roles and (b) their structural positions in the policy network. Based on temporal and cross-sectional exponential random graph models, we compare five cases about climate, telecommunications, flood prevention, and toxic chemicals politics in Switzerland and Germany. The five networks cover national and local networks at different stages of the policy cycle. The results confirm that institutional and structural drivers seem to have a crucial impact on how an actor is perceived in decision making and implementation and, therefore, their ability to significantly shape outputs and service delivery.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

Gefangen im Nullsummenspiel - Eine Bewertung der MEI-Umsetzungsvorschläge

Die Annahme der Volksinitiative "gegen Masseneinwanderung" vom 9. Februar 2014 verankert Art. 121a in der Schweizer Bundesverfassung. Auch ein Jahr nach der Abstimmung bleibt unklar, wie und ob die Initiative umgesetzt werden soll und kann. Wir finden, es braucht eine systematische Analyse aller Umsetzungsvorschläge anhand eines möglichst klaren Bewertungsrasters. Das Diskussionspapier untersucht die Machbarkeit der generellen Zielsetzung der Initiative, indem verschiedene Umsetzungsvorschläge bewertet werden. Diese werden in einem zweidimensionalen Bewertungsraster eingeordnet wodurch Gestaltungsspielräume und Zielkonflikte lokalisiert werden können (siehe Resultate auf Seite 20). Die Autoren ziehen folgende Schlussfolgerung für den Umsetzungsprozess: Die Masseneinwanderungsinitiative enthält in ihrem Kern einen Zielkonflikt. Die Einführung staatlicher Steuerungsinstrumente bei gleichzeitiger Wahrung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Interessen ist nicht möglich. Deshalb braucht es eine politische Entscheidung, welches Ziel höher gewichtet werden soll: wirtschaftliche Prosperität oder "eigenständig gesteuerte Migration". Anstatt den Glauben an die Quadratur des Kreises weiterhin aufrecht zu erhalten, wäre es aus Respekt gegenüber der direkten Demokratie und der Berechenbarkeit der zukünftigen Migrations-und Europapolitik zielführender, eine Entscheidung über die Gewichtung dieser einander entgegenstehenden politischen Ziele möglichst rasch anzugehen.