Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.

Benford's Law and Fraud Detection. Facts and Legends

Is Benford's law a good instrument to detect fraud in reports of statistical and scientific data? For a valid test the probability of "false positives" and "false negatives" has to be low. However, it is very doubtful whether the Benford distribution is an appropriate tool to discriminate between manipulated and non-manipulated estimates. Further research should focus more on the validity of the test and test results should be interpreted more carefully.

Reactive, Slow and...Innovative? Decision-making Structures and Policy Outputs

Consensus democracies like Switzerland are generally known to have a low innovation capacity (Lijphart 1999). This is due to the high number of veto points such as perfect bicameralism or the popular referendum. These institutions provide actors opposing a policy with several opportunities to block potential policy change (Immergut 1990; Tsebelis 2002). In order to avoid a failure of a process because opposing actors activate veto points, decision-making processes in Switzerland tend to integrate a large number of actors with different - and often diverging - preferences (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Including a variety of actors in a decision-making process and taking into account their preferences implies important trade-offs. Integrating a large number of actors and accommodating their preferences takes time and carries the risk of resulting in lowest common denominator solutions. On the contrary, major innovative reforms usually fail or come only as a result of strong external pressures from either the international environment, economic turmoil or the public (Kriesi 1980: 635f.; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Sciarini 1994). Standard decision-making processes are therefore characterized as reactive, slow and capable of only marginal adjustments (Kriesi 1980; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2009; Sciarini 2006). This, in turn, may be at odds with the rapid developments of international politics, the flexibility of the private sector, or the speed of technological development.

Socio-technical transitions and policy change - Advocacy coalitions in Swiss energy policy

Policies and politics are an integral part of socio-technical transitions but have not received much attention in the transitions literature so far. Drawing on the advocacy coalition framework, our paper addresses this gap with a study on actors and coalitions in Swiss energy policy. Our results show that advocacy coalitions in Switzerland have largely remained stable despite the Fukushima shock. However, heterogeneity of beliefs has increased and in 2013, even a majority of actors expressed their support for the energy transition – an indication that major policy change might be ahead. It seems that in socio-technical transitions, changes in the policy issue and in the actor base also work toward policy change, next to changes in core beliefs. We make suggestions how the advocacy coalition framework can inform analysis and theory building in transition studies. We also present first ideas about the interplay of socio-technical systems and policy systems.

Negotiating an Energy Deal under TTIP: Drivers and Impediments to U.S. Shale Exports to Europe

The problem of global security of energy supply is growing in importance. TTIP negotiations represent an opportunity to improve energy security in Europe and negotiate a legal framework for bilateral trade in energy, which could serve as a model for future negotiations at a multilateral level. This paper explores some of the thorniest legal, geopolitical, and economic issues that need to be taken up by TTIP negotiators for the promotion of a secure and sustainable trade in energy between the United States and European Union. It gives an account of the most recent developments in the TTIP negotiations on energy and examines the link between a possible legal framework for energy trade under TTIP and other energy-related regional and international fora. The paper critically assesses the negotiating positions of the European Union and the United States in light of their reciprocal energy profiles and needs. It offers an overview of the critical items most likely to be on top of the TTIP agenda on energy based on a comparative analysis of energy provisions in E.U. and U.S. legislation and in light of the both parties’ interests. Finally, it discusses the main driving forces and inhibiting factors capable of facilitating or rather impeding a successful conclusion of an energy trade deal between the United States and the European Union.