Effect of oral calcium loading on intact PTH and calcitriol in idiopathic renal calcium stone formers and healthy controls

The calciuric response after an oral calcium load (1000 mg elemental calcium together with a standard breakfast) was studied in 13 healthy male controls and 21 recurrent idiopathic renal calcium stone formers, 12 with hypercalciuria (UCa x V > 7.50 mmol/24 h) and nine with normocalciuria. In controls, serum 1,25(OH)2 vitamin D3 (calcitriol) remained unchanged 6 h after oral calcium load (50.6 +/- 5.1 versus 50.9 +/- 5.0 pg/ml), whereas it tended to increase in hypercalciuric (from 53.6 +/- 3.2 to 60.6 +/- 5.4 pg/ml, P = 0.182) and fell in normocalciuric stone formers (from 45.9 +/- 2.6 to 38.1 +/- 3.3 pg/ml, P = 0.011). The total amount of urinary calcium excreted after OCL was 2.50 +/- 0.20 mmol in controls, 2.27 +/- 0.27 mmol in normocalciuric and 3.62 +/- 0.32 mmol in hypercalciuric stone formers (P = 0.005 versus controls and normocalciuric stone formers respectively); it positively correlated with serum calcitriol 6 h after calcium load (r = 0.392, P = 0.024). Maximum increase in urinary calcium excretion rate, delta Ca-Emax, was inversely related to intact PTH levels in the first 4 h after calcium load, i.e. more pronounced PTH suppression predicted a steeper increase in urinary calcium excretion rate. Twenty-four-hour urine calcium excretion rate was inversely related to the ratio of delta calcitriol/deltaPTHmax after calcium load (r = -0.653, P = 0.0001), indicating that an abnormally up-regulated synthesis of calcitriol and consecutive relative PTH suppression induce hypercalciuria.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm. Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers. Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.