Prestimulus default mode activity influences depth of processing and recognition in an emotional memory task

Low self-referential thoughts are associated with better concentration, which leads to deeper encoding and increases learning and subsequent retrieval. There is evidence that being engaged in externally rather than internally focused tasks is related to low neural activity in the default mode network (DMN) promoting open mind and the deep elaboration of new information. Thus, reduced DMN activity should lead to enhanced concentration, comprehensive stimulus evaluation including emotional categorization, deeper stimulus processing, and better long-term retention over one whole week. In this fMRI study, we investigated brain activation preceding and during incidental encoding of emotional pictures and on subsequent recognition performance. During fMRI, 24 subjects were exposed to 80 pictures of different emotional valence and subsequently asked to complete an online recognition task one week later. Results indicate that neural activity within the medial temporal lobes during encoding predicts subsequent memory performance. Moreover, a low activity of the default mode network preceding incidental encoding leads to slightly better recognition performance independent of the emotional perception of a picture. The findings indicate that the suppression of internally-oriented thoughts leads to a more comprehensive and thorough evaluation of a stimulus and its emotional valence. Reduced activation of the DMN prior to stimulus onset is associated with deeper encoding and enhanced consolidation and retrieval performance even one week later. Even small prestimulus lapses of attention influence consolidation and subsequent recognition performance. Hum Brain Mapp, 2015. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Descriptive/Inferential Cognitive Processes and Evaluative Cognitive Processes: Relationships Among Each Other and with Emotional Distress

We aimed to delineate key constructs from two forms of cognitive-behavioral therapy: cognitive therapy and rational-emotive behavior therapy. Furthermore, we aimed to investigate the interrelations among each other and with emotional distress. The key constructs of the underlying theories of these therapies (i.e., descriptive/inferential beliefs, evaluative beliefs) are often treated together as distorted cognitions and included as such in various scales. We used a cross-sectional design. Seventy-four undergraduate students (mean age = 24.68) completed measures of automatic thoughts and emotional distress. Three therapists trained in cognitive-behavioral therapy divided automatic thoughts into descriptive/inferential beliefs and evaluative beliefs by consensus. Correlation and mediation analyses were performed. These constructs showed medium to high associations to each other and to distress. The relationship between descriptive/inferential beliefs and distress was mediated by evaluative beliefs. Descriptive and inferential cognitions may not produce emotions without first being appraised in terms of personal relevance.

Narcissism and emotional contagion: do narcissists “catch” the emotions of others?

In this research, we investigated the association between narcissism and one central aspect of empathy, susceptibility for emotional contagion (the transfer of emotional states from one person to another). In an experimental study (N=101), we were able to compare actual susceptibility for emotional contagion (as indicated by a change in emotions that converges with the emotions of another person) and self-reported susceptibility for emotional contagion (assessed via questionnaire). Results showed that in the case of positive emotions, narcissists were actually less susceptible to emotional contagion than individuals low in narcissism. At the same time, however, narcissists believed they were more susceptible to contagion of positive emotions. Thus, narcissists were less likely to “catch the positive emotions” of others than individuals low in narcissism, but at the same time lacked the self-insight capabilities to notice this.

The specificity of emotion inferences as a function of emotional contextual support

Research on emotion inferences has shown that readers include a representation of the main character's emotional state in their mental representations of the text. We examined the specificity of emotion representations as a function of the emotion content of short narratives, in terms of the quantity and quality of emotion components included in the narratives, based on the GRID instrument (Fontaine et al., 2013). In a self-paced reading task, target sentences that only moderately matched the emotional context were read faster than target sentences that strongly matched the emotional context of the narratives. In a “makes sense” judgment task, we showed that this result was not driven by a mapping difficulty and, in a memory task, we provided some evidence that these effects reflected integration processes. We suggest that readers can integrate specific emotions into their mental representations, but only if provided with the appropriate emotional contextual support.