Unpacking reputational power: Intended and unintended determinants of the assessment of actors' power

The idea behind the reputational measure for assessing power of political actors is that actors involved in a decision-making process have the best view of their fellows' power. There has been, however, no systematic examination of why actors consider other actors as powerful. Consequently, it is unclear whether reputational power measures what it ought to. The paper analyzes the determinants of power attribution and distinguishes intended from unintended determinants in a data-set of power assessment covering 10 political decision-making processes in Switzerland. Results are overall reassuring, but nevertheless point toward self-promotion or misperception biases, as informants systematically attribute more power to actors with whom they collaborate.

Who Is Influential and Why? The Determinants of Reputational Power

Power is one of the most fundamental concepts in political science, and it is a crucial aspect of decision-making structures. The distribution of power between political actors and coalitions of actors informs us about who is actually able to influence decision-making processes. It is thus no surprise that power is a centerpiece of our assessment of political decision-making in Switzerland. In line with the main argument of this book, Chapter 3 has uncovered important changes in decision-making structures, which resulted in a rebalancing of power between governing parties, interest groups and state executive actors. Conjecturing about the reasons that may account for these changes, we pointed to factors of an organizational and institutional nature. For example, we put forward the decline of pre-parliamentary procedures oriented towards corporatist intermediation as a possible explanation for the weakening of interest groups. More generally, in several chapters it has been suggested that there is a relationship between the institutional design of a decision-making process, the related importance of decision-making phases and an actor's participation in these phases on the one hand, and the power of actors (and coalitions of actors) on the other. In addition, the analyses carried out in Chapters 2 to 5 draw our attention to the differences in power structure across decision-making processes or types of processes.

The Performance of Swiss and German Family Firms: Investigating Strategies, Orientations and SEW as Determinants

In this chapter we center our attention on the performance drivers of family firms in Switzerland and Germany and compare the corresponding results with the findings generated in the US. Investigating family firms is justified as this organizational form not only constitutes the majority of all firms globally (Sharma and Carney, 2012), but in particular in Switzerland and Germany. In fact, more than 88 percent of all firms in Switzerland are defined as family firms (Frey, Halter, Klein, and Zellweger, 2004), and numbers for Germany are similar (Klein, 2000). While more than 99 percent of all companies in Switzerland are small and medium-sized (Frey et al., 2004), the share of family firms varies with firm size; more specifically, the share of family firms decreases with increasing firm size, which is in line with findings from Germany (Klein, 2000). The social and economic impact of family firms is remarkable. In Germany for instance, family controlled firms provide 60 percent of all jobs and account for 51 percent of the total sales of the German economy (cf. www.familienunternehmen.de). Even though the interest of both academics and practitioners in family firms has been rising significantly in recent years, the existing body of knowledge in the field is still rather fragmented (Sharma, 2004; Sharma and Carney, 2012).