Livelihood and Community Development: LforS learning and simulation game

Up to 15 people can participate in the game, which is supervised by a moderator. Households consisting of 1-5 people discuss options for diversification of household strategies. Aim of the game: By devising appropriate strategies, households seek to stand up to various types of events while improving their economic and social situation and, at the same time, taking account of ecological conditions. The annual General Community Meeting (GCM) provides an opportunity for households to create a general set-up at the local level that is more or less favourable to the strategies they are pursuing. The development of a community investment strategy, to be implemented by the GCM, and successful coordination between households will allow players to optimise their investments at the household level. The household who owns the most assets at the end of the game wins. Players participate very actively, as the game stimulates lively and interesting discussions. They find themselves confronted with different types of decision-making related to the reality of their daily lives. They explore different ways to model their own household strategies and discuss risks and opportunities. Reflections on the course of the game continually refer to the real-life situations of the participants.

Sustainable Pasture Management : LforS learning and simulation game

Three teams consisting of 2 to 5 persons each play the game. Each team represents a farm. Each team decides jointly on its strategy. In annual meetings in winter, the farm teams jointly discuss, evaluate and decide on how to proceed and actions to be taken. The farms make use of three different pasture areas (village pasture, intensive pasture and summer pasture) for grazing their livestock. The carrying capacity of each pasture area is different and varies according to the season. In each season, the farms have to decide on how many livestock units to graze on which pasture. Overgrazing and pasture degradation occur if the total number of livestock units exceeds the carrying capacity of a specific pasture area. Overgrazing results in a reduction of pasture productivity. To diversify and improve their livelihood strategy farms can make individual investments to increase productivity at the farm level, eg. in fodder production or in income generating activities. At the community level, collective investments can be made which may influence livestock and household economy, e.g. rehabilitate and improve pasture productivity, improve living conditions on remote pastures etc. Events occurring in the course of the game represent different types of (risk) factors such as meteorology, market, politics etc. that may positively or negatively influence livestock production and household economy. A sustainable management of pastures requires that farms actively regulate the development of their herds, that they take measures to prevent pasture degradation and to improve pasture productivity, and that they find a balance between livestock economy and other productive activities. The game has a double aim: a) each farm aims at its economic success and prosperity, and b) the three farm teams jointly have to find and implement strategies for a sustainable use of pasture areas.

Integrated Disaster Reduction Approach: LforS Learning and Simulation Game

Main objective of the game is to increase the coping capacity of players and familiarise them with the Integrated Disaster Reduction Approach. The game is intended to prepare for and introduce the players to a subsequent Learning for Sustainability capacity building workshop for community leaders. The game represents a typical emergency situation resulting from a natural disaster. Before and after the event, adequate measures help to prevent or minimise potential damages. Once a disaster has occurred, concerted actions and immediate measures need to be taken to rescue as much as possible (human lives, livestock, material) and safeguard the village against further damage and losses. In the course of the game, each playing team can proof its knowledge on adequate measures that have to be taken in order to avoid or reduce losses related to natural disasters. Such measures relate to assessment and monitoring of risks, prevention and mitigation measures, preparedness and response as well as recovery and reconstruction.

Stratégies de ménages et développement communal: LforS learning and simulation game

Au travers de stratégies appropriées, les ménages, appelés ici Unités de Production et de Consommation (UPC), cherchent à faire face à différents évènements et à améliorer leur situation économique et sociale tout en tenant compte des conditions écologiques. Au travers de l’Assemblée Générale Communale (AGC), les UPC peuvent créer des conditions cadres locales plus ou moins favorables aux stratégies qu’ils poursuivent. Par le développement d’une stratégie d’investissement communale mise en œuvre par l’AGC et une bonne coordination entre les UPC, les joueurs peuvent optimiser leurs investissements au niveau des ménages. Vainqueur est l’UPC qui à la fin du jeu dispose du plus grand patrimoine.

CONMICOM – conflict mitigation in communities: LforS learning and simulation game

Three extended families live around a lake. One family are rice farmers, the second family are vegetable farmers, and the third are a family of livestock herders. All of them depend on the use of lake water for their production, and all of them need large quantities of water. All are dependent on the use of the lake water to secure their livelihood. In the game, the families are represented by their councils of elders. Each of the councils has to find means and ways to increase production in order to keep up with the growth of its family and their demands. This puts more and more pressure on the water resources, increasing the risk of overuse. Conflicts over water are about to emerge between the families. Each council of elders must try to pursue its families interests, while at the same time preventing excessive pressure on the water resources. Once a council of elders is no longer able to meet the needs of its family, it is excluded from the game. Will the parties cooperate or compete? To face the challenge of balancing economic well-being, sustainable resource management, and individual and collective interests, the three parties have a set of options for action at hand. These include power play to safeguard their own interests, communication and cooperation to negotiate with neighbours, and searching for alternatives to reduce pressure on existing water resources. During the game the players can experience how tensions may arise, increase and finally escalate. They realise what impact power play has and how alliances form, and the importance of trust-building measures, consensus and cooperation. From the insights gained, important conflict prevention and mitigation measures are derived in a debriefing session. The game is facilitated by a moderator, and lasts for 3-4 hours. Aim of the game: Each family pursues the objective of serving its own interests and securing its position through appropriate strategies and skilful negotiation, while at the same time optimising use of the water resources in a way that prevents their degradation. The end of the game is open. While the game may end by one or two families dropping out because they can no longer secure their subsistence, it is also possible that the three families succeed in creating a situation that allows them to meet their own needs as well as the requirements for sustainable water use in the long term. Learning objectives The game demonstrates how tension builds up, increases, and finally escalates; it shows how power positions work and alliances are formed; and it enables the players to experience the great significance of mutual agreement and cooperation. During the game and particularly during the debriefing and evaluation session it is important to link experiences made during the game to the players’ real-life experiences, and to discuss these links in the group. The resulting insights will provide a basis for deducing important conflict prevention and transformation measures.

Completeness of Follow-Up Determines Validity of Study Findings: Results of a Prospective Repeated Measures Cohort Study.

BACKGROUND Current reporting guidelines do not call for standardised declaration of follow-up completeness, although study validity depends on the representativeness of measured outcomes. The Follow-Up Index (FUI) describes follow-up completeness at a given study end date as ratio between the investigated and the potential follow-up period. The association between FUI and the accuracy of survival-estimates was investigated. METHODS FUI and Kaplan-Meier estimates were calculated twice for 1207 consecutive patients undergoing aortic repair during an 11-year period: in a scenario A the population's clinical routine follow-up data (available from a prospective registry) was analysed conventionally. For the control scenario B, an independent survey was completed at the predefined study end. To determine the relation between FUI and the accuracy of study findings, discrepancies between scenarios regarding FUI, follow-up duration and cumulative survival-estimates were evaluated using multivariate analyses. RESULTS Scenario A noted 89 deaths (7.4%) during a mean considered follow-up of 30±28months. Scenario B, although analysing the same study period, detected 304 deaths (25.2%, P<0.001) as it scrutinized the complete follow-up period (49±32months). FUI (0.57±0.35 versus 1.00±0, P<0.001) and cumulative survival estimates (78.7% versus 50.7%, P<0.001) differed significantly between scenarios, suggesting that incomplete follow-up information led to underestimation of mortality. Degree of follow-up completeness (i.e. FUI-quartiles and FUI-intervals) correlated directly with accuracy of study findings: underestimation of long-term mortality increased almost linearly by 30% with every 0.1 drop in FUI (adjusted HR 1.30; 95%-CI 1.24;1.36, P<0.001). CONCLUSION Follow-up completeness is a pre-requisite for reliable outcome assessment and should be declared systematically. FUI represents a simple measure suited as reporting standard. Evidence lacking such information must be challenged as potentially flawed by selection bias.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Effects of team Knowledge and ecological constraints on decisional processes in customized football game scenarios

Several theories assume that successful team coordination is partly based on knowledge that helps anticipating individual contributions necessary in a situational task. It has been argued that a more ecological perspective needs to be considered in contexts evolving dynamically and unpredictably. In football, defensive plays are usually coordinated according to strategic concepts spanning all members and large areas of the playfield. On the other hand, fewer people are involved in offensive plays as these are less projectable and strongly constrained by ecological characteristics. The aim of this study is to test the effects of ecological constraints and player knowledge on decision making in offensive game scenarios. It is hypothesized that both knowledge about team members and situational constraints will influence decisional processes. Effects of situational constraints are expected to be of higher magnitude. Two teams playing in the fourth league of the Swiss Football Federation participate in the study. Forty customized game scenarios were developed based on the coaches’ information about player positions and game strategies. Each player was shown in ball possession four times. Participants were asked to take the perspective of the player on the ball and to choose a passing destination and a recipient. Participants then rated domain specific strengths (e.g., technical skills, game intelligence) of each of their teammates. Multilevel models for categorical dependent variables (team members) will be specified. Player knowledge (rated skills) and ecological constraints (operationalized as each players’ proximity and availability for ball reception) are included as predictor variables. Data are currently being collected. Results will yield effects of parameters that are stable across situations as well as of variable parameters that are bound to situational context. These will enable insight into the degree to which ecological constraints and more enduring team knowledge are involved in decisional processes aimed at coordinating interpersonal action.