Direct Democracy and Institutional Trust: Relationships and Differences across Personality Traits

Direct democracy plays a prominent role in the explanation of institutional trust. To date, however, empirical findings on the effects of direct democracy remain inconclusive. In this article, we argue that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences institutional trust, but how and to what degree depends on individuals’ personality traits. Running hierarchical analyses of unique survey data from a random sample of eligible Swiss voters, we document three findings: First, we show that the number of ballot measures is not directly associated with institutional trust. Second, we demonstrate that the Big Five personality traits affect the propensity to trust. Third, some of these traits also alter the relationship between direct democracy and institutional trust, suggesting that certain personality types are more likely to be sensitive to popular votes than others and that not everyone is equally likely to respond to political stimuli, even in highly democratic environments.

Taking the multidimensionality of democracy seriously: institutional patterns and the quality of democracy

Democracies come in all shapes and sizes. Which configuration of political institutions produces the highest democratic quality is a notorious debate. The lineup of contenders includes ‘consensus’, ‘Westminster’, and ‘centripetal’ democracy. A trend in the evaluation of the relationship between empirical patterns of democracy and its quality is that the multidimensional nature of both concepts is increasingly taken into account. This article tests the assertion that certain centripetal configurations of proportionality in party systems and government, and unitarism in the remaining state structure, might outperform all other alternatives both in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness. Analyzing 33 democracies, the results of interactive regression models only partially support this claim. Proportional–unitary democracies have the best track record in terms of representation, but there are little differences in participation, transparency, and government capability compared with other models.

How exclusive is assembly democracy? Citizens assembly and ballot participation compared

This paper analyses the difference between two specific forms of citizens’ involvements, namely whether a vote is cast by ballot or in a citizens’ assembly in which people gather in town halls to decide legislative questions in a deliberative manner. We show both theoretically and empirically how citizens’ assemblies and decisions at the ballot box substantially differ not only in terms of their underlying model of democracy, but also in their structural conditions and, thus, with respect to the social inequality of participation. We test our hypotheses in a Bayesian multilevel framework using real participation data collected from 15 political decisions made in a Swiss commune. Our results show that citizens’ assemblies are not only characterised by lower participation rates, but also by a particular composition of the electorate. While citizens’ assemblies are more equal regarding income groups, ballots favour a more equitable participation in terms of gender and age.

Power Games in Strategy Formation Processes – A Performative Interpretation

The article approaches an understanding of power within strategy formation processes established by verbal and bodily communication. On this note, we examined concepts of power constituted by hierarchy and developed a conceptual framework for a performative interpretation of power. In line with Austin’s (1962) and Butler’s (1990, 1993, 1997) concept of performativity as well as strategy-as-practice research (Balogun et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) we ask: How is persuasion achieved by strategic actors during strategy formation processes? To explore verbal and bodily communication empirically we developed an experimental setting in a small high-tech company located in Germany in December, 2012. The Results indicate that (1) during critical incidents – when perspectives clash – actors use arguments to gain persuasion. (2) The data illustrates that independently of their hierarchical position within the company, strategic actors show an equal distribution of argumentative techniques.

Democratic Legitimation of Trade Policy Tomorrow: TTIP, Democracy and Market in the Swiss Constitution

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are increasingly more concerned with regulatory convergence, rather than trade liberalisation through elimination of tariffs. This appears to result more often in so-called dynamic trade agreements, which still evolve after adoption. Further economic integration in democracies, however, depends on the support of the constituency. This article takes a closer look at the democratic legitimation of global economic integration in a case study on Switzerland. It finds that the current principles and institutions of democracy in Switzerland are unlikely to fully accommodate the new regulatory challenges of dynamic FTAs.