Self-licensing effects on food choices

Recalling an egoistic act nudges people to choose healthy over unhealthy food options. Conversely, participants preferred unhealthy over healthy food options when they recalled an altruistic deed. Consistent with this choice pattern participants were willing to pay more for healthy than for unhealthy options. This experiment extends the self-licensing literature.

Impact of family control/influence on stakeholders' perceptions of benevolence

This article proposes a model explaining how family control/influence in an organization affects individual stakeholders’ perceptions of benevolence. The model suggests two effects. First, based on socioemotional wealth research, we propose that family control/influence positively affects stakeholders’ perceptions of benevolence through the benevolent behavior that the organization shows toward its stakeholders. However, this effect can be negatively influenced if the family’s socioemotional wealth goals in terms of “Family control and influence” and/or “Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession” are at risk. Second, we argue that family control/influence, to the extent that it is perceivable to the stakeholder, influences stakeholders’ perceptions of benevolence through categorization processes. However, the impact of perceivable family control/influence on stakeholders’ perceptions of benevolence is not straightforward but instead hinges on a set of individual-level contingency factors of the stakeholder, such as stakeholders’ family business in-group membership, stakeholders’ secondhand category information, and stakeholders’ firsthand category information.

Which Combinations Of New Venture Firms Resources Payoff? A Configurational Perspective

Baldauf, Artur; Schweiger, Simone A.; Wuethrich, Adrian

The Nestlé crash

On November 17, 1988, the board of directors of Nestlé AG decided to allow foreign investors to hold Nestlé registered stock, reversing a longstanding practice. This decision had a tremendous impact on the prices of the firm's three classes of common stock, as well as on the prices of several other corporations traded on the Zürich stock exchange. These price changes can be explained by the hypothesis that demand curves slope down.

Optimal Scheduling of Work-Content-Constrained Projects

The execution of a project requires resources that are generally scarce. Classical approaches to resource allocation assume that the usage of these resources by an individual project activity is constant during the execution of that activity; in practice, however, the project manager may vary resource usage over time within prescribed bounds. This variation gives rise to the project scheduling problem which consists in allocating the scarce resources to the project activities over time such that the project duration is minimized, the total number of resource units allocated equals the prescribed work content of each activity, and various work-content-related constraints are met. We formulate this problem for the first time as a mixed-integer linear program. Our computational results for a standard test set from the literature indicate that this model outperforms the state-of-the-art solution methods for this problem.

Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Say on Pay: ein Überblick über Gestaltungsoptionen, ökonomische Konsequenzen und Erkenntnisse aus Empirie und Laborexperimenten

Unter dem Stichwort Say on Pay (SoP) haben in den letzen Jahren die meisten Länder der EU und die USA den Aktionären Abstimmungsrechte im Zusammenhang mit der Vergütung des Top-Managements eingeräumt. Zwischen den einzelnen Ländern bestehen jedoch erhebliche Unterschiede hinsichtlich der konkreten Ausgestaltung des SoP. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Wirkungen unterschiedlicher Gestaltungsoptionen des SoP auf die Anreizgestaltung und den Nutzen des Managements und der Aktionäre im Rahmen eines einfachen linearen Agency Modells. Dabei erweisen sich das vorvertragliche bindende SoP und das bedingt verpflichtende, nachvertragliche bindende SoP gegenüber den anderen untersuchten Varianten als überlegen. Während das konsultative SoP an seiner mangelnden Durchsetzbarkeit leidet, bietet das nachvertragliche bindende SoP Anreize für opportunistisches Verhalten auf Seiten der Aktionäre und führt deshalb zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten. In Ergänzung der Modellanalyse wird ein Überblick über die wichtigsten empirischen und experimentellen Studien zum Thema SoP gegeben und deren Inhalt im Lichte der Modellergebnisse diskutiert. Most countries of the European Union as well as the US recently introduced shareholder votes on the remuneration of executives, also referred to as “Say on Pay” (SoP). Interestingly, legislators in different jurisdictions opted for quite dissimilar voting right regimes. We provide an overview of the main regulatory approaches and discuss the potential impact of variations in SoP design on the structure of compensation contracts and the utility of shareholders and executives. We find that pre-contractual SoP and conditional post-contractual SoP with binding consequences are in the best interest of shareholders. By contrast, advisory SoP typically suffers from lacking enforceability. We also find that post-contractual SoP with binding consequences results in efficiency losses because it fuels moral hazard on the part of shareholders. We complement the theoretical analysis with a discussion of recent empirical and experimental studies on Say on Pay.