Mapping tibiofemoral gonarthrosis: an MRI analysis of non-traumatic knee cartilage defects

OBJECTIVE Arthroscopy is "the gold standard" for the diagnosis of knee cartilage lesions. However, it is invasive and expensive, and displays all the potential complications of an open surgical procedure. Ultra-high-field MRI now offers good opportunities for the indirect assessment of the integrity and structural changes of joint cartilage of the knee. The goal of the present study is to determine the site of early cartilaginous lesions in adults with non-traumatic knee pain. METHODS 3-T MRI examinations of 200 asymptomatic knees with standard and three-dimensional double-echo steady-state (3D-DESS) cartilage-specific sequences were prospectively studied for early degenerative lesions of the tibiofemoral joint. Lesions were classified and mapped using the modified Outerbridge and modified International Cartilage Repair Society classifications. RESULTS A total of 1437 lesions were detected: 56.1% grade I, 33.5% grade II, 7.2% grade III and 3.3% grade IV. Cartographically, grade I lesions were most common in the anteromedial tibial areas; grade II lesions in the anteromedial L5 femoral areas; and grade III in the centromedial M2 femoral areas. CONCLUSION 3-T MRI with standard and 3D-DESS cartilage-specific sequences demonstrated that areas predisposed to early osteoarthritis are the central, lateral and ventromedial tibial plateau, as well as the central and medial femoral condyle. ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE In contrast with previous studies reporting early cartilaginous lesions in the medial tibial compartment and/or in the medial femoral condyle, this study demonstrates that, regardless of grade, lesions preferentially occur at the L5 and M4 tibial and L5 and L2 femoral areas of the knee joint.

Long-term ticagrelor monotherapy versus standard dual antiplatelet therapy followed by aspirin monotherapy in patients undergoing biolimus-eluting stent implantation: rationale and design of the GLOBAL LEADERS trial

AIMS The GLOBAL LEADERS trial is a superiority study in patients undergoing percutaneous coronary intervention, with a uniform use of Biolimus A9-eluting stents (BES) and bivalirudin. GLOBAL LEADERS was designed to assess whether a 24-month antithrombotic regimen with ticagrelor and one month of acetylsalicylic acid (ASA), compared to conventional dual antiplatelet therapy (DAPT), improves outcomes. METHODS AND RESULTS Patients (n >16,000) are randomised (1:1 ratio) to ticagrelor 90 mg twice daily for 24 months plus ASA ≤100 mg for one month versus DAPT with either ticagrelor (acute coronary syndrome) or clopidogrel (stable coronary artery disease) for 12 months plus ASA ≤100 mg for 24 months. The primary outcome is a composite of all-cause mortality or non-fatal, new Q-wave myocardial infarction at 24 months. The key safety endpoint is investigator-reported class 3 or 5 bleeding according to the Bleeding Academic Research Consortium (BARC) definitions. Sensitivity analysis will be carried out to explore potential differences in outcome across geographic regions and according to specific angiographic and clinical risk estimates. CONCLUSIONS The GLOBAL LEADERS trial aims to assess the role of ticagrelor as a single antiplatelet agent after a short course of DAPT for the long-term prevention of cardiac adverse events, across a wide spectrum of patients, following BES implantation.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Bevacizumab continuation versus no continuation after first-line chemotherapy plus bevacizumab in patients with metastatic colorectal cancer: a randomized phase III non-inferiority trial (SAKK 41/06)

BACKGROUND Chemotherapy plus bevacizumab is a standard option for first-line treatment in metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC) patients. We assessed whether no continuation is non-inferior to continuation of bevacizumab after completing first-line chemotherapy. PATIENTS AND METHODS In an open-label, phase III multicentre trial, patients with mCRC without disease progression after 4-6 months of standard first-line chemotherapy plus bevacizumab were randomly assigned to continuing bevacizumab at a standard dose or no treatment. CT scans were done every 6 weeks until disease progression. The primary end point was time to progression (TTP). A non-inferiority limit for hazard ratio (HR) of 0.727 was chosen to detect a difference in TTP of 6 weeks or less, with a one-sided significance level of 10% and a statistical power of 85%. RESULTS The intention-to-treat population comprised 262 patients: median follow-up was 36.7 months. The median TTP was 4.1 [95% confidence interval (CI) 3.1-5.4] months for bevacizumab continuation versus 2.9 (95% CI 2.8-3.8) months for no continuation; HR 0.74 (95% CI 0.58-0.96). Non-inferiority could not be demonstrated. The median overall survival was 25.4 months for bevacizumab continuation versus 23.8 months (HR 0.83; 95% CI 0.63-1.1; P = 0.2) for no continuation. Severe adverse events were uncommon in the bevacizumab continuation arm. Costs for bevacizumab continuation were estimated to be ∼30,000 USD per patient. CONCLUSIONS Non-inferiority could not be demonstrated for treatment holidays versus continuing bevacizumab monotheray, after 4-6 months of standard first-line chemotherapy plus bevacizumab. Based on no impact on overall survival and increased treatment costs, bevacizumab as a single agent is of no meaningful therapeutic value. More efficient treatment approaches are needed to maintain control of stabilized disease following induction therapy. CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00544700.

Induction chemoradiation in stage IIIA/N2 non-small-cell lung cancer: a phase 3 randomised trial

BACKGROUND One of the standard options in the treatment of stage IIIA/N2 non-small-cell lung cancer is neoadjuvant chemotherapy and surgery. We did a randomised trial to investigate whether the addition of neoadjuvant radiotherapy improves outcomes. METHODS We enrolled patients in 23 centres in Switzerland, Germany and Serbia. Eligible patients had pathologically proven, stage IIIA/N2 non-small-cell lung cancer and were randomly assigned to treatment groups in a 1:1 ratio. Those in the chemoradiotherapy group received three cycles of neoadjuvant chemotherapy (100 mg/m(2) cisplatin and 85 mg/m(2) docetaxel) followed by radiotherapy with 44 Gy in 22 fractions over 3 weeks, and those in the control group received neoadjuvant chemotherapy alone. All patients were scheduled to undergo surgery. Randomisation was stratified by centre, mediastinal bulk (less than 5 cm vs 5 cm or more), and weight loss (5% or more vs less than 5% in the previous 6 months). The primary endpoint was event-free survival. Analyses were done by intention to treat. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00030771. FINDINGS From 2001 to 2012, 232 patients were enrolled, of whom 117 were allocated to the chemoradiotherapy group and 115 to the chemotherapy group. Median event-free survival was similar in the two groups at 12·8 months (95% CI 9·7-22·9) in the chemoradiotherapy group and 11·6 months (8·4-15·2) in the chemotherapy group (p=0·67). Median overall survival was 37·1 months (95% CI 22·6-50·0) with radiotherapy, compared with 26·2 months (19·9-52·1) in the control group. Chemotherapy-related toxic effects were reported in most patients, but 91% of patients completed three cycles of chemotherapy. Radiotherapy-induced grade 3 dysphagia was seen in seven (7%) patients. Three patients died in the control group within 30 days after surgery. INTERPRETATION Radiotherapy did not add any benefit to induction chemotherapy followed by surgery. We suggest that one definitive local treatment modality combined with neoadjuvant chemotherapy is adequate to treat resectable stage IIIA/N2 non-small-cell lung cancer. FUNDING Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI), Swiss Cancer League, and Sanofi.

Non-canonical actions of Nogo-A and its receptors

Nogo-A is a myelin associated protein and one of the most potent neurite growth inhibitors in the central nervous system. Interference with Nogo-A signaling has thus been investigated as therapeutic target to promote functional recovery in CNS injuries. Still, the finding that Nogo-A presents a fairly ubiquitous expression in many types of neurons in different brain regions, in the eye and even in the inner ear suggests for further functions besides the neurite growth repression. Indeed, a growing number of studies identified a variety of functions including regulation of neuronal stem cells, modulation of microglial activity, inhibition of angiogenesis and interference with memory formation. Aim of the present commentary is to draw attention on these less well-known and sometimes controversial roles of Nogo-A. Furthermore, we are addressing the role of Nogo-A in neuropathological conditions such as ischemic stroke, schizophrenia and neurodegenerative diseases.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.