Direct metabolites of Ethanol as biological markers of alcohol use: Basic aspects and applications

In addition to self reports and questionnaires, biomarkers are of relevance in the diagnosis of and therapy for alcohol use disorders. Traditional biomarkers such as gamma-glutamyl transpeptidase or mean corpuscular volume are indirect biomarkers and are subject to the influence of age, gender and non-alcohol related diseases, among others. Direct metabolites of ethanol such as Ethyl glucuronide (EtG), ethyl sulphate (EtS) and phosphatidylethanol (PEth) are direct metabolites of ethanol, that are positive after intake of ethyl alcohol. They represent useful diagnostic tools for identifying alcohol use even more accurately than traditional biomarkers. Each of these drinking indicators remains positive in serum and urine for a characteristic time spectrum after the cessation of ethanol intake - EtG and EtS in urine up to 7 days, EtG in hair for months after ethanol has left the body. Applications include clinical routine use, emergency room settings, proof of abstinence in alcohol rehabilitation programmes, driving under influence offenders, workplace testing, assessment of alcohol intake in the context of liver transplantation and foetal alcohol syndrome. Due to their properties, they open up new perspectives for prevention, interdisciplinary cooperation, diagnosis of and therapy for alcohol-related problems.

Targeting GRPR in urological cancers--from basic research to clinical application

Gastrin releasing peptide (GRP) is a regulatory peptide that acts through its receptor (GRPR) to regulate physiological functions in various organs. GRPR is overexpressed in neoplastic cells of most prostate cancers and some renal cell cancers and in the tumoral vessels of urinary tract cancers. Thus, targeting these tumours with specifically designed GRP analogues has potential clinical application. Potent and specific radioactive, cytotoxic or nonradioactive GRP analogues have been designed and tested in various animal tumour models with the aim of receptor targeting for tumour diagnosis or therapy. All three categories of compound were found suitable for tumour targeting in animal models. The cytotoxic and nonradioactive GRP analogues have not yet shown convincing tumour-reducing effects in human trials; however, the first clinical studies of radioactive GRP analogues--both agonists and antagonists--suggest promising opportunities for both diagnostic tumour imaging and radiotherapy of prostate and other GRPR-expressing cancers.

Improving the clinical prediction of psychosis by combining ultra-high risk criteria and cognitive basic symptoms

OBJECTIVE Cognitive impairments are regarded as a core component of schizophrenia. However, the cognitive dimension of psychosis is hardly considered by ultra-high risk (UHR) criteria. Therefore, we studied whether the combination of symptomatic UHR criteria and the basic symptom criterion "cognitive disturbances" (COGDIS) is superior in predicting first-episode psychosis. METHOD In a naturalistic 48-month follow-up study, the conversion rate to first-episode psychosis was studied in 246 outpatients of an early detection of psychosis service (FETZ); thereby, the association between conversion, and the combined and singular use of UHR criteria and COGDIS was compared. RESULTS Patients that met UHR criteria and COGDIS (n=127) at baseline had a significantly higher risk of conversion (hr=0.66 at month 48) and a shorter time to conversion than patients that met only UHR criteria (n=37; hr=0.28) or only COGDIS (n=30; hr=0.23). Furthermore, the risk of conversion was higher for the combined criteria than for UHR criteria (n=164; hr=0.56 at month 48) and COGDIS (n=158; hr=0.56 at month 48) when considered irrespective of each other. CONCLUSIONS Our findings support the merits of considering both COGDIS and UHR criteria in the early detection of persons who are at high risk of developing a first psychotic episode within 48months. Applying both sets of criteria improves sensitivity and individual risk estimation, and may thereby support the development of stage-targeted interventions. Moreover, since the combined approach enables the identification of considerably more homogeneous at-risk samples, it should support both preventive and basic research.

The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences.

Form Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements

Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.

Expressing and Amplifying Positive Emotions Facilitate Goal Attainment in Workplace Interactions

Expressing emotions has social functions; it provides information, affects social interactions, and shapes relationships with others. Expressing positive emotions could be a strategic tool for improving goal attainment during social interactions at work. Such effects have been found in research on social contagion, impression management, and emotion work. However, expressing emotions one does not feel entails the risk of being perceived as inauthentic. This risk may well be worth taking when the emotions felt are negative, as expressing negative emotions usually has negative effects. When experiencing positive emotions, however, expressing them authentically promises benefits, and the advantage of amplifying them is not so obvious. We postulated that expressing, and amplifying, positive emotions would foster goal attainment in social interactions at work, particularly when dealing with superiors. Analyses are based on 494 interactions involving the pursuit of a goal by 113 employes. Multilevel analyses, including polynomial analyses, show that authentic display of positive emotions supported goal attainment throughout. However, amplifying felt positive emotions promoted goal attainment only in interactions with superiors, but not with colleagues. Results are discussed with regard to the importance of hierarchy for detecting, and interpreting, signs of strategic display of positive emotions.

In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Abstract: In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. We then outline an alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes.

Emotions and Values

There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).