The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy: Ideological Roots of Inequality

The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy examines how implementing American tropes in policy design inadvertently frustrates policy goals. It investigates multiple market-oriented designs including funding for private organizations to deliver public services, funding for individuals to buy services, and policies incentivizing or mandating private actors to provide social policy. The author shows that these solutions often not only fail to achieve social goals, but, in fact, actively undermine them, for example saddling the poor with debt or encouraging discrimination. The book carefully details the mechanisms through which this occurs, for example a mismatch between program goals and either contract terms or individual preferences. The author examines several policies in depth, covering universal social insurance programs like healthcare and pensions, as well as smaller interventions like programs for the homeless. The author builds the argument using detailed empirical evidence as well as anecdote, keeping the book accessible and entertaining.

Managing social policy under federalism: The challenges of hybrid funding and program delivery

This paper discusses generally the question of the level of government that should be used to administer different social policies. The chapter focuses on the Medicaid program, looking at recent state-level changes in health insurance for the poor and long-term care policy. Particular attention will be paid to the question of how states have used their new freedoms to outsource public insurance to the private sector and on the consequent differences in outcomes across states. Notably, this paper will be drawn from my forthcoming book “The American Myth of Markets in Social Policy” (Palgrave, MacMillan, November, 2015).

Coalition Formation in Parliament and during the Policy Process

In modern democratic systems, usually no single collective actor is able to decisively influence political decision-making. Instead, actors with similar preferences form coalitions in order to gain more influence in the policy process. In the Swiss political system in particular, institutional veto points and the consensual culture of policy-making provide strong incentives for actors to form large coalitions. Coalitions are thus especially important in political decision-making in Switzerland, and are accordingly a central focus of this book. According to one of our core claims - to understand the actual functioning of Swiss consensus democracy - one needs to extend the analysis beyond formal institutions to also include informal procedures and practices. Coalitions of actors play a crucial role in this respect. They are a cornerstone of decision-making structures, and they inform us about patterns of conflict, collaboration and power among actors. Looking at coalitions is all the more interesting in the Swiss political system, since the coalition structure is supposed to vary across policy processes. Given the absence of a fixed government coalition, actors need to form new coalitions in each policy process.

Political Decision-Making in Switzerland. The Consensus Model under Pressure

This in-depth study of the decision-making processes of the early 2000s shows that the Swiss consensus democracy has changed considerably. Power relations have transformed, conflict has increased, coalitions have become more unstable and outputs less predictable. Yet these challenges to consensus politics provide opportunities for innovation.