UNDERSTANDING TRENDS ASSOCIATED WITH CLOUDS IN IRRADIATED EXOPLANETS

Unlike previously explored relationships between the properties of hot Jovian atmospheres, the geometric albedo and the incident stellar flux do not exhibit a clear correlation, as revealed by our re-analysis of Q0-Q14 Kepler data. If the albedo is primarily associated with the presence of clouds in these irradiated atmospheres, a holistic modeling approach needs to relate the following properties: the strength of stellar irradiation (and hence the strength and depth of atmospheric circulation), the geometric albedo (which controls both the fraction of starlight absorbed and the pressure level at which it is predominantly absorbed), and the properties of the embedded cloud particles (which determine the albedo). The anticipated diversity in cloud properties renders any correlation between the geometric albedo and the stellar flux weak and characterized by considerable scatter. In the limit of vertically uniform populations of scatterers and absorbers, we use an analytical model and scaling relations to relate the temperature-pressure profile of an irradiated atmosphere and the photon deposition layer and to estimate whether a cloud particle will be lofted by atmospheric circulation. We derive an analytical formula for computing the albedo spectrum in terms of the cloud properties, which we compare to the measured albedo spectrum of HD 189733b by Evans et al. Furthermore, we show that whether an optical phase curve is flat or sinusoidal depends on whether the particles are small or large as defined by the Knudsen number. This may be an explanation for why Kepler-7b exhibits evidence for the longitudinal variation in abundance of condensates, while Kepler-12b shows no evidence for the presence of condensates despite the incident stellar flux being similar for both exoplanets. We include an "observer's cookbook" for deciphering various scenarios associated with the optical phase curve, the peak offset of the infrared phase curve, and the geometric albedo.

Veterinary hemodialysis: advances in management and technology.

Hemodialysis (HD) is a renal replacement therapy that can enable recovery of patients in acute kidney failure and prolong survival for patients with end-stage kidney failure. HD is also uniquely suited for management of refractory volume overload and removal of certain toxins from the bloodstream. Over the last decade, veterinary experience with HD has deepened and refined and its geographic availability has increased. As awareness of the usefulness and availability of dialytic therapy increases among veterinarians and pet owners and the number of veterinary dialysis facilities increases, dialytic management will become the standard of advanced care for animals with severe intractable uremia.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Blocking of LFA-1 enhances expansion of Th17 cells induced by human CD14(+) CD16(++) nonclassical monocytes.

Among human peripheral blood (PB) monocyte (Mo) subsets, the classical CD14(++) CD16(-) (cMo) and intermediate CD14(++) CD16(+) (iMo) Mos are known to activate pathogenic Th17 responses, whereas the impact of nonclassical CD14(+) CD16(++) Mo (nMo) on T-cell activation has been largely neglected. The aim of this study was to obtain new mechanistic insights on the capacity of Mo subsets from healthy donors (HDs) to activate IL-17(+) T-cell responses in vitro, and assess whether this function was maintained or lost in states of chronic inflammation. When cocultured with autologous CD4(+) T cells in the absence of TLR-2/NOD2 agonists, PB nMos from HDs were more efficient stimulators of IL-17-producing T cells, as compared to cMo. These results could not be explained by differences in Mo lifespan and cytokine profiles. Notably, however, the blocking of LFA-1/ICAM-1 interaction resulted in a significant increase in the percentage of IL-17(+) T cells expanded in nMo/T-cell cocultures. As compared to HD, PB Mo subsets of patients with rheumatoid arthritis were hampered in their T-cell stimulatory capacity. Our new insights highlight the role of Mo subsets in modulating inflammatory T-cell responses and suggest that nMo could become a critical therapeutic target against IL-17-mediated inflammatory diseases.

The HARPS search for southern extra-solar planets XXXVII. Five new long-period giant planets and a system update

We describe radial-velocity time series obtained by HARPS on the 3.60 m telescope in La Silla (ESO, Chile) over ten years and report the discovery of five new giant exoplanets in distant orbits; these new planets orbit the stars HD 564, HD 30669, HD 108341, and BD -114672. Their periods range from 492 to 1684 days, semi-major axes range from 1.2 to 2.69 AU, and eccentricities range from 0 to 0.85. Their minimum mass ranges from 0.33 to 3.5 MJup. We also refine the parameters of two planets announced previously around HD 113538, based on a longer series of measurements. The planets have a period of 663 ± 8 and 1818 ± 25 days, orbital eccentricities of 0.14 ± 0.08 and 0.20 ± 0.04, and minimum masses of 0.36 ± 0.04 and 0.93 ± 0.06 MJup. Finally, we report the discovery of a new hot-Jupiter planet around an active star, HD 103720; the planet has a period of 4.5557 ± 0.0001 days and a minimum mass of 0.62 ± 0.025 MJup. We discuss the fundamental parameters of these systems and limitations due to stellar activity in quiet stars with typical 2 m s-1 radial velocity precision.